Britain and Hiroshima

Most historical accounts of the atomic bombings of Japan show little interest in Britain's explicit authorization for the attacks. Meanwhile, the few historians who have attempted to explain it rely on a unitary, rational actor model of the British state that is misleading. This article demonstrates that high-ranking British officials became anxious early on about the strategic consequences of a peremptory use of the new weapon. Therefore, especially over the course of 1944 they sought to engage Washington on the linked questions of the bomb's wartime use and its postwar control. However, these officials' initiatives were rebuffed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who paved the way to the bombings based on a fervent desire for Anglo-American integration, and on a dim understanding of the bomb's revolutionary potential.     

Skewness correction X̄ and R charts for skewed distributions

This paper proposes a skewness correction (SC) method for constructing the and R control charts for skewed process distributions. Their asymmetric control limits (about the central line) are based on the degree of skewness estimated from the subgroups, and no parameter assumptions are made on the form of process distribution. These charts are simply adjustments of the conventional Shewhart control charts. Moreover, the chart is almost the same as the Shewhart chart if the process distribution is known to be symmetrical. The new charts are compared with the Shewhart charts and weighted variance (WV) control charts. When the process distribution is in some neighborhood of Weibull, lognormal, Burr or binomial family, simulation shows that the SC control charts have Type I risk (i.e., probability of a false alarm) closer to 0.27% of the normal case. Even in the case where the process distribution is exponential with known mean, not only the control limits and Type I risk, but also the Type II risk of the SC charts are closer to those of the exact and R charts than those of the WV and Shewhart charts. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 555–573, 2003     

The strategy of the organisation of Ukrainian nationalists in its quest for a sovereign state, 1939–1950

ABSTRACT

The armed resistance offered by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) to the Soviet state was the toughest internal political challenge that the Soviet regime faced from World War II to the 1980s. However, OUN’s grand strategy was based on self-delusion and was, therefore, always irrational. It resulted in misinterpretation of the sentiments of Ukrainians and the international situation, collaboration with Nazi Germany despite incompatible goals, counterproductive ethnic violence and sweeping terror against alleged Soviet collaborators. Local civilians rather than the representatives of the Soviet regime were OUN’s primary target; this alienated most residents of Western Ukraine.