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251.
252.
热推进技术采用小分子量气体作为推进剂可以获取较高的比冲,是具有巨大应用前景的空间推进技术,而提高热推力器换热芯换热效率是目前亟待解决的问题。本文设计了基于层板结构的换热芯,结合层板结构的传热特点与流固耦合传热理论,对层板换热芯传热和工质流动进行了模拟计算。根据耦合传热理论,将层板与工质的导热简化为系统内部边界条件,通过仿真计算得到了层板流固耦合温度场和流场分布特性,工质可以被加热至2300K以上,验证了层板结构用于热推力器换热芯的有效性。 相似文献
253.
小型电动垂直起降飞行器的悬停续航性能取决于推进系统的性能。基于电池、电机、电调的质量模型和螺旋桨的推力-功耗关系,利用电池的恒流放电模型建立了垂直起降飞行器的续航时间评估模型,分析了推进系统参数和有效载荷对飞行器续航性能的影响规律,研究结论可用于电动垂直起降飞行器的总体设计和推进系统选型。 相似文献
254.
Siegfried S. Hecker 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):445-455
North Korea has the bomb but not much of a nuclear arsenal. For fifty years, it pursued the plutonium path to the bomb in parallel with its pursuit of nuclear electricity. My visits to North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex provided a window to its plutonium capabilities. After having made six visits to North Korea, Pyongyang surprised me during my seventh visit last November by showing me a small, modern uranium enrichment plant, which I was told was needed for its new indigenous light water reactor program. However, the same capabilities can be used to produce highly enriched uranium bomb fuel. Following a pattern of having made poor risk-management decisions during much of the past twenty years of diplomacy dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat, Washington remains in a standoff with Pyongyang. 相似文献
255.
Michael Krepon 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):457-463
Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory (vol. 1, 312 pages, $24.95) and A Comparative Perspective (vol. 2, 488 pages, $24.95), edited by William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova. Stanford University Press, 2010. 相似文献
256.
Clifton W. Sherrill 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):31-49
Understanding why the Iranian regime wants to possess nuclear weapons is essential to formulating the best policy to prevent (or perhaps to simply manage) the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. Three general theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—provide a framework for looking at Iran's nuclear motivations. However, contrary to many analyses, the regime's desire to possess nuclear arms stems not from neorealist defensive concerns, but rather from offensive goals driven by domestic politics. The use of extremist Islamism by the Iranian regime to justify its autocratic rule is the primary motivating factor. Accordingly, the outlook for diplomatically addressing the Iranian regime's nuclear aspirations appears dim. 相似文献
257.
Stephen I. Schwartz 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):205-208
This article offers a survey of risks that might arise for strategic stability (defined as a situation with a low probability of major-power war) with the reduction of US and Russian nuclear arsenals to “low numbers” (defined as 1,000 or fewer nuclear weapons on each side). These risks might include US anti-cities targeting strategies that are harmful to the credibility of extended deterrence; renewed European anxiety about a US-Russian condominium; greater vulnerability to Russian noncompliance with agreed obligations; incentives to adopt destabilizing “launch-on-warning” strategies; a potential stimulus to nuclear proliferation; perceptions of a US disengagement from extended deterrence; increased likelihood of non-nuclear arms competitions and conflicts; and controversial pressures on the UK and French nuclear forces. Observers in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states who consider such risks significant have cited four possible measures that might help to contain them: sustained basing of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe; maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture; high-readiness means to reconstitute US nuclear forces; and enhanced US and allied non-nuclear military capabilities. These concrete measures might complement the consultations with the NATO allies that the United States would in all likelihood seek with respect to such important adjustments in its deterrence and defense posture. 相似文献
258.
Elena K. Sokova 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):209-212
Russia holds the largest stocks of civilian highly enriched uranium (HEU) of any country, operating more than fifty research reactors, pulsed reactors, and critical assemblies using HEU, as well as nine HEU-fueled icebreakers. Russia's participation in international efforts to phase out civilian HEU is crucial if international HEU minimization efforts are to succeed. Individual Russian institutes and organizations participate in international programs to replace HEU with low-enriched uranium in Soviet-supplied research reactors, develop alternative fuels, and repatriate fresh and spent HEU fuel from third countries. However, an overarching national policy on HEU phase-out has yet to be adopted. There are many obstacles to obtaining such a commitment from Moscow. At the same time, the ongoing reform of the Russian nuclear industry and plans for expansion of domestic nuclear power generation and for increased nuclear exports create opportunities for securing such a commitment. 相似文献
259.
Torrey Froscher 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):419-424
Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen. Stanford University Press, 2009. 300 pages, $35. 相似文献
260.
Michael D. Cohen 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):433-435
Conventional wisdom states that the stability-instability paradox does not explain the effect of nuclear proliferation on the conflict propensity of South Asia, and that nuclear weapons have had a different and more dangerous impact in South Asia than Cold War Europe. I argue that the paradox explains nuclear South Asia; that the similarities between nuclear South Asia and Cold War Europe are strong; and that conventional instability does not cause revisionist challenges in the long run. I develop and probe a psychological causal mechanism that explains the impact of nuclear weapons on Cold War Europe and South Asia. Following the ten-month mobilized crisis in 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have adopted a more moderate foreign policy toward India after experiencing fear of imminent nuclear war, as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev did forty years earlier. I argue that the stability-instability paradox explains Cold War Europe and nuclear South Asia and will, conditional on Iranian and North Korean revisionism, predict the impact of nuclear weapon development on these states' conflict propensities. 相似文献