Economic Competition and Nuclear Cooperation

The number of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements surged during the “nuclear renaissance” of the past decade. This proliferation is only partially explained by the prevailing approaches that focus on strategic imperatives. To supplement these explanations, this study draws on neoliberal models of economic competition to posit that bilateral agreement negotiations also exhibit conditions of “uncoordinated interdependence” and maneuvering to gain market share. Case evidence suggests the contours of supplier state bids for civilian assistance are determined at least as much by considerations about economic competition as they are by positive strategic goals. In addition, this study identifies several cases of cooperation where there appears to be little or no strategic motive for export agreements. The study concludes that patterns of economic competition and the influence of peers in defined competitive spaces alter material payoffs and impact policies. It also identifies a surprising role for principled restraint in dampening strategic and economic competition in some dyads.     

The Moral Dimension of “Global Zero”

Regrettably, moral arguments are largely absent from the current debate on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, complementing politico-strategic thinking with ethical categories could significantly strengthen the abolitionist call. To fill the gap, this article analyzes the evolution of the nuclear ethics of the Roman Catholic Church and especially its position on nuclear deterrence. If this strategy was granted interim and strictly conditioned moral acceptance during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence is today increasingly considered ineffective, an obstacle to genuine disarmament, and hence morally unjustifiable. In the new security context, the conditions for the Catholic Church's “interim nuclear ethics” have altered, and nuclear disarmament has become a feasible option and an alternative strategy to deterrence.     

核潜艇事故回顾与压水堆技术改进展望

分析统计了国外自核潜艇诞生以来所报道的大部分核事故,并就事故发生的原因和后果进行了描述．其中重点讨论了反应性事故与失水事故（ＬＯＣＡ）．最后,对２１世纪新型核潜艇的安全性作了简要展望．     

国外核潜艇事故中的潜艇大气控制问题

本文分析国外核潜艇事故与潜艇大气控制的关系,以及应从中吸取的经验教训。     

提高潜艇核安全性的措施

本文根据对潜艇处于水下状态发生辐射事故时的辐射影响的分析,得出当燃料元件包壳破损率和蒸汽发生器传热管泄漏量即使在允许限值内,主辅机舱空气放射性浓度有可能超过允许水平,而直接影响艇员的健康,并针对这一点提出了相应的改进措施。     

How long until midnight? Intelligence-policy relations and the United States response to the Israeli nuclear program, 1959–1985

Why did the United States fail to stop Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons? Existing research argues that patrons such as the U.S. should have an easy time halting proliferation by militarily and economically vulnerable clients. Nevertheless, Israel acquired nuclear weapons with relatively little American opposition. Utilizing extensive primary source research, we argue that problematic intelligence-policy relations hindered U.S. efforts to arrest Israeli proliferation as (1) policymakers often gave mixed guidance to the intelligence community, resulting in (2) limited information on Israeli efforts that reinforced policy ambiguity. The results carry implications for understanding the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and intelligence-policy relations.     

The stability of the nuclear nonproliferation norm: a critique of norm-contestation theory

This article argues that the nuclear nonproliferation norm (NNPN) is a social fact with a relatively independent life of its own and that it has a powerful impact on the behavior of both nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). It challenges the application of critical constructivist research on norms to the NNPN and the idea that its legitimacy and structural power depend on contestation “all the way down.” State and non-state actors play an important role in explaining the dynamics of the NNPN, but agential constructivism runs the danger of “throwing the baby out with the bath water,” neglecting the structural impact of the NNPN on state behavior. The article examines the limitations of norm-contestation theory, arguing that some norms are more resistant to contestation than others. The NNPN is more difficult to contest than new norms (such as the Responsibility to Protect) because it is rooted in fifty years of nonproliferation nuclear diplomacy. The US-India nuclear deal is not a case of “norm change” but a violation of the NNPN. The “core” of the NNPN has not changed since the US-India nuclear deal. The conflict confronting NWS and NNWS is about the implementation of “type 2” norms (organizing principles) and “type 3” norms (standardized procedures), and not about the “hard core” of the NNPN.     

Reactor-grade plutonium and nuclear weapons: ending the debate

The claim that reactor-grade plutonium cannot or will not be used to produce nuclear weapons has been used to justify non-nuclear-weapon states’ large stockpiles of plutonium that has been separated from highly radioactive spent fuel. However, by using reduced-mass plutonium cores, it is possible to manufacture reliable nuclear weapons with reactor-grade plutonium. These weapons can have the same design, size, weight, and predetonation probability as weapons using weapon-grade plutonium and would require no special cooling. The increased radiation from reactor-grade plutonium could be easily managed by shielding and operational procedures. Weapons using plutonium routinely produced by pressurized-water reactors could have a lethal area between 40 percent and 75 percent that of weapons using weapon-grade plutonium. In the past, both Sweden and Pakistan considered using reactor-grade plutonium to produce nuclear weapons, and India may be using reactor-grade plutonium in its arsenal today. Despite claims to the contrary, the United States used what was truly reactor-grade plutonium in a successful nuclear test in 1962. The capability of reactor-grade plutonium to produce highly destructive nuclear weapons leads to the conclusion that the separation of plutonium, plutonium stockpiling, and the use of plutonium-based fuels must be phased out and banned.     

The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?

Students of international politics known as ‘proliferation optimists’ argue that when it comes to the spread of nuclear weapons ‘more may be better’ because nuclear weapons deter great power war and produce greater levels of international stability. This essay provides a critique of proliferation optimism, challenging optimism’s conception of nuclear deterrence theory, its logical underpinnings, and its policy recommendations. It does this by conducting an intellectual history of proliferation optimism, identifying the core weaknesses of proliferation optimism as a theoretical framework, and articulating the myriad threats posed by nuclear proliferation.     

Eight Lost Years? Nixon,Ford, Kissinger and the Non-Proliferation Regime, 1969–1977

The years following the signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 have generally been seen as a period of neglect in US non-proliferation policy. While joining recent scholarship questioning this, the article also shows that the policies that emerged from the Nixon–Ford years were the product of a broad range of factors that constrained both the United States’ ability and willingness to build an effective non-proliferation regime. These included the Nixon administration’s initial skepticism regarding the NPT, as well as the global dispersion of power away from the US, combined with the continued importance of anti-Soviet containment.