Nuclear weapons,existential threats,and the stability–instability paradox

Recent scholarship has largely ignored systematic differences in the existential threats that nuclear-weapon possessors pose to other states. This study theorizes that the capacity to pose existential threats shapes nuclear-armed states’ willingness to use military force against one another. We explore three hypotheses regarding how nuclear-based existential threats can deter conflict or encourage it, including under the conditions proposed by the stability–instability paradox. We rely on a statistical analysis of nuclear-armed dyads from 1950 to 2001 and employ the Nuclear Annihilation Threat (NAT) Index to capture variation in the existential threats nuclear-armed states pose to one another. We find that being able to pose an existential threat to another state emboldens potential initiators to use military force but does not deter attacks. The emboldening effects are particularly strong under the hypothesized conditions of the stability–instability paradox. Our study provides unique contributions to ongoing debates over the political effects of nuclear weapons.     

THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence is sometimes treated as a known quantity—a definite thing that keeps us safe and ensures our security. It has also often been used as a justification for possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence, however, is based on an unexamined notion: the belief that the threat to destroy cities provides decisive leverage. An examination of history (including recent reinterpretations of the bombing of Hiroshima) shows that destroying cities rarely affects the outcome of wars. How is it possible that an action that is unlikely to be decisive can make an effective threat? Recent work on terrorism suggests that attacks against civilians are often not only ineffective but also counterproductive. And a review of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows more obvious failures than obvious successes. Given this, the record of nuclear deterrence is far more problematic than most people assume. If no stronger rationale for keeping these dangerous weapons can be contrived, perhaps they should be banned.     

舰船推进轴系设计方案的综合评估

探讨了将多目标决策理论应用于舰船推进轴系设计方案综合评估的方法 ,建立了推进轴系设计方案的多层次评估模型 ,讨论了基于层次分析法评估指标权值确定的矢量计算方法 ,给出了运用模糊隶属函数的底层典型定量指标的确定方法 .文中论述的方法对舰船推进轴系设计方案的科学评估决策具有实用价值     

故障诊断和容错技术在控制系统中的应用研究

介绍了控制系统的故障诊断和容错控制的基本概念和任务 ,评述了故障诊断和容错控制技术所用的各种方法 ,并对故障诊断和容错控制技术在核动力装置控制系统中应用的可行性进行了探讨 .     

核电磁脉冲模拟器放电回路的数值分析

介绍了核电磁脉冲模拟器的组成和主要参数,分析了核电磁脉冲模拟器回路的暂态过程,讨论了电路参数、火花电阻和陡化开关击穿时刻对脉冲波形的影响,并提出了改善输出波形的方法。     

核动力装置一回路辅助系统失水事故的仿真研究

运用一种操作简便、计算速度快的工具软件对某核动力装置一回路辅助系统典型位置的失水事故进行了仿真.通过分析仿真结果得出不同位置的破口引起不同后果的事故,其中有些事故可以忽略,有些事故则相当严重.     

潜艇电力推进装置的动态模型辨识

将系统辨识的方法应用到潜艇电力推进系统的动态特性的分析中 ,辨识算法采用递推增广矩阵法(RELS) ,并采用变遗忘因子 ,以改善系统的跟踪性能 .研究对象为一模拟电力推进机组 ,在实验数据的基础上建立了该系统励磁控制下的动态模型 .     

吊舱电力推进系统性能评估及设计方法

将吊舱电力推进系统和常规推进系统进行比较,经分析得到在总布置、水动力、生命力和制造维修等方面吊舱电力推进具有优良性能,最后对牵引式吊舱对转桨的设计方法作了介绍．     

有温度反馈时中子动力学方程的新解法

当引入大阶跃反应性时 ,应用去耦合法求解中子动力学方程 ,导出了堆功率新的响应表达式 .与老的表达式相比 ,该表达式的应用范围更广 ,适用于初始功率为任意值