The Success of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and its Contribution to the Nonproliferation Regime

The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in The Hague was a resounding success, both in organizational terms and in terms of substance. The new substance can be found in the Communiqué, as well as in innovative joint statements by participants, all of which may be considered as implementation of actions decided upon in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The next two years in the NSS process cannot be business as usual. This viewpoint makes some suggestions for NSS states to undertake between now and the final summit in 2016, including preparations for winding down the NSS process as we know it.     

Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse

This article questions the predominantly pessimistic assessments over the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After analysing available evidence on states’ interests and interactions within the NPT’s framework, it argues that several negative expectations are unwarranted. Conversely, the article identifies three potentially threatening scenarios. Therefore, it scrutinizes the likely impact of reactive nuclear proliferation; analyses the probability of significant actors challenging the existent nuclear architecture; and explores whether the treaty’s enforcement might soon be diluted. The article concludes the NPT is unlikely to face fundamental threats in the foreseeable future.     

Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence,Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy

Secure second strike nuclear forces are frequently held to be easy to procure. Analysts have long argued that targeting intelligence against relocatable targets like submarine launched and land mobile ballistic missiles is difficult to obtain. However, the scholarly consensus on intelligence for counterforce operations is seriously overdrawn. Both during and after the Cold War, the United States developed substantial intelligence capabilities to track and target submarines and mobile missiles. These efforts achieved important and under-appreciated success. Second strike forces have been far more vulnerable than most analysts are willing to credit.     

潜艇核事故应急评价模式研究

评价模式是核事故应急评价系统的核心．在理论分析的基础上,建立了适合基地特点的潜艇核事故应急评价模式及参数,并通过假想事故对所建立的评价模式进行了校核．结果表明,该模式具有良好的可靠性和可行性,适合基地的特点,满足核潜艇核事故应急评价的要求．根据所建模式,还编制了一套实用、可靠、灵活、方便的应用软件．     

PSA 技术在船舶核动力装置 RCMA 中的应用

从重要功能产品的确定、维修工作类型的选择和维修工作间隔期的确定３个方面出发,说明了概率安全评价（ＰＳＡ）技术在船舶核动力装置以可靠性为中心的维修分析（ＲＣＭＡ）中的应用．     

一种新的一体化压水型反应堆──热管输热核反应堆构想

本文提出了热管输热核动力反应堆的构想,即用热管代替现今压水堆的一回路管道、主泵和稳压器,并对热管输热反应堆进行了原理分析,提出了工程应用可行性等急需研究的问题。     

核危机博弈冲突消解图模型分析

核安全是国家安全体系的重要组成部分。针对博弈过程定量化分析方法的不足,调整冲突消解图模型分析方法并将其应用于核危机博弈分析。提出冲突消解图模型分析流程、相关定义和矩阵表示方法;以1969年爆发的中苏核危机为背景,基于历史数据构建核危机冲突模型,应用矩阵表示算法分析博弈状态演化过程;引入博弈政策和军事能力两类模型参数,调节参数进行博弈模型敏感性分析;应用联盟分析方法识别出可能存在的决策者联盟及其对国家关系演化的影响;根据模型数据分析结果,总结相关结论和决策参考。研究结果表明,冲突分析方法适用于核危机管控研究,采用与军事实力相匹配的策略在危机博弈演化中具有重要作用。     

India nuclear weapons: No first use or no full disclosure?

This article argues India is laying the foundation to move away from “no-first-use” (NFU) as its nuclear weapons employment policy. Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, India has claimed NFU as the centerpiece of its nuclear strategy. But India has a history of developing foundational changes to its nuclear weapons program before such changes actually occur. For example, the infrastructure of India’s nuclear weapons program was already being created in the 1950s under the guise of civilian nuclear power. Similarly, the weaponization of India’s program, which did not officially occur until after the 1998 tests, had its genesis in far earlier decisions. A close examination of trends in India’s nuclear weapons production complex, its delivery systems, and its command and control complex all lead to the conclusion that India is laying the groundwork for more flexible employment options, up to and including first use. This article does not argue such a decision has been taken. Rather, it argues the underpinning is in place to allow for a move to more flexible options, perhaps very quickly, at some point in the future. This could occur during crisis or it could occur incrementally over time.     

Security assurances and proliferation risks in the Trump administration

Comments that Donald Trump made while campaigning to be U.S. president have raised concerns that his administration will pull back from U.S. alliance commitments and encourage countries such as Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arms. The new article by Frühling and O’Neil outlines an institutional framework that can be helpful in assessing the risks that Trump administration policies will lead to nuclear proliferation. An institutional perspective shows that important elements of U.S. security assurances will continue to function, and this reduces the chances that President Trump’s actions or statements will trigger proliferation by U.S. allies. The greatest risk to global non-proliferation efforts posed by a Trump administration in fact lies elsewhere, in the possibility that President Trump will seek to abrogate the Iran nuclear deal.     

Sharing security in an era of international cooperation: unmanned aerial vehicles and the United States’ Air Force

The United States’ Air Force (USAF) has developed and used unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology to monitor and assassinate dangerous terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Currently, there are few countries that possess armed UAV and since the US created much of this technology, the USAF is usually part of the training that automatically accompanies the purchase of its UAVs. The research question this article attempts to answer is, “What is the extent of the United States’ Air Force assistance in the training and proliferation of UAV technology to foreign militaries?”