基于公共燃气排导结构的共架发射系统武器选择与布局方法

公共燃气排导结构和同心筒结构的共架发射系统由于燃气排导机理不同,其对武器发射的影响及在武器选择、布局等方面均存在较大差异.针对公共燃气排导结构的共架发射系统分析了公共燃气排导对武器发射的影响,提出了武器选择与布局方法,通过算例进行了验证并得出结论:公共燃气排导结构的共架发射系统武器布局上应采取分散布局,武器选择上应优先选择“无发射活动、对应武器数量较多、烧蚀值较小”的模块,且按照模块编号依次交替在不同模块进行武器发射.     

基于复杂网络的武器装备重要度评估方法

针对现有武器装备重要度评估方法存在的缺点和不足,基于复杂网络中改进的节点重要度评估指标和方法,建立了武器装备重要度评估模型。该方法不仅描述了武器装备在装备体系中的重要程度,也反映了武器装备失效后的修复情况。最后通过一评估示例,说明了方法的有效性和适应性。     

基于复杂网络的防空武器系统目标选择研究

基于复杂网络的思想,通过对防空武器目标体系网络的拓扑参数分析,构建了防空武器目标体系网络,利用pajek软件,对网络进行了可视化分析,采用基于不同策略的攻击方式进行了模拟仿真,对仿真结果进行了分析。经过分析发现,基于节点度值和基于节点介数的攻击可以较好的降低网络效率,因此我们以节点度值和介数为主要依据,确定了目标打击顺序,为指挥决策人员进行防空目标选择提供了借鉴和参考。     

基于效费比的武器目标分配

有效武器目标分配(WTA)是防空阵地的核心。分析了目标毁伤收益、武器损伤关键战术指标因素,提出基于效费比的WTA评价标准,建立了针对多目标的WTA模型,并研究了用遗传算法求解模型的方法。该遗传算法通过设计一种武器目标分配的染色体编码,利用最优保存策略选择运算、均匀交叉运算、非均匀变异运算来求解。仿真结果验证了模型的合理性和算法的有效性。     

武器装备军事需求论证的地位与作用

介绍了武器装备军事需求论证的概念,从武器装备发展的基本规律出发,对武器装备军事需求论证在武器装备论证中的地位与作用进行了全面分析,突出了武器装备军事需求论证在武器装备建设中的重要地位,强调了武器装备军事需求论证的“牵引”作用。     

Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?

Abstract

What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they ‘work’ by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure.     

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962

This article examines the nuclear command and control (C²) system implemented in Pakistan since 1998, and discusses its potential consequences for the risk of inadvertent or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. I argue that troubled civil-military relations and Pakistan's doctrine of ‘asymmetric escalation’ account for the creation of a command and control system with different characteristics during peacetime and military crises. Although the key characteristics of Pakistan's nuclear C² system allow relatively safe nuclear operations during peacetime, operational deployment of nuclear weapons during military standoffs is likely to include only rudimentary protections against inadvertent or unauthorised nuclear release. The implication of this study is that any shift from peacetime to wartime command and control procedures is likely to further destabilise Indo-Pakistani relations during the early stages of a diplomatic or military standoff, and introduce a non-trivial risk of accidental escalation to the nuclear level.     

Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960: The Soul of Containment. by William Inboden

This article predicts that the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected. This delegitimation of nuclear weapons is due to five factors whose importance has grown since the mid-1990s: nuclear proliferation, the risk of nuclear terrorism, the nuclear taboo, missile defence, and the increased importance of international law. The article starts with categorizing nuclear weapons policies: nuclear primacy, maximum deterrence, minimum deterrence, existential deterrence, and post-existential deterrence. The nuclear weapon states will probably shift their policies from nuclear primacy (US), maximum deterrence (Russia), minimum or existential deterrence (UK, France, Israel, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea) to post-existential deterrence (or elimination), taking one step at a time.     

Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia

Russian reliance on its non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been an ongoing concern for security experts. What is the Russian de facto employment doctrine for this arsenal? This article argues that Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) have no defined mission and no deterrence framework has been elaborated for them. This study disentangles Russian thoughts and deeds about regional nuclear deterrence and the role of NSNW in it. Situating the Russian case in the comparative context, the article argues that establishing a coherent theater nuclear posture and streamlining it with the national level deterrence strategy is a demanding and frequently unfulfilled task. It is likely to remain as such for both current and prospective nuclear states that consider an asymmetrical deterrence posture.     

Home Defence and the Sandys Defence White Paper, 1957

Long understood as the key document in Britain's Cold War history, the Duncan Sandys Defence White Paper of 1957 nevertheless has a largely forgotten context: home defence. This article argues that understanding this context allows important new conclusions to be drawn concerning the drafting, presentation and the reception of the document and the deterrent strategy it expounded. It argues that the Paper failed to establish a new doctrine for civil defence which reconciled the policy with the wider deterrent strategy. In doing this, the Paper presented a muddled policy to the public: one which failed to justify the reductions in civil defence provision but which stressed the destructive power of thermonuclear weapons. This had the effect of encouraging the critics of the government's nuclear strategy to flag up the absence of adequate civil defence measures and highlight the ‘admission’ that there was no defence against the hydrogen bomb.