Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016

During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times.     

The fateful phoenix: the revival of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq

Although the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is seen as a novel manifestation of Islamic extremism, it is in fact the latest, albeit perhaps the most effective, of a long line of revivalist movements in the Islamic and the Arab worlds. Its motivations – hisba and jihad – differ little from its predecessors and its ambitions – to create a state organised in accordance with the precepts of the Islamic caliphate – reflect a long-standing Islamic ambition. It differs, of course, in terms of the sophistication of its political and military strategies, which mirror the contemporary complexities of the world in which it operates, but its objectives recall long-standing Islamic ideals, even if articulated in radically brutal and extremist ways. More importantly, perhaps, ISIS or Da’ish, to give it its Arabic sobriquet, reflects the enormous degree of resentment inside the Middle East at the ways in which Western powers have intervened in regional affairs over recent years, particularly their support for regimes and economic systems there that have betrayed, in the popular imaginary, the essential principles of social justice that lie at the root of Islamic vision of ideal social order. Indeed, in many respects, its analysis of the world in which it operates and of the objectives it seeks differ little in essence from those any other resistance and rejectionist movement, whether religious or sectarian. More specifically, it has been the sectarian conflict that resulted from the reversal of political order in Iraq as a result of the 2003 American-led invasion that has driven the success of the movement in capturing widespread Sunni support. Whether it can manage the complexities of the administration of a state remains open to question.     

网络中心作战体系效能评估方法初探

网络中心作战体系是信息化战争要求下的一个具体作战体系,其效能评估是网络中心战研究领域的重要问题,是解决网络中心作战体系建设中方案论证、性能效能指标、经济因素等诸多问题的有效方法。首先提出了网络中心作战体系效能评估的基本概念;然后阐述了网络中心作战体系效能评估方法问题,分析介绍了几种较为成熟的评估方法的特点、适用性和不足;最后提出一种基于探索性建模与分析方法的网络中心作战体系效能评估框架,作为研究网络中心作战体系效能评估的参考评估框架。     

The Peninsular War guerrilla and its antecedents: humiliation forgotten,disaster prefigured: the guerra fantástica of 1762

ABSTRACT

The brief war that took place between Spain and Portugal in 1762 is one of the least known episodes in the latter’s military history, whereas, thanks to Wellington’s construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras, the French invasion of 1810–11 is right at the other end of the spectrum. Yet the two episodes are closely linked to one another. At the very least, they are uncannily reminiscent in terms of their details – in both cases substantial foreign armies were vanquished through a combination of irregular resistance, scorched-earth tactics and the clever use of field fortifications – and the article therefore argues that Wellington based the plan that defeated the forces of Marshal Massena on the strategy used by the Portuguese half a century earlier.     

The artful use of national power: Portuguese Angola (1961–1974)

In its colony of Angola, Portugal during its colonial wars (1961–1974) was able to exploit the economic dependence and divided population loyalties of its hostile neighbours the Congo and Zambia as well as the cleavages within the nationalist movements to prevent a crippling insurgency. The rulers of both countries were largely dependent on Angola for trade, and were eager to have the side effects of the robust Angolan economy with its 11% annual growth brush off on their own moribund ones. While relationships were never comfortable, the sponsors of revolution were forced to reign in their ‘freedom fighters’ in order to maintain the functioning of their export-dependent economies. Portuguese leadership also played a vital role, as it was able to bring together diverse elements of national power in a concerted policy for dealing with these enemies, whether they were insurgents or their sanctuary countries. This policy of leveraging national power and playing on the vulnerabilities of its opponents worked well during its war in Angola and still holds valuable lessons for countries that find themselves in similar circumstances.     

Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.     

一种新的保持分形特征的分形变形方法

针对IFS吸引子变形过程中间出现的分形特征退化的问题,提出基于局部吸引子的近似凸包及旋转匹配的特征对应方法.IFS吸引子的局部吸引子可由独立的IFS生成,IFS中每个压缩仿射映射存在不动点,构造所有不动点的凸包,即得到局部近似凸包;证明了局部近似凸包间的相似对应等价于局部吸引子间的相似对应,并提出了通过旋转匹配的特征对应方法实现局部近似凸包的配对,最后计算所有配对下相似度最高的一组局部近似凸包匹配,确定局部吸引子间的特征对应,即IFS特征对应.对两个IFS进行线性插值可实现保持分形特征的分形变形.     

利用舰船内部磁场的反演建模方法

积分方程法被广泛应用于舰船磁场反演建模当中,但模型要求有足够多的测量点用于获取舰船在特定深度的磁场。针对积分方程法利用近场磁场建模时精度较差的问题,提出一种增加约束方程的改进措施,并分别开展了薄钢板模型和三维舰船模型磁场数值仿真。采用有限元方法对舰船内部测量点进行初始化选择,基于舰船内部磁场测量值构建了反演模型,采用奇异值分解法求解磁源参数并预测船外空间磁场,舰船外部空间磁场预测结果的均方根误差小于12%。舰船舱段模型磁场推算实验表明,由舱段内部磁场预测外部磁场的均方根误差约为13%,证明了所提出方法的有效性,可以改善传统反演模型的不稳定和精度不足的问题,研究结果可为舰船闭环消磁的算法设计提供思路。