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151.
采用步冷曲线法测定了不同组成的十六醇-癸酸二元体系的相变温度,绘制了该体系的T-X相图,该体系为具有最低共熔点的二元体系,其最低共熔温度为常温,具有广泛的应用价值。 相似文献
152.
Daniel Goure 《Defense & Security Analysis》2012,28(1):17-35
In 2009, the Obama administration announced a new missile defense strategy, termed a phased-adaptive architecture (PAA) focused primarily on countering the growing threat from theater ballistic missiles. The success of this strategy is predicated on the rapid development and fielding of successive increments of defensive capability in a manner adapted to the specific requirements for missile defenses in different regions of the world. The administration is committed to building a European regional missile defense system, the European PAA or EPAA between now and 2020. The first elements of the EPAA were deployed in late 2011. However, much progress is still required in order to reach the goals set for the PAA. This article addresses the technological, operational and political issues confronting the Obama administration in its efforts to make the PAA a reality. 相似文献
153.
Stephen Blank 《Defense & Security Analysis》2012,28(1):36-54
Asia, where nuclear powers already interact (including North Korea), exerts a growing influence on the thinking and policy underlying Russia's current and future nuclear (and overall defense) posture. China's rise is forcing Russia into a greater reliance on strategic offensive weapons and tactical nuclear weapons. These in turn will reinforce its opposition to US missile defenses, not only in Europe but also in Asia. Russia must now entertain the possibility of nuclear use in regional conflicts that would otherwise remain purely conventional. It cannot be postulated blindly that nuclear weapons serve no discernible purpose other than to deter nuclear attacks by other nuclear powers. The strategic equation in Asia and in the Russian Far East convincingly demonstrates the falsity of this approach. Nuclear weapons will be the essential component of Russia's regional defense policy if not of its overall policies – and this also includes contingencies in Europe. 相似文献
154.
Henry U. Ufomba 《Defense & Security Analysis》2012,28(4):360-367
Apart from North Korea, no state's nuclear program in the twenty-first century has raised more concern to international security than Iran's. While Iran insists that its nuclear program is strictly for civilian purpose in line with Article IV of non-proliferation treaty, the USA and its allies insist that Iran has military intentions and called for sanctions. The failure of sanctions to deter Iran from its nuclear agenda had made many scholars and policy-makers call for a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Situated within this debate, this paper positions itself as an antagonist to the preemptive airstrike option and argues that involving India in a possible nuclear “iron curtain” against Iran – a move known as technical isolation – remains the best option to the current nuclear crises. 相似文献
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Thomas A. Marks 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2017,28(1):81-118
During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times. 相似文献
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