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潘学萍 《武警工程学院学报》2013,(5):93-95
当前,军队院校的政治理论课教学,以教员课堂讲授为主,重课堂理论教学、轻社会实践锻炼的现象比较严重。这种传统的教学模式不利于创新型人才培养和教育转型的需要。政治理论课必须向基地教学延伸。 相似文献
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J. Thomas Moriarty 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):476-497
The purpose of this paper is to provide a better conceptualization of insurgent strategies. Specifically, I shall examine Che Guevara's ‘Foco’ theory of insurgency, as it is one of the most theoretically popular and most pervasive strategies of insurgency currently practiced throughout the world. After briefly examining the origins, objectives, and theoretical strengths of the Foco theory (also known as the Vanguard Theory), I will argue that Guevara's theory suffers from an internal tension that I term the ‘Vanguard's Dilemma’. The significance of this dilemma creates a tension within the Vanguard Theory that can be fatal for insurgents if properly exploited by counterinsurgent operations. This paper will examine in detail this dilemma and show how it can be exploited. Given that several insurgent groups within Iraq and Afghanistan currently adhere to the Vanguard Theory of insurgency, a proper understanding of this insurgent strategy is an essential first step in the long road towards confronting and winning asymmetrical conflicts. 相似文献
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Stephen Pampinella 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5):721-743
As US counterinsurgency campaigns draw to a close, doctrine for asymmetric warfare written during the War on Terror has come under heavy criticism. While many have argued that this shift to ‘winning hearts and minds’ is evidence that the United States is taking humanitarianism and nation-building seriously, others argue that a wide gap exists between US counterinsurgency doctrine and the protection of civilians afflicted by conflict. In this article, I show that the latter is true by comparing theories of instrumental and communicative action to US doctrine for operational design, stability operations, and counterinsurgency. I argue that these texts treat the people as an object to be manipulated for the achievement of pre-determined self-interested strategic goals rather than members of a community that jointly designs operations to fulfill shared objectives. However, US doctrine does contain communicative elements that, if prioritized, would better support humanitarian and state-building objectives otherwise subordinated in the War on Terror. 相似文献
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Nancy W. Gallagher 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):469-498
ABSTRACTSince the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is. 相似文献
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Thomas W. Lucas 《海军后勤学研究》2003,50(4):306-321
There are multiple damage functions in the literature to estimate the probability that a single weapon detonation destroys a point target. This paper addresses differences in the tails of four of the more popular damage functions. These four cover the asymptotic tail behaviors of all monotonically decreasing damage functions with well‐behaved hazard functions. The differences in estimates of probability of kill are quite dramatic for large aim‐point offsets. This is particularly important when balancing the number of threats that can be engaged with the chances of fratricide and collateral damage. In general, analysts substituting one damage function for another may badly estimate kill probabilities in offset‐aiming, which could result in poor doctrine. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 306–321, 2003. 相似文献
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