Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

The vanguard's dilemma: understanding and exploiting insurgent strategies

The purpose of this paper is to provide a better conceptualization of insurgent strategies. Specifically, I shall examine Che Guevara's ‘Foco’ theory of insurgency, as it is one of the most theoretically popular and most pervasive strategies of insurgency currently practiced throughout the world. After briefly examining the origins, objectives, and theoretical strengths of the Foco theory (also known as the Vanguard Theory), I will argue that Guevara's theory suffers from an internal tension that I term the ‘Vanguard's Dilemma’. The significance of this dilemma creates a tension within the Vanguard Theory that can be fatal for insurgents if properly exploited by counterinsurgent operations. This paper will examine in detail this dilemma and show how it can be exploited. Given that several insurgent groups within Iraq and Afghanistan currently adhere to the Vanguard Theory of insurgency, a proper understanding of this insurgent strategy is an essential first step in the long road towards confronting and winning asymmetrical conflicts.     

At war with social theory: Instrumental and communicative action in US military doctrine during the War on Terror

As US counterinsurgency campaigns draw to a close, doctrine for asymmetric warfare written during the War on Terror has come under heavy criticism. While many have argued that this shift to ‘winning hearts and minds’ is evidence that the United States is taking humanitarianism and nation-building seriously, others argue that a wide gap exists between US counterinsurgency doctrine and the protection of civilians afflicted by conflict. In this article, I show that the latter is true by comparing theories of instrumental and communicative action to US doctrine for operational design, stability operations, and counterinsurgency. I argue that these texts treat the people as an object to be manipulated for the achievement of pre-determined self-interested strategic goals rather than members of a community that jointly designs operations to fulfill shared objectives. However, US doctrine does contain communicative elements that, if prioritized, would better support humanitarian and state-building objectives otherwise subordinated in the War on Terror.     

室温下单电子晶体管3种临界尺寸的确定

为使单电子晶体管达到实际应用的地步,开展室温条件下相关研究成为必然。从正统理论出发,推导、计算出室温条件下单电子晶体管能否正常工作的库仑岛临界尺寸:存储器件为6.5nm,逻辑器件为1.5nm;本文还推导和计算出单电子晶体管室温下发生能量量子化效应的临界尺寸:4.7nm,并对这3种临界尺寸进行了验证和分析。另外,通过比较分析本文还得出了室温条件下,所有逻辑器件均必须考虑能量量子化效应,所有存储器件应尽量考虑能量量子化效应的结论。分析结果表明,库仑岛临界尺寸的确定对单电子晶体管的实际应用具有重要意义。     

基于区间灰关联的雷达辐射源识别新方法

在现代密集信号环境中,接收机测得的和辐射源数据库中的雷达特征参数具有不确定性,一般用区间值表示.针对区间类型的特征参数的雷达辐射源识别,提出了一种新的基于区间灰关联度的雷达辐射源融合识别方法.该方法首先运用区间灰关联度得到基本概率赋值,然后运用证据组合与决策实现目标识别.仿真结果表明,这种识别方法是有效的.     

多源验前信息下基于证据理论的ML-Ⅱ融合方法

在复杂新型产品的可靠性评估中,试验的样本量通常较小,而Bayes方法在小样本统计推断中比经典统计方法更为适用.针对可靠性工程中遇到的验前信息的多源性问题,给出了一种基于证据理论的ML-Ⅱ融合方法.在融合过程中考虑了信息源的可信性,减小了可信度低的信息源对评估结果的影响.以电子产品为例,算例实验表明了该方法在有“干扰信息源”存在的情况下的评估结果的有效性和合理性.     

基于改进证据理论的多传感器目标识别

由于证据理论融合冲突信息会得出不合理的结论,限制了其在目标识别中的应用.为解决这一问题,提出了一种改进融合方法.研究各证据与其他证据的联系,通过计算证据与其他证据均值的距离,求出此证据受其他证据的支持度.归一化支持度获得证据权值,加权平均原有证据后按Dempster规则融合,作出识别.针对空中目标识别算例,对比验证几种方法,结果显示:该方法能够融合冲突信息,在降低计算量的同时,加快收敛速度,提高了识别快速性和准确性.     

基于排队论的装备维修人员数量需求模型*

确定维修人员需求是对装备维修机构进行科学管理和对维修人员进行有计划培训的需要。在分析装备维修人员构成的随机服务系统特征的基础上,运用排队论理论建立了以平均等待时间为目标的维修人员需求的愿望模型,该模型可更加确切地描述各专业对维修人员的实际需求。通过对模型进行仿真,结果表明了模型的合理性。     

装备维修系统的组织模型研究

综述了组织模型的研究现状,用维修组织的存在环境、构成要素、维修目标、维修策略和存在时间建立了复杂装备维修系统的形式化模型,分析并研究了维修组织要素之间的交互、隶属与协作关系,定义了维修系统的元组织。该方法可描述动态复杂条件下的维修系统,有利于装备维修保障信息系统的计算机建模与实现。     

装备采购理论体系研究

为加强装备采购理论研究的顶层设计,促进装备采购理论发展,在分析装备采购理论体系研究必要性的基础上,运用纵横统一的方法,对装备采购理论体系框架进行了构建,对装备采购理论研究方向进行了规划。