Collecting Oriental and Asiatic Arms and Armour: The Activities of British and East India Company Officers,c.1800-1850

During the first half of the 19th century substantial quantities of Oriental and Asiatic arms and armour first began to appear in Britain. On the one hand they certainly reflected the expansion of empire but their wider significance has yet to be discussed. This article seeks to address that omission by exploring the growth of interest in these objects within military circles, what they represented to the individuals who acquired them, and how they fitted into the wider collecting strategies of military officers as a group.     

基于打击链的智能武器风险分析与控制方法研究

打击链是分析武器和系统等作战要素有效性的一种方法.针对当前智能武器概念缺乏一致定义的问题,本文提出了基于打击链作战方式的智能武器判定方法.针对智能武器认定困难引发的军控措施争论,分析了智能武器两方面的失控风险:人失去对自主武器的控制权与自主武器本身存在不可控因素和缺陷;以及智能武器的问责困境:如何在指挥者、编程者与智能...     

Brothers in arms,yet again? Twenty-first century Sino-Russian strategic collaboration in the realm of defence and security

2014–2015 were years of turmoil for strategic relations, with Sino-Russian relations emerging as a particularly interesting set of ties to observe. This article asks whether recurrent Sino-Russian exhortations of friendship are mirrored by their strategic alignment in the defence and security realm, half a century after the end of the Sino-Soviet pact during the communist era. We examine the arms trade between the two countries and with regional partners, but also the recent pattern of bilateral and multilateral military exercises, as a combined test of the security and defence relationship. We are able to show that the image of friendship that both Moscow and Beijing like to promote, while apparent at the UN Security Council and within the BRICS group, remains constrained by rivalry in high-tech segments of the arms industry and by lingering concerns about the prospects of peer interference in their shared regional vicinity.     

Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and Non-proliferation

ABSTRACT

To an observer, Japan’s approach to nuclear weapons can appear confused and contradictory. The only country to have been attacked with nuclear weapons is variously described as a pacifist and non-nuclear nation and as a proliferation threat. These widely varied and conflicting conclusions are understandable given that conflicting messages are sent by senior figures. However Japan’s stance is in fact a coherent, if not uncomplicated, response both to its security needs and to domestic public opinion. However, the security provided by US extended nuclear deterrence underlines and enables this approach. The key policies and decisions were taken in both Washington and Tokyo between China’s first nuclear test (1964) and Japan’s ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1976). How the United States came to offer this additional security guarantee to Japan and how Japan came to rely upon it underscore this complex stance and are crucial to understanding a longstanding and ongoing security arrangement and source of stability and security in northeast Asia.     

The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

ABSTRACT

Extended deterrence has been a main pillar of the security alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) since the end of the Korean War. The changing dynamics of US extended deterrence in Korea, however, affected Seoul’s strategic choices within its bilateral alliance relationship with Washington. Examining the evolution of US extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula until the Nixon administration, this article explains why South Korea began its nuclear weapons programme in a historical context of the US–ROK alliance relationship. This article argues that President Park Chung-hee’s increasing uncertainty about the US security commitment to South Korea in the 1960s led to his decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s despite the fact that US tactical nuclear weapons were still stationed in South Korea.     

美军2021财年核电磁脉冲领域国防预算概况与简析

本文基于美国国防部机构、海军、空军和天军2021财年的国防预算文件,梳理出与核电磁脉冲科研活动相关的12个课题,并通过统计对比,提炼出美军核电磁脉冲科研活动的主要内容及关注点.统计结果显示,这些课题均属于"研究、开发、试验与鉴定"范畴,涉及国防科研预算8个子类中的6个,预算总金额为5.28亿美元.总体而言,美军2021...     

Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse

This article questions the predominantly pessimistic assessments over the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After analysing available evidence on states’ interests and interactions within the NPT’s framework, it argues that several negative expectations are unwarranted. Conversely, the article identifies three potentially threatening scenarios. Therefore, it scrutinizes the likely impact of reactive nuclear proliferation; analyses the probability of significant actors challenging the existent nuclear architecture; and explores whether the treaty’s enforcement might soon be diluted. The article concludes the NPT is unlikely to face fundamental threats in the foreseeable future.     

Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence,Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy

Secure second strike nuclear forces are frequently held to be easy to procure. Analysts have long argued that targeting intelligence against relocatable targets like submarine launched and land mobile ballistic missiles is difficult to obtain. However, the scholarly consensus on intelligence for counterforce operations is seriously overdrawn. Both during and after the Cold War, the United States developed substantial intelligence capabilities to track and target submarines and mobile missiles. These efforts achieved important and under-appreciated success. Second strike forces have been far more vulnerable than most analysts are willing to credit.     

一类非线性军备竞赛博弈的动力学研究

针对多国军备竞赛问题,基于混沌动力学理论,并考虑到非线性因素对军备竞赛的影响,改进了理查森军备竞赛模型,建立了三国非线性军备竞赛的动力学模型,通过Matlab数值仿真表明,各博弈方的预期函数影响军备竞赛的稳定性,通过调整国家的不同预期函数变量,能够使军备竞赛从混沌逐步趋于稳定,这一结果将为国际军控研究提供一定的参考。     

The Success of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and its Contribution to the Nonproliferation Regime

The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in The Hague was a resounding success, both in organizational terms and in terms of substance. The new substance can be found in the Communiqué, as well as in innovative joint statements by participants, all of which may be considered as implementation of actions decided upon in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The next two years in the NSS process cannot be business as usual. This viewpoint makes some suggestions for NSS states to undertake between now and the final summit in 2016, including preparations for winding down the NSS process as we know it.