直升机单机等距螺旋应召搜潜效能模型与仿真

等距螺旋法是直升机应召反潜中常用的搜潜样式。潜艇位置误差及航速误差对螺旋搜潜概率及搜潜战术运用具有显著影响。依据研究问题的逻辑关系,分别建立了潜艇速度散布模型和等距螺旋搜潜效能模型,运用蒙特卡罗法对直升机应召螺旋搜潜效能进行分析评估。实例验证了模型的可信度,提出了存在潜艇速度误差条件下,延迟时间和预估航速的改变对于搜潜效能的影响。     

Extended Deterrence and National Ambitions: Italy’s Nuclear Policy, 1955–1962

ABSTRACT

Throughout the Cold War, Italy was one of the most steadfast NATO allies in hosting American nuclear weapons on its territory. Such a policy could easily be construed as an example of almost automatic confidence in the US nuclear umbrella, yet only on the surface did extended deterrence appease Italian anxieties about the uncertainties of the American nuclear guarantee. The Italian rationale for accepting a large array of US nuclear weapons did as a matter of fact involve a complex mix of reasons, ranging from trying to ensure that the Italian government would be consulted in the event of a major crisis, to willingness to enhance the country’s profile inside any Western multilateral fora. The paper will investigate this policy by looking at how the Italian government behaved at the height of the NATO nuclear sharing debate, between 1957 and 1962, arguably one of the historical moments in the Cold War when the concept of extended deterrence was most intensely discussed. Drawing up on hitherto classified archival sources as well as on some less-known public ones, the paper will show how Italian diplomats, military leaders and policymakers understood the dangers and political implications of US nuclear policies. It will, hopefully, demonstrate that Italy’s persistent search for a multilateral solution to the nuclearisation of NATO strategy shows that Italy never saw extended deterrence as a solution per se, but only as a temporary means to an end.     

远程预警声呐发现目标后的机动原则

鉴于经典的载体优化理论对装备舷侧阵声呐的潜艇的局限性,讨论了装备舷侧阵远程预警声呐的潜艇发现目标后的机动问题.在分析经典的载体优化机动理论的使用条件和特点的前提下,借鉴美国潜艇拖曳阵远程预警声呐发现目标后的战术机动思想,提出了装备舷侧阵声呐的潜艇发现目标后可以采取与初始发现方位线相垂直的倒"U"字机动策略及具体的细节.该机动方法理论上成立,但具体参数的确定还需要经过计算机仿真和海上实践的检验.同时认为战术理论的发展与装备技术水平的发展紧密相关.     

Geopolitics over Proliferation: the Origins of US Grand Strategy and Their Implications for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

How much does the United States care about nonproliferation? Recent scholarship suggests that the fear of spreading nuclear weapons was central to the US grand strategy in the Cold War. In one important case, however, this argument does not hold. This article draws on theoretical debates and newly declassified archives to demonstrate the primacy of geopolitics over nonproliferation in Washington’s policy toward India and Pakistan. Despite their rhetoric, Democratic and Republican leaders consistently relegated nonproliferation to the backburner whenever it conflicted with other strategic goals. Moreover, they inadvertently encouraged proliferation in South Asia at three inter-connected levels: technology, security, and identity.     

‘It isn’t over until the fuel cell sings’: A reassessment of the US and French pledges of nuclear assistance in the 1970s

Based on newly declassified archival documents, the aim of this study is to contribute to an improved understanding of the evolution of the non-proliferation regime through an examination of US and French nuclear cooperation agreements in the latter half of the 1970s. The four pledges of nuclear assistance examined – US assistance to Egypt and Israel, and French assistance to Pakistan and South Korea – failed to materialise by the end of the decade. Why did that happen? What caused the four pledges to fail? We find that the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion and the emergence of opposing domestic factions on the nuclear front in the supplier states generated major changes in US and French nuclear export policies, and also contributed to the development of a collaborative partnership between the two competing nuclear exporters, on the other.     

2019年水下无人系统发展综述

对2019年世界各主要国家和地区水下无人系统的发展情况进行了综合梳理分析。首先研究了美国和日本发布的水下无人系统相关战略规划,之后整理了世界主要国家和地区水下无人系统装备发展情况,并对水下无人系统的关键技术(水下光学通信技术,水下导航技术,能源动力技术,协同作战技术)发展情况进行了总结。综述表明世界各主要军事强国从战略规划、装备研制和技术攻关等维度不断推进水下无人系统能力建设,全面提升水下无人自主作战和跨域协同作战能力水平。     

Nuclear opportunism: A theory of how states use nuclear weapons in international politics

How do states use nuclear weapons to achieve their goals in international politics? Nuclear weapons can influence state decisions about a range of strategic choices relating to military aggression, the scope of foreign policy objectives, and relations with allies. The article offers a theory to explain why emerging nuclear powers use nuclear weapons to facilitate different foreign policies: becoming more or less aggressive; providing additional support to allies or proxies, seeking independence from allies; or expanding the state’s goals in international politics. I argue that a state’s choices depend on the presence of severe territorial threats or an ongoing war, the presence of allies that provide for the state’s security, and whether the state is increasing in relative power. The conclusion discusses implications of the argument for our understanding of nuclear weapons and the history of proliferation, and nonproliferation policy today.     

How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?

The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This article seeks to answer a basic question: How durable is the taboo? We develop different predictions about norm durability depending on whether the taboo is based primarily on moral logic or strategic logic. We use the comparable case of the norm against strategic bombing in the 20th century to evaluate these hypotheses. The logic and evidence presented in this paper suggest that the norm of nuclear non-use is much more fragile than most analysts understand.     

潜艇对机动目标跟踪和攻击若干问题的探讨

在现代作战条件下,潜艇所要跟踪和攻击的目标多数情况下应认为是机动目标。限于潜艇所载目标探测传感器和武器特点,以及潜艇自身隐蔽性、机动性方面的约束,潜艇跟踪和攻击机动目标存在许多困难和值得研究的问题。对这些问题进行了较为系统地梳理,并对其中的若干问题进行了探讨,包括目标机动的原因、机动目标可判断性问题、机动判断手段、机动判断后目标参数的处理、机动目标攻击的基本原则和方法等,还对潜艇指控系统强化机动目标跟踪和攻击功能提出了一些建议。     

基于方位量测的舰艇对潜定位技术研究

结合舰艇拖曳线列阵声纳实际搜潜装备,利用舰载线列阵声纳测得的潜艇目标方位信息,建立了基于方位量测的舰艇对潜艇目标定位的数学模型,给出求解潜艇运动参数的定位算法,并对定位误差进行了分析,在定位模型及算法的基础上,仿真研究了潜艇与舰艇之间的初始距离、舰艇测得潜艇目标初始方位角、潜艇航向等因素对定位性能的影响,给出仿真结果并进行了分析,该结果对于指导实际反潜具有一定的实用价值。