The Pitfalls of Cross-National Comparison in Conflict Research

Professor Joseph Soeters shows admirable ambition in comparing national styles of conflict resolution and is extremely eager to draw historical lessons from such comparative exercises. However, he gets entangled in national mythmaking as he underestimates the complexity of comparative history of this kind. Particularly the establishment of true causal links between national (strategic) cultures and actual tactical behaviour on the ground is far more difficult than he suggests in his recent book chapter and his reply to my article in this journal.     

‘Clean’ bombs: Nuclear technology and nuclear strategy in the 1950s

The idea of ‘clean’ bombs, nuclear weapons with a reduced amount of radioactive fallout resulting from their fission part, has met much ridicule since its public inauguration in 1956. Many scholars have regarded the bombs as a propaganda tool, stopping short of analyzing their role in the transformative phase of US nuclear strategy in the 1950s. This paper reexamines the clean bomb episode through 1958, shedding light upon the dynamic relationship between the development of nuclear weapons technology and the evolution of nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response. It also discusses the mechanism and momentum of nuclear weapons technology innovation until the US suspended nuclear testing in late 1958.     

Insurgency by the numbers I: A reconsideration of the ecology of communist success in jiangxi province,China

Theorizing about Taliban operations in Afghanistan has its limits and it is possible that Kabul-centric strategies do not adequately address the unique circumstances of each region in the country. How exactly has the Taliban gone about attaining its objectives in Kandahar province and how have those approaches evolved since 2002? And how have the Taliban adapted to coalition forces' attempts to compete with the insurgency and stamp it out? The answers to these questions are critical in the formulation of any counterinsurgency approach to Afghanistan.     

基于SIMD处理器的全定制多粒度矩阵寄存器文件

在SIMD处理器上映射矩阵运算时会带来大量的数据重排操作从而降低系统性能。本文提出定制化的多粒度矩阵寄存器文件(MMRF)以消除数据重排操作。MMRF支持多粒度的并行行访问和列访问,从而提升矩阵运算的性能。MMRF可以被动态配置为不同的并行访问模式,在不同模式下一个或多个子矩阵可以被并行处理。实验结果显示,同传统的向量寄存器文件(VRF)和矩阵寄存器文件(MRF)相比,MMRF可分别带来2.21倍和1.6倍的平均性能提升,面积分别增加14.3%和3.7%,功耗分别增加14.6%和2.2%。同TMS320C64x+处理器相比,基于SIMD技术的FT-Matrix处理器在引入MMRF后可以得到5.65倍到7.71倍的性能提升。通过层次化的全定制设计技术,MMRF的面积和关键路径分别减少17.9%和39.1%。     

‘Full spectrum dominance’: Donald Rumsfeld,the Department of Defense,and US irregular warfare strategy, 2001–2008

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake.     

美国海军水面舰艇导弹防空体系分析

分析了美国海军防空作战思想,在此前提下总结出美海军舰空导弹体系主要的作战任务,说明了美海军典型水面舰艇装备舰空导弹的情况,最后阐述了今后美舰空导弹的发展趋势。     

美军2010年联合作战构想

详细阐述了美军２０１０年联合作战构想的内容,应重视主宰机动、精确打击、全维保护、集中后勤等４个作战概念。     

Influence of propagation direction on operation performance of rotating detonation combustor with turbine guide vane

Due to the pressure gain combustion characteristics, the rotating detonation combustor (RDC) can enhance thermodynamic cycle efficiency. Therefore, the performance of gas-turbine engine can be further improved with this combustion technology. In the present study, the RDC operation performance with a turbine guide vane (TGV) is experimentally investigated. Hydrogen and air are used as propellants while hydrogen and air mass flow rate are about 16.1 g/s and 500 g/s and the equivalence ratio is about 1.0. A pre-detonator is used to ignite the mixture. High-frequency dynamic pressure transducers and silicon pressure sensors are employed to measure pressure oscillations and static pressure in the combustion chamber. The experimental results show that the steady propagation of rotating detonation wave (RDW) is observed in the combustion chamber and the mean propagation velocity is above 1650 m/s, reaching over 84% of theoretical Chapman-Jouguet detonation velocity. Clockwise and counterclockwise propagation directions of RDW are obtained. For clockwise propagation direction, the static pressure is about 15% higher in the combustor compared with counterclockwise propagation direction, but the RDW dominant frequency is lower. When the oblique shock wave propagates across the TGV, the pressure oscillations reduces significantly. In addition, as the detonation products flow through the TGV, the static pressure drops up to 32% and 43% for clockwise and counterclockwise propagation process respectively.     

The Peninsular War guerrilla and its antecedents: humiliation forgotten,disaster prefigured: the guerra fantástica of 1762

ABSTRACT

The brief war that took place between Spain and Portugal in 1762 is one of the least known episodes in the latter’s military history, whereas, thanks to Wellington’s construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras, the French invasion of 1810–11 is right at the other end of the spectrum. Yet the two episodes are closely linked to one another. At the very least, they are uncannily reminiscent in terms of their details – in both cases substantial foreign armies were vanquished through a combination of irregular resistance, scorched-earth tactics and the clever use of field fortifications – and the article therefore argues that Wellington based the plan that defeated the forces of Marshal Massena on the strategy used by the Portuguese half a century earlier.     

Organizing for the ‘gray zone’ fight: early Cold War realities and the CIA’s Directorate of Operations

ABSTRACT

Despite its portrayal as something new, the concept of the ‘gray zone’ is not novel. It was the Cold War battleground in which the USA and the Soviet Union waged rival unconventional campaigns, and it was there that the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was given responsibility for operating. This was not the organization’s original purpose, but Cold War exigencies forced Washington to improvise and build an organization with unique capabilities. These early years shaped the CIA’s operations directorate, creating two distinct cultures within the larger agency, one focused on intelligence collection and the other focused on covert action.