潜艇作战指数计算研究

潜艇的作战指数是反映其综合作战能力的效能指标,由于传统的作战指数计算方法在实际应用中操作难度较大且横向可比性不高,提出了一种由已知的潜艇作战指数推算待求的潜艇作战指数的较为简便的新方法,即采用层次分析法确立潜艇作战能力的因素集和权重集,运用拓展的灰色关联法求得所选潜艇的灰色关联度,利用已知的作战指数和所求的关联度通过数值分析建立两者的函数关系,并由此推算出待求的作战指数.以攻击型潜艇对水面舰艇作战指数为例,求取潜艇作战指数.     

使用噪声干扰器规避主动声自导鱼雷的潜艇机动分析

针对噪声干扰器广泛应用于潜艇反鱼雷作战,分析了潜艇释放噪声干扰器后的机动原则,建立了仿真所需要的鱼雷声学模型和鱼雷机动模型.通过仿真得到了不同潜艇机动方案时潜艇的生存概率,仿真结果为滞艇使用噪声干扰器规避主动声自导鱼雷攻击的机动决策提供了依据.     

潜艇使用自航式声诱饵防御声自导鱼雷模型研究

针对潜艇如何使用自航式声诱饵防御声自导鱼雷,分析了自航式声诱饵的初始航向范围,并建立了相应的防御模型.然后采用线性规划方法,求取最优的潜艇规避角度和诱饵航向.最后时典型态势进行仿真计算,结果表明,采用该方法得出的结果与实际作战基本符合,从而验证了模型的正确性.     

喷水推进装置及其在舰艇上的应用

船舶喷水推进装置具有推进效率高、噪音小、操作性能好以及适合浅水航行等特点,其军事价值将越来越受到世界各国海军的重视.分析了喷水推进装置的优、缺点,简要介绍了其基本原理和结构,并总结了其在潜艇和水面舰艇上的应用,对其今后的应用与发展趋势作了简要分析.     

A Foregone Conclusion? The United States,Britain and the Trident D5 Agreement

Existing studies of the United Kingdom’s purchase of Trident D5 missiles have simplified the Reagan administration’s sale. Using previously classified documentation, this article highlights the potential political and financial ramifications of a sale agreement that led to complex deliberations within the Thatcher government up until the final day of negotiations. The White House viewed the sale as a means to strengthen Western nuclear and conventional forces to counter the perceived Soviet threat. However, even within this conducive environment, US officials still drove a hard bargain with their British counterparts, in order to support US strategic interests. Indeed, the White House utilised the sale to influence British defence policy. In this way, the Trident agreement was not a foregone conclusion but rather a continuation of the friendly, but not preordained, nature of US–UK nuclear relations that has been renegotiated, according to the varying interests of both parties, throughout the partnership's existence.     

THE NEXUS OF GLOBALIZATION AND NEXT-GENERATION NONPROLIFERATION

Although globalization has created opportunities for nuclear and biological proliferation dangers to take root and grow, it also has opened the door to new solutions. Original ideas and approaches are needed to develop a stronger, more flexible next-generation nonproliferation strategy that accounts for the increasingly important integration of economic, political, and technological issues. The foundation of this strategy should focus on tapping the power of market-based mechanisms, understanding how commercially driven decisions affect proliferation threats, establishing new partnerships, and forging cohesion among the current nonproliferation mechanisms. The implementation of such a strategy will require forceful leadership, a cultural shift from both policymakers and the range of stakeholders, and consensus building within the international community.     

NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF CIVILIAN HEU ELIMINATION

An increasing number of countries recognize the special risks of nuclear terrorism associated with the civilian use and storage of and commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU). They are especially concerned that non-state actors might gain access to HEU and use it to build and detonate improvised nuclear devices. The risk is aggravated by the very large global stocks of HEU, some of which are inadequately protected. Although HEU has few commercial uses, and most experts believe it is technically feasible to substitute low-enriched uranium for HEU in nearly all civilian applications, efforts to reduce HEU stocks have been impeded by a variety of economic, political, and strategic considerations. This article analyzes the nature of these impediments and discusses what is required to overcome them.     

NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTION AS DETERRENCE

Recently, post-explosion nuclear forensics, or nuclear attribution, has gained a new spotlight within the nuclear weapons scientific and policymaking community. Academics are beginning to ask whether post-explosion forensics might create a replacement for an international nonproliferation regime, or at least offer a fallback option to deter states and individuals from selling nuclear materials. This paper examines current attribution technology from unclassified literature and finds the technology to be well developed but not foolproof, such that nuclear attribution currently provides little deterrent value. If current capabilities were publicized more thoroughly and if the post-explosion process of assessing the evidence were internationalized, states and intermediate actors might be deterred more effectively. Developing a nuclear fingerprint database is also discussed. While useful, its impact on deterrence would be minimal.     

THE NPT

This article assesses the successes and failures of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since its creation in 1968 by developing and applying a set of “metrics” to each of the NPT's substantive articles as well as to its withdrawal provisions. In light of this analysis, the article also puts forward some specific proposals for strengthening the NPT and its implementation, with a view to the debate and decisions at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. A concluding section turns explicitly to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and proposes pursuit of agreement on three NPT Action Plans: one for nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for nuclear disarmament. Combining vision and practicable steps, these Action Plans would set out a roadmap for action between the 2010 and the 2015 NPT Review Conferences. They could provide a foundation for substantive exchanges—in this case, on progress toward their implementation—during the preparations for the 2015 conference.     

EXAMINING ISRAEL'S NPT EXCEPTIONALITY: 1998–2005

Israel's exceptional status as a nonsignatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been an increasingly salient issue, particularly during the intense debate over universality in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and again following the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998. This analysis argues that despite these events, Israel's diplomatic position has not weakened significantly in the past decade. The factors that have led to this outcome include changes in the political and strategic environment, including the Iraqi and Iranian NPT violations, and Israeli engagement in different fora such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the United Nations, and in bilateral strategic dialogues with key powers. This report examines whether Israel's exceptional status is likely to be maintained in the face of recent developments in Iran and the precedent set by the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement.