Air power in humanitarian intervention: Kosovo and Libya in comparative perspective

It would be hard to overstate the importance of air power in humanitarian intervention (HI) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Yet, the role of air power in HI and R2P has been understudied. This article seeks to remedy the lack of systematic investigation. It does so by developing a framework for assessing the effectiveness of air power during military operations in HI and R2P and applies it to NATO’s air campaigns in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) and Libya (Operation Unified Protector). Upon examination NATO is revealed to have fared better in Libya than Kosovo in positively accomplishing its stated humanitarian objectives, minimizing collateral damage and reducing the costs for the interveners, all of which are aspects considered by the model. The relative effectiveness of Operations Unified Protector is generally attributed to geography, diplomacy and technology. It is argued that better ground support, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and burden sharing are needed to enhance the utility of air power in HI and R2P even further.     

The subversion of the Bulgarian defence system – the Russian way

Russia has long been pursuing an intended and calculated policy of keeping enough influence in Bulgaria in order to have control over national decisions. Together with the economic, energy, political and information tools used by Russia in its hybrid war against Bulgaria and in its bid to achieve an enduring “state capture,” defence is also a distinct target of Russian subversion now. A list of noticeable subversive actions with tangible effects can be summarised, ranging from fuelling division and manipulating public opinion, preventing the strengthening of the NATO position in the Black Sea, sabotaging defence reform to various options of subverting the modernisation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and seeking new ways to keep legacy Soviet military equipment in operation as long as possible. This issue must be urgently addressed both nationally and in NATO.     

Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War

Recent tensions between Russia and the United States have sparked debate over the value of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One controversy surrounds the extent to which NATO raises the risk of war through entrapment—a concept that scholars invoke to describe how states might drag their allies into undesirable military conflicts. Yet scholars have advanced different, even conflicting arguments about how entrapment risks arise. I offer a typology that distinguishes between the mechanisms through which entrapment risks allegedly emerge on the basis of their institutional, systemic, reputational, and transnational ideological sources. I use the 2008 Russo-Georgian War to illustrate how the purported mechanisms of entrapment fare in elucidating that conflict. In analyzing why entrapment risks emerge, and thinking counterfactually about The 2008 War, I argue that scholars need to disentangle the various mechanisms that drive both alliance formation and war to make sure that entrapment risks do indeed exist.     

革命歌曲在建设现代化武警中的作用

革命歌曲具有催人奋进的独特精神力量,是革命军人战斗力的“力量倍增器”。在建设现代化武警过程中,革命歌曲可以发挥理想导引功能、信念塑造功能、团结凝聚功能、精神激励功能、情操陶冶功能。     

Making defense planning meaningful: the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense

Hungary, a former communist state, adapted a Western-style defense planning system during the 1990s and 2000s. Although on the surface the elements of this planning system were similar to the planning programming budgeting system (PPBS) developed by the US Department of Defense, strategic guidance for defense planning has not been properly developed until recently. Thus, albeit PPBS-based defense plans were developed in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense (Hungarian MoD) regularly, they lacked both an expression of clear priorities and strategic focus. This article delineates the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian MoD concentrating on current developments, and introduces the newly elaborated analytical concepts and tools, which helped to create needed strategic guidance in Hungary.     

新形势下加强和改进武警审计工作的思考

武警审计是政府审计体系的重要组成部分,在监督经费运行、规范军事经济秩序方面发挥着重要作用,但随着军事经济改革的不断深入、国家审计制度的不断创新,武警审计在审计理念、审计目标、审计手段等方面存在一定问题。从提高审计意识、调整审计体制、适应审计发展趋势三个方面探讨了解决上述问题的对策。     

新疆边境地区恐怖活动特点及打击对策

近年来以“东突”为主的恐怖势力在新疆边境地区活动十分猖獗,呈现出联合,渗透对象多元、低龄等特点。公安边防部队地处边境一线,任务艰巨,责任重大,要通过加强反恐情报建设、健全装备保障体制、加强战法研究与战术训练、加强边境管理以及加强国际警务合作等多种对策,不断提高部队打击和防范恐怖活动的能力与水平,为维护边疆稳定做出贡献。     

Can Smart Defense work? A suggested approach to increasing risk- and burden-sharing within NATO

“Smart Defense” is NATO's new approach to risk- and burden-sharing, which has been a chronic problem within the alliance since the 1950s. Numerous solutions have been proposed, but initiatives resulting in more equitable burden-sharing have never been fully implemented. There are two driving forces influencing a county's willingness to support such initiatives – the economic theory of alliances and the risks posed by the implementation of capability sharing. The authors examine each of these and propose that rather than aiming for group consensus on the production of capabilities, NATO should focus on interoperability through support functions. This approach provides the most likely solution for connecting the forces, doctrine, procedures, standards and other factors of joint capability production such that country leaders find the risks of doing so to be politically and militarily acceptable.     

Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–2009

During their 60 years within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Denmark and Norway have experienced both high and low standings within the alliance, which can be attributed to both external and internal factors influencing their alliance strategies. During the ‘first’ Cold War and Détente, 1949–79, Danish and Norwegian alliance strategy aimed to simultaneously deter and reassure the Soviet Union. During the ‘second’ Cold War, 1979–89, Danish alliance policy became driven by domestic politics, and the Danish government was forced to formally dissociate the country from NATO's policies. Norway was not uncritical, but held a much lower profile. After the Cold War this situation shifted. Denmark successfully rehabilitated itself as a loyal and dependable ally by responding to the call for focusing on out-of-area operations. Meanwhile, Norway's continued focus on the lingering Russian Threat made the country seem out-of-touch with priorities in the post-Cold War alliance, and domestic politics prevented a more active out-of-area engagement.     

Lessons learned: The Dutch ‘Stay-Behind’ organization 1945–1992

Right after World War II, two separate initiatives were taken in the Netherlands to establish a stay-behind organization – or, rather, two stay-behind organizations. Both initiatives were purely Dutch, and both groups, remnants from wartime Dutch intelligence and sabotage organizations, wanted to liaise exclusively with the British. Only later did the Americans become members of what then came to be known as the Tripartite Committee. After a period of about 15 years, during which the Chief of the General Staff loosely coordinated both organizations, known as O (for Operations) and I (for Intelligence), a crisis broke out. The question was whether the two organizations should be amalgamated or not. After much discussion it was decided to keep them separate, but more closely coordinated. The first coordinator of this new type, a non-military man, was appointed in 1967. From that moment on the Dutch stay-behind organization, under supervision of highly respected civilian authorities, was able to perfect its organizational structure. The introduction, during the 1980s, of new specially designed radio equipment made special wireless operators superfluous. This development made for a leaner and more efficient organization.

After the Berlin Wall had come down, and in the wake of the ‘Gladio’ affair in Italy, the Dutch stay-behind organization was dissolved.