Nuclear opportunism: A theory of how states use nuclear weapons in international politics

How do states use nuclear weapons to achieve their goals in international politics? Nuclear weapons can influence state decisions about a range of strategic choices relating to military aggression, the scope of foreign policy objectives, and relations with allies. The article offers a theory to explain why emerging nuclear powers use nuclear weapons to facilitate different foreign policies: becoming more or less aggressive; providing additional support to allies or proxies, seeking independence from allies; or expanding the state’s goals in international politics. I argue that a state’s choices depend on the presence of severe territorial threats or an ongoing war, the presence of allies that provide for the state’s security, and whether the state is increasing in relative power. The conclusion discusses implications of the argument for our understanding of nuclear weapons and the history of proliferation, and nonproliferation policy today.     

How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?

The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This article seeks to answer a basic question: How durable is the taboo? We develop different predictions about norm durability depending on whether the taboo is based primarily on moral logic or strategic logic. We use the comparable case of the norm against strategic bombing in the 20th century to evaluate these hypotheses. The logic and evidence presented in this paper suggest that the norm of nuclear non-use is much more fragile than most analysts understand.     

Noncombatant Immunity and the Ethics of Blockade

This article counters Michael Walzer's argument against tight blockades. It shows that the interdiction of food shipments need not violate the principle of noncombatant immunity. Whether it is morally permissible to impose a strict blockade depends on the circumstances of the target state. The more self-sufficient a country is, the more acceptable it should be for a belligerent to cut the enemy's external lines of supply. The Allied blockade of Germany during the First World War illustrates the argument. Fault in this case should be assigned to the German government for the loss of civilian lives.     

From show of force to naval presence,and back again: the U.S. Navy in the Baltic, 1982–2017

This article discusses roles and missions of the United States Navy with a particular focus on the Baltic Sea. That particular sea has gained renewed political and military attention following Russia's resurgent and increasingly hybrid-offensive foreign policy. Baltic nations, uncertain of what the future holds, ought to look at sea power and maritime missions in the Baltic, as well as US naval presence in Europe, to draw lessons for future posture.     

压水堆运行中ΔT超温度/超功率保护分析

从核电站压水堆动力装置在运行中ΔT超温度 /超功率保护功能出发 ,介绍了压水堆ΔT超温度 /超功率保护系统 ,分析了确定极限限制线以及保护区的方法 ,并对此作出了评价 .     

高功率电磁环境下导弹发射阵地近地面电磁脉冲波形仿真*

主要研究在高功率电磁环境下高空核爆到达导弹预设作战阵地近地面时的电磁脉冲环境.首先给出高空核爆电磁脉冲场近地面计算的理论基础,然后分析不同条件下近地面的电磁脉冲环境参数,编程实现了基于时域有限差分算法的电磁脉冲波形数值仿真,完成了多种特定预设战场环境下的电磁脉冲计算,最后给出由于电磁脉冲武器的发展和HEMP波形表述形式变化,给导弹武器系统抗电磁脉冲性能研究带来的影响和新动态趋势.结论认为:应加强对前沿更陡、强度更强电磁脉冲的抵抗能力,防御重点放在机动作战样式方面,提高战地战时抗毁生存能力.     

概率风险评估在核电站消防安全管理中的应用

介绍了概率风险评估与火灾概率风险评估的基本概念,详细论述了概率风险评估的主要内容及其在核电站火灾安全管理中的应用。     

舰炮反导系统总体结构分析及其优化决策

本文对现有国际上10余种舰炮近程反导系统的总体配置、探测传感器安装位置和种类、杀伤命中机制、自动机型式、弹—炮结合及炮座安装型式等进行了分析对比,并采用价值工程模糊综合决策法(VEFDM)对其总体结构方案进行了优化决策,从而为火炮总体优化设计提供一定的参考依据。     

舰船动力装置经济性的概念、模型及其应用

讨论舰船动力装置经济性的概念、度量指标及计算模型．然后,就其在动力装置的设计参数优选、机型选择和技术状态评定等方面的应用作了讨论．     

水雷磁引信目标识别技术初探

目标识别技术应用于水雷磁引信的关键是目标特征量的提取与分类器的设计。本文提出了舰船目标吨位识别的四维特征向量,设计出完整的二叉树分类器。仿真计算表明,这种特征量的正确识别率在90％以上,为目标识别技术在水雷磁引信中的应用作了有益的探索。