Optimal operating policies in a commodity trading market with the manufacturer's presence

With the help of the Internet and express delivery at relatively low costs, trading markets have become increasingly popular as a venue to sell excess inventory and a source to obtain products at lower prices. In this article, we study the operational decisions in the presence of a trading market in a periodic‐review, finite‐horizon setting. Prices in the trading market change periodically and are determined endogenously by the demand and supply in the market. We characterize the retailers'optimal ordering and trading policies when the original manufacturer and the trading market co‐exist and retailers face fees to participate in the trading market. Comparing with the case with no trading fees, we obtain insights into the impact of trading fees and the fee structure on the retailers and the manufacturer. Further, we find that by continually staying in the market, the manufacturer may use her pricing strategies to counter‐balance the negative impact of the trading market on her profit. Finally, we extend the model to the case when retailers dynamically update their demand distribution based on demand observations in previous periods. A numerical study provides additional insights into the impact of demand updating in a trading market with the manufacturer's competition. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

测试轮直径对路面不平度测试精度的影响

在加速度信号的路面不平度测量过程中,由于测试轮的几何外形对路面的滤波作用,会对功率谱密度的测量产生误差。为解决这一问题,在仿真环境下,通过测量在给定路面等级的随机路上行驶的测试装置测试轮的响应,研究不同直径的测试轮对同一路面不平度的滤波作用,分析其影响关系,从而为路面不平度测试装置测试轮轮径的选择提供参考。     

国家能源供给对军队后勤建设的影响研究

军队后勤建设离不开国家能源供给,军队能源储备、军事训练、国防工程、科研试验以及日常生活等方面均与国家能源供给有着密切的关系。探讨了国家能源供给对军队后勤建设的影响内容,分析了国家能源供给对军队后勤建设的影响,提出了确定国家能源供给对军队后勤建设影响的方法步骤。     

军事供应链不确定性产生机理研究

军事供应链中不可避免地存在不确定性。构建了军事供应链不确定性产生机理的概念模型,从需求、供应、环境三个方面分析了军事供应链不确定性产生的原因,同时,对军事供应链中可能存在的各种不确定性进行了讨论,明确了加剧不确定性影响的因素是军事供应链系统的复杂性。具体表现为军事供应链成员交互关系的复杂性和军事供应链网络结构的复杂性。提出正是由于这两个原因的存在,对军事供应链的保障性能产生了巨大的影响。     

Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

We study the supplier relationship choice for a buyer that invests in transferable capacity operated by a supplier. With a long‐term relationship, the buyer commits to source from a supplier over a long period of time. With a short‐term relationship, the buyer leaves open the option of switching to a new supplier in the future. The buyer has incomplete information about a supplies efficiency, and thus uses auctions to select suppliers and determine the contracts. In addition, the buyer faces uncertain demand for the product. A long‐term relationship may be beneficial for the buyer because it motivates more aggressive bidding at the beginning, resulting a lower initial price. A short‐term relationship may be advantageous because it allows switching, with capacity transfer at some cost, to a more efficient supplier in the future. We find that there exists a critical level of the switching cost above which a long‐term relationship is better for the buyer than a short‐term relationship. In addition, this critical switching cost decreases with demand uncertainty, implying a long‐term relationship is more favorable for a buyer facing volatile demand. Finally, we find that in a long‐term relationship, capacity can be either higher or lower than in a short‐term relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Contracts and coordination: Supply chains with uncertain demand and supply

Considering a supply chain with a supplier subject to yield uncertainty selling to a retailer facing stochastic demand, we find that commonly studied classical coordination contracts fail to coordinate both the supplier's production and the retailer's procurement decisions and achieve efficient performance. First, we study the vendor managed inventory (VMI) partnership. We find that a consignment VMI partnership coupled with a production cost subsidy achieves perfect coordination and a win‐win outcome; it is simple to implement and arbitrarily allocates total channel profit. The production cost subsidy optimally chosen through Nash bargaining analysis depends on the bargaining power of the supplier and the retailer. Further, motivated by the practice that sometimes the retailer and the supplier can arrange a “late order,” we also analyze the behavior of an advance‐purchase discount (APD) contract. We find that an APD with a revenue sharing contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain as well as achieve flexible profit allocation. Finally, we explore which coordination contract works better for the supplier vs. the retailer. It is interesting to observe that Nash bargaining solutions for the two coordination contracts are equivalent. We further provide recommendations on the applications of these contracts. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 305–319, 2016     

Resequencing with parallel queues to minimize the maximum number of items in the overflow area

This article treats an elementary optimization problem, where an inbound stream of successive items is to be resequenced with the help of multiple parallel queues in order to restore an intended target sequence. Whenever early items block the one item to be currently released into the target sequence, they are withdrawn from their queue and intermediately stored in an overflow area until their actual release is reached. We aim to minimize the maximum number of items simultaneously stored in the overflow area during the complete resequencing process. We met this problem in industry practice at a large German automobile producer, who has to resequence containers with car seats prior to the assembly process. We formalize the resulting resequencing problem and provide suited exact and heuristic solution algorithms. In our computational study, we also address managerial aspects such as how to properly avoid the negative effects of sequence alterations. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 401–415, 2016