现代潜艇作战软件的需求与技术难点

随着现代潜艇探测设备在探测目标数量上的增加、探测范围的提高及武器装备性能的改进,潜艇的作战效能越来越多地依赖于潜艇指控系统的信息处理能力,由此就为潜艇作战软件的功能和性能提出了新的要求。以此为目的、以潜艇信息化装备建设为目标,从分析潜艇作战的客观环境和技术特点着手,阐述了潜艇作战软件的功能需求、辅助指挥决策模式和研制开发的技术难点。     

潜艇耐压壳动力学响应和声辐射研究概况与趋势

论述了流场中潜艇耐压壳自由振动、受简谐力或力矩作用和受冲击载荷情况下的动力学响应和声辐射研究概况 ,讨论了带有阻尼材料的复合潜艇耐压壳的动力学和声辐射研究情况 ,以及阻尼材料的破坏研究概况 ,并指出了今后的研究方向     

潜艇适航性监测的卡尔曼滤波器异常数据修正方法

结合潜艇适航性变量监测问题,研究了卡尔曼滤波器的原理和异常行为检测,分析了异常数据对卡尔曼滤波器影响,并通过新息分析和过程信号引入不确定性,给出了一种对异常数据进行剔除并对滤波器进行修正的方法.对潜艇适航性中的横摇进行了数值仿真,给出了经典卡尔曼滤波与改进卡尔曼滤波的对比仿真结果.仿真结果表明:采用改进算法处理,可以有...     

基于下方近场平面磁场的潜艇高空磁场计算方法

潜艇高空磁场一般由包络面磁场计算得到,但实际中包络面磁场较难测量,而下方近场平面磁场则容易获得.在下方近场平面磁场的基础上,利用边界积分法计算得到下方远场磁场,再根据潜艇远场磁场分布的全空间一致性,计算出远场等效磁矩,得到高空远场磁场.实验分析表明了潜艇远场磁场分布的全空间一致性,由下方近场平面磁场可以较准确地得到潜艇...     

Identification of Pu and U isotopic composition and its applications in environmental and CBRN research

This paper describes the most common presently used methods for detecting uranium and plutonium isotopes after their introduction to environment. Known isotope ratios of U and Pu in different nuclear events are important tool for characterizing the sources of nuclear material. Detection techniques both in field and in laboratory are presented, as well as different models that can be used for identifying the origin and age of the nuclear material. Identification of the source of nuclear material in environmental samples is needed for estimating the quality and quantity of the nuclear hazard. This information is essential in risk assessment and crisis management, in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) research after e.g. a terrorist attack, in radioecology and environmental radioactivity research.     

基于潜艇指控系统的软件模块化研究

针对目前潜艇装备软件的现状,结合工程实践,运用软件模块化思想,提出了基于构件的潜艇指控系统软件开发模型和层次化的潜艇指控系统软件体系结构,并在此基础之上,对潜艇指控系统软件进行了模块化研究,给出了潜艇指控系统软件模块框架。实践表明,该设计方法实现了软件与其他系统的集成,提高了软件的质量与可靠性。     

反潜飞机对潜搜索法研究

反潜飞机使用吊放声纳对潜搜索具有不连续性.针对该特点,提出一种在实际搜索中能方便执行并且具有一定实用价值的搜索法.该法的基本思想是:通过增大或者减小取整的方法来保证起始相遇点在起始点,终止相遇点在该搜索段的终止点.算例验证该法正确可信.     

NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship,Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy

In nuclear nonproliferation negotiations, many governments pursue multiple objectives, and changes in policy can occur rapidly—and often unexpectedly. For these reasons, understanding nonproliferation requires empathy and imagination rather than just historical fact. This article considers one teaching tool to encourage such insight—simulations—and demonstrates how teaching and scholarship can interact to improve our understanding of the complex decisions and negotiations involved in nuclear nonproliferation. The article consists of five parts: first, it explains the benefits of simulations as both a policy development tool in Washington and as a teaching tool in universities; second, it describes the pedagogical strategy of the Stanford University simulation program; third, it shows how the simulations have identified and highlighted theoretical and substantive insights that are often neglected in scholarly studies of nonproliferation; and fourth, it describes how students are tested to enhance the learning experience from the simulation. Fifth and finally, the article provides concluding observations about how using simulations in the classroom can help scholars develop insights that improve their understanding of real-world nuclear negotiation dynamics and outcomes.     

How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III

Ron Rosenbaum, How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III. Simon & Schuster, 2011. 305 pages, $28.     

KICKING THE HORNETS’ NEST

This article applies the concept of nuclear ambivalence to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear ambivalence differs from other approaches to understanding nuclear proliferation in that it focuses on the deeply misunderstood relationship between the two potential uses of nuclear power: energy and weapons. According to this theory, the civilian applications of nuclear technology cannot be separated from the potential military applications and vice versa. Ambivalence, therefore, extends into the realm of states’ nuclear intentions, making it impossible to know with certainty what a potential proliferator's “true” intentions are. This article will demonstrate that the concept of nuclear ambivalence applies in the case of Iran, suggesting that current international nonproliferation efforts run the risk of encouraging rather than discouraging Iranian weaponization. The final section outlines recommendations for policy makers to reverse this counterproductive nonproliferation approach.