The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice

This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis – the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon – a ‘culminating point of deterrence’.     

Britain’s ‘Independent’ V-Bomber Force and US Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1962

This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.     

多种武器攻击下舰艇装备生命力的加权模糊综合评估

通过应用模糊数学理论中模糊评估法对舰艇装备系统生命力进行了模糊评判 ,建立多武器攻击下舰艇装备生命力加权模糊评估模型 ,并以某舰艇装备的主动力系统回路为例 ,运用所建立的评估模型对其生命力进行具体评估 ,结果分析表明根据加权模糊综合评判模型 ,选用合理的加权系数 ,就能把模糊性很强的装备生命力指标定量化 ,为设备系统设计方案选优提供依据。     

War and rumours of war,do improvements in space technologies bring space conflict closer?

Combat in near-Earth orbit is emerging as a more realistic possibility. The argument here is that changes in space technologies combined with a sea change in political rhetoric is bringing the possibility of military conflict in space technologies. This movement reflects a generational shift as the original decisions regarding military conflict in space are now being reassessed by a generation who did not experience World War II or the Cold War. For these, the sanctuary approach to space activities is not as persuasive and new enhanced space technologies bring the possibility of victory or at least survival possible during a conflict in space.     

基于平衡计分卡的武器装备维修绩效评价指标体系构建

武器装备维修是武器装备维修保障的重要内容,加强装备维修绩效评价,建立科学规范的绩效评价指标体系,对深入推进装备维修工作健康发展将发挥积极作用。以平衡计分卡为研究手段,运用"5M1E"分析法,从一个内核和四个维度出发,分析武器装备维修绩效评价的影响因素,据此建立评价指标体系,并应用于装备维修管理实践,为有效提高装备维修保障效益提供有益借鉴。     

国外核潜艇事故中的潜艇大气控制问题

本文分析国外核潜艇事故与潜艇大气控制的关系,以及应从中吸取的经验教训。     

舰载激光武器系统建模与仿真技术

针对舰载激光武器系统仿真技术发展要求和应用方向,通过对舰载激光武器系统组成、功能和作战过程的分析,归纳整理出一套较完整的舰载激光武器仿真模型,其中对激光能量传输仿真模型和毁伤效果仿真模型进行详细描述;并提出仿真软件设计方案,包括软件功能组成、软件结构、软件运行流程等仿真软件设计要点;最后介绍了软件的仿真输出结果。文中设计的仿真软件可支持舰载激光武器系统的设计开发,也可以应用到舰船新型防空反导火控系统仿真认证中。     

一维热构件模型及其在船用核动力装置运行分析中的应用

建立了一维热构件模型 ,该模型具有广泛的适用性 ,可以模拟是否有内热源、不同几何形状及具有多种边界条件的热构件 .方程采用隐式有限差分法求解热传导方程 ,并将模型应用于核动力装置的运行分析中 .计算结果表明 ,本文所建立的一维热构件模型能逼真地描述一维热构件的温度场分布 ,计算精度高 .     

Serious Rules for Nuclear Power Without Proliferation

The authors propose five principles for addressing the major deficiencies of the current treaty-based approach to nonproliferation. These involve: effectively closing the door to withdrawals from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); defining which nuclear technologies fall within the NPT's “inalienable right” provision, so as to maintain a reasonable safety margin against possible military application; expansion of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections to include greater readiness to use its “special” inspection authority; creation of an NPT enforcement regime, to include a secretariat; and universalizing the NPT so as to apply to all states, while creating a path for current non-parties to come into compliance. There is no illusion here about the prospects for the adoption of this approach. At a minimum, the world needs to be frank about the gap between nuclear programs and current nonproliferation protection. Encouragement of greater use of nuclear power should be predicated on closing that gap.     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.