排序方式: 共有75条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
41.
冯平 《装甲兵工程学院学报》2001,15(2):36-41,46
提出了一种新的分析具有分解形式的高维非线性电路平衡点全局渐近稳定的方法.这种方法以矩阵分解为工具,结合平衡点的渐近稳定判据,用分解矩阵的稳定性决定平衡点的全局渐近稳定性.与目前该问题所采用的LIYAPUNOV直接法相比,该方法具有无须判断平衡点的唯一性,判别方法直接明了等优点.电路维数越大时,此方法越有其优势.同时,该方法对于其他形式的非线性系统的分析,也有重要的启发性及应用价值. 相似文献
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针对军事欺骗战法定量分析困难的问题,采用基于贝叶斯统计推断和博弈均衡分析的数学方法,在理论上为解决此难题提供了一种可行的方法.该方法首先定义基本概率矩阵,然后根据贝叶斯原理为交战双方构造用于统计推断的主观概率矩阵,并在由两个主观概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链与实施军事欺骗机会之间建立对应关系,再将此关系推广到基本概率矩阵,即是否存在实施军事欺骗的机会将由基本概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链决定.对理论成果的初步应用表明:通过分析由战场情报信息构成的基本概率矩阵的偏序链,可以科学地运用军事欺骗和反军事欺骗战法. 相似文献
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Colin Jennings 《Defence and Peace Economics》2016,27(3):404-422
This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence which does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be a Nash equilibrium it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace. 相似文献
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研究如下一类具有标准发生率的SI型传染病模型{ds/dt=rS(1-(S+I)/K-β SI/(S+I), dI/dt=βSI/(S+I)-dI。应用微分方程定性理论,给出了该系统地方病平衡点、无病平衡点和总人口消亡平衡点的全局渐近稳定的充分条件。 相似文献
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李雅普诺夫运动稳定性与平衡状态稳定性的关系 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
齐晓慧 《军械工程学院学报》2002,14(4):35-38
稳定性是系统分析的重要内容 ,针对在系统稳定性分析中 ,运动稳定性和平衡状态稳定性之间常易于混淆的问题 ,详细分析了两种稳定性之间内在本质联系 ,给出了从一种稳定性过渡到另一种稳定性的方法 相似文献
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描述战斗毁伤"规模效应"的Lanchester模型默认作战体系内部是"完美的"。本文扬弃此假设,首次从作战体系内部"共识"涌现的视角提出了一个模拟体系对抗价值链的网络"同步效应"模型,研究了战场变化、个体/群体认知、自同步与对抗均衡等概念的网络拓扑和权值演化形式,并发现在对抗均衡条件下无标度网络具有"同步脆弱性"。 相似文献
48.
张先剑 《国防科技大学学报》2019,41(2):185-190
大规模作战具有高动态、非完全信息和不确定性,在分析归纳目前解决动态武器目标分配问题的一系列方法的基础上,尝试构建基于双方动态博弈的攻防对抗综合数学模型,并利用纳什均衡和帕累托最优算法进行分阶段求解。结果表明,该数学模型和博弈论方法结合能够有效解决武器目标动态分配问题。 相似文献
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We study the competition problem of purchase and multiretrieval of perishable seasonal produce, where wholesalers purchase and stock their products in the first period, and then retrieve and sell them in subsequent periods. We first consider the duopoly case and assume that the prices are exogenous and fluctuate. In each period, after the price realization, the wholesalers retrieve some stock from their warehouses to satisfy their demands. One wholesaler's unsatisfied customers can switch to another and be satisfied by its left retrieved products. Any unsold retrieved stock has no salvage value and any unsatisfied demand is lost. The unretrieved stock is carried to the next period at a perishable rate. The wholesalers compete for the substitute demand by determining their own purchase and retrieval quantities. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and that the Nash equilibrium strategy has the simple “sell-down-to” structure. We also consider the general N-person game and show the existence of the Nash equilibrium, and characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy for the symmetric case. In addition, we consider the case with endogenous prices, and show that the problem reduces to a repeated newsvendor game with price and inventory competition. We derive the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to examine the impacts of the model parameters on the equilibrium outcomes and to generate managerial insights. 相似文献
50.
We consider the single‐server constant retrial queue with a Poisson arrival process and exponential service and retrial times. This system has not waiting space, so the customers that find the server busy are forced to abandon the system, but they can leave their contact details. Hence, after a service completion, the server seeks for a customer among those that have unsuccessfully applied for service but left their contact details, at a constant retrial rate. We assume that the arriving customers that find the server busy decide whether to leave their contact details or to balk based on a natural reward‐cost structure, which incorporates their desire for service as well as their unwillingness to wait. We examine the customers' behavior, and we identify the Nash equilibrium joining strategies. We also study the corresponding social and profit maximization problems. We consider separately the observable case where the customers get informed about the number of customers waiting for service and the unobservable case where they do not receive this information. Several extensions of the model are also discussed. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011 相似文献