Burden sharing and the future of NATO: wandering between two worlds

The US role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance is a 65-year history of retrenchment and renewal. When Washington has sought a retrenchment from the world, it traditionally increased burden sharing pressure on Europe to do more. During times of increased global ambition, the USA reaffirmed its traditional leadership role in the Alliance and its commitment to NATO effectiveness and relevance. This cycle of NATO retrenchment and renewal, however, is halting. Though the USA will continue to go through periods of relative increases and decreases in security policy ambition, signs point to a permanent defense and security retrenchment in Europe. Germany is the ally singularly capable of filling the resulting security gap. If NATO is to avoid the drift toward irrelevance many critics have predicted, Germany will need to cast off old inhibitions toward security and defense leadership. These trends and their implications for NATO's future are explored through historical case studies and the shifting contemporary security environment.     

Indian and Chinese espionage

India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.     

The case of Donald Rumsfeld: leadership traps in national security

Taking its point of departure in Donald Rumsfeld’s second term as US Secretary of Defense (2001–2006), this article analyses the crisis of strategic leadership in Western national security. Three “traps” are identified that explain why Donald Rumsfeld ultimately was a failure as defence secretary and demonstrate the perils of national security governance. These traps are termed the inquisitor trap, the strong leader trap and the delegation trap. It is argued that our understanding of strategic leadership in national security, particularly in defence, can benefit from insights gained from the study of strategic leadership in business. As such, this article engages the recent trend of merging insights from business and military strategy.     

自由环境下网络数据采集与分析

以小波分析的原理与算法为基础提出一种新的自由环境下网络数据采集与分析方法,使用这种方法可以监测网络的状态、数据流动情况以及网络上传递的信息。当信息以数据流的形式在网络上传输时,在互联网的入口处设置监测系统,便可以源源不断地将网上传输的信息截获。通过该监控技术可以任意采集和分析因特网上的各种信息,如网页访问http,电子邮件email,Telnet,Ftp等,以及这些信息中的用户名和密码,并对采集到的数据进行分析和还原。一旦发现有黑客行为、恐怖分子信息、邪教信息、反民族信息等非法信息,技术系统会自动捕获,并将有关的信息(包括:非法信息来源的IP地址、目的地址等)发送至监控中心,监控中心根据需要可通过功能设定,对非法可疑的IP地址锁定实施24小时自动跟踪。从而及时发现网络犯罪,保护网络与信息安全。     

空间电磁环境计算机仿真

本文在建立了地面雷达数据库的基础上,对空间平台所处的雷达信号环境进行了仿真研究。文中给出了部分仿真数学模型和仿真软件模块结构,并利用仿真软件对空间平台位置处的雷达信号功率流密度和各种分布特性等进行了仿真试验研究,给出了有意义的仿真试验结果     

淋水对帐篷热环境改善的实验研究

针对部队野外驻训帐篷内部温度高、热环境差的问题,在帐篷贴铝箔的基础上,对帐篷淋水前后进行了实验研究.利用被动蒸发冷却技术,水分蒸发吸收大量汽化潜热的特性来改善帐篷的热环境.实验结果表明淋水后的帐篷内的WBGT值小于32℃,在人体的承受范围内.     

基于RBAC的分布式数据库系统安全管理技术

分析了分布式数据库系统安全管理的必要性 ,引入了基于角色的访问控制模型 ,结合分布式数据库系统的开发实例 ,阐述了利用Delphi实现基于SQLServer的分布式数据库系统安全管理的技术。     

综合战场环境仿真软件建模

作为C3I系统重要组成部分的综合战场环境仿真软件要求必须具有开放性和可重用性,以适应战场环境和武器系统的变革.基于以上特点,本文采用UML对综合战场环境仿真软件需求进行建模,采用此方法对该软件进行建模,可以将复杂的综合战场环境仿真系统用简单明了的可视化图形表示出来,为整个软件的开发提供灵活、一致、易读的表达,不仅可以解决软件开发中众多领域人员难以互相交流理解的难题,还可以提高软件的可靠性、可重用性和可维护性.     

西南边疆地区陆军航空兵作战运用

近年来,西南方向局势相对紧张。在当前我国面临全方位安全压力的情况下,如何正确认识西南方向军事斗争现状,如何充分做好该方向军事斗争准备,显得尤为重要。文章主要分析了西南方向上的作战环境,总结了该方向作战环境对陆军航空兵作战行动的影响,研究了陆军航空兵在该方向上的作战运用问题。     

A Cursed and Fragmented Island: History and Conflict Analysis in Bougainville,Papua New Guinea

This paper is a review piece examining the main factors responsible for the civil war, lasting from 1988 to 1998, on Bougainville island, an autonomous region in Papua New Guinea. History, economy, and social aspects of the island – especially traditional society features, mining activities, the effects of colonization and industrialization – are highlighted. The aim of the article is to identify which factors best explain the outbreak of the conflict. The main assumption is that no single factor can explain the civil war, as these elements require a comprehensive analysis. The ‘resource curse’ theory, i.e. the presence of natural resources leading to economic failure, and the existence of ethnic cleavages, are proposed as explanations, although further factors must also taken into account. Finally, the analysis helps to contextualize the unfolding events in Bougainville and its path to democratization.