The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: ascertaining causation and determining solutions

By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.     

Contents and Author Index,Volume 19, 2012

The U.S. Congress, charged with overseeing U.S. nuclear weapons policy and programs, usually addresses such policies and programs through the annual authorization and appropriations process, focusing mostly on questions of how many and what types of weapons the United States should deploy, with little attention paid to questions about nuclear weapons strategy, doctrine, and policy. The oversight process has brought about some significant changes in the plans for U.S. nuclear weapons, including the elimination of funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study and the shift of that funding into a study of the Reliable Replacement Warhead. But with the focus on authorizations and appropriations, along with the divided jurisdiction over nuclear weapons policy and programs in congressional committees, Congress has not, either recently or during the Cold War and post–Cold War eras, conducted a more comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, policy, or force structure. Changes in committee jurisdictions could affect the oversight process, but as long as nuclear weapons policy and programs remain a relatively low priority for most members of Congress, and the country at large, it is unlikely that Congress will pursue such a comprehensive debate.     

HARNESSING GLOBAL TRADE DATA FOR BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL

Unlike treaties dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention still lacks formal verification measures, 31 years after entering into force. Here we propose a global export-import monitoring system of biological dual-use items as an additional measure for a web of biological arms controls that could complement traditional export controls. We suggest that such a measure may help to guide consultation or verification processes in the biological area.     

“GOOD COP/BAD COP” AS A MODEL FOR NONPROLIFERATION DIPLOMACY TOWARD NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

Scholarly and popular literature in the recent past has framed nonproliferation diplomacy toward both Iran and North Korea as an example of “good cop/bad cop,” a social-psychological strategy borrowed from law enforcement to describe a process for forcing a confession by subjecting a target to stressful emotional contrast. This article examines those two cases, roughly covering the period since 2003, when the most recent attempts to deal with the Iranian and North Korean proliferation threats began, in light of criteria for employment of the good cop/bad cop strategy. There is some evidence that within the framework of the six-party talks with North Korea and within the framework of the EU-3-U.S. diplomacy toward Iran, the players seeking nonproliferation have adopted good cop/bad cop roles to that end. The article concludes, however, that while there are similarities to the interrogation room technique, the complexity of the international political environment as compared to the interrogation room has prevented the states involved from successfully adopting or effectively exploiting good and bad cop roles. Substantial and exploitable differences of interest among them, and the availability of alternative “escape routes” for the target state, raise serious questions about the applicability of the good cop/bad cop strategy to these two nonproliferation cases, and even about its applicability in future nonproliferation challenges.     

INDIA AND THE NEW LOOK OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

U.S. nuclear export policy has undergone major transformations since 1945, and the most recent change, as expressed in the July 18, 2005, India-U.S. Joint Statement, represents an especially significant shift in policy. The document reverses more than a quarter century of U.S. declaratory policy, suggesting that the current U.S. administration regards nuclear proliferation to be both inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing. This article investigates this policy shift, looking at the history of U.S. nuclear export policy and the potential ramifications of the new policy on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The author also touches on the potential effects of the Joint Statement on Indian-Pakistani relations. Finally, it is suggested that it is not too late for India and the United States to change the new policy with more consideration for the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group Initiative.     

ACHIEVING NUCLEAR BALANCE

One of the most important questions affecting U.S. national security is the future size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. While there is clear consensus within the U.S. government on the need to reduce the size of the arsenal, there is none on the best path to achieve these cuts; on the type of deterrent necessary to deal with future threats; or on the size of the production complex needed to support that arsenal. Creating a strategic commission to review these questions, as contemplated in the Fiscal 2008 House Defense Authorization bill, is a necessary first step to establish a sensible nuclear policy. The Reliable Replacement Warhead, which has the potential to transform the complex while preserving the current moratorium on nuclear testing, is a program worth exploring further if it stays within congressionally mandated bounds. As Congress considers both programmatic and policy matters related to U.S. nuclear weapons, it is vital that we also renew and strengthen U.S. leadership on nuclear nonproliferation.     

美军新版《太空作战》联合条令的主要内容、变化及分析

2013年5月29日,美军参联会发布新版《太空作战》联合条令。文章对新版条令的主要内容进行了概括,对新、旧版本条令的差异进行了分析研究。     

The industrial structure of National Defence and transaction costs

A recent paper in Defence Economics suggests that “a single variable, the public opinion balance, ... when accompanied by a control variable measuring the proportion of responses in the ‘residuum’ (no opinion or keep the status quo), permits an accurate prediction of subsequent changes in the rate of change of U.S. defense outlays from the mid‐1960s through the 1980s” (Higgs and Kilduff, 1993, p. 227). In contrast, this comment provides evidence that since 1986 the Higgs‐Kilduff model frequently mispredicts the direction of U.S. defense spending. In addition, the average prediction error, and its variance, since 1986 consistently exceeds the average prediction error, and its variance, for the years prior to 1986.     

基于TCP/IP协议的无人机IFFC系统仿真

为了提高无人机自主飞行、自主攻击的能力,设计一种整体式的无人机综合火力/飞行控制系统(IFFC系统),并对激光制导炸弹模态下的系统进行数字仿真.系统基于Winsock的TCP/IP协议的C/S模式,在服务器上完成无人机火控解算、火飞耦合器设计,在客户端设计基于PID算法的飞行控制模块.火控系统根据飞行状态和目标信息实时计算炸弹可达区域,瞄准距离误差经过火飞耦合器形成航向和俯仰控制命令反馈给飞控系统,驱动载机消.除瞄准误差,实现闭环控制.实验结果表明,无人机的瞄准速度和攻击精度都有所提高,为进一步开展自主式UAV的研究打下基础.     

Effects of Mg/PTFE pyrotechnic compositions on reignition characteristics of base bleed propellants and heating mechanism

The effects of magnesium/polytetrafluoroethylene (Mg/PTFE) pyrotechnic compositions on the coupled flow field and reignition mechanism are important aspects governing the performance and range of base bleed projectiles (BBPs).Owing to a decrease in pressure and temperature when the BBP leaves the muzzle,rapid depressurization occurs,which extinguishes the base bleed propellant.The Mg/PTFE py-rotechnic composition pressed in the igniter of the base bleed unit (BBU) provides additional energy to the BBU via a chemical reaction.Thus,the extinguished base bleed propellant is reignited under the effect of high-temperature combustion gas jets from the igniter.In this study,a numerical analysis is conducted to evaluate the effects of PTFE and Mg granularity as well as Mg/PTFE pyrotechnic compo-sitions.Owing to the rapid depressurization,the temperature and pressure was found to decrease for different Mg/PTFE pyrotechnic compositions.However,the depressurization time increased as the PTFE granularity increased,the Mg granularity decreased,and the Mg content increased.When the pressure in the combustion chamber of the BBU decreased to the atmospheric pressure,the combustion gas jets from the igniter expand upstream (rather than downstream).However,these combustion gas jets exhibit different axial and radial expansion characteristics depending on the pyrotechnic compositions used.The results show that the reignition delay time,td,of the base bleed propellant was 377.608,94.27,387.243,523.966,and 221.094 ms for cases A-E,respectively.Therefore,it was concluded that the Mg/PTFE pyrotechnic composition of case B was the most beneficial for the reignition of the base bleed propellant,with the earliest addition of energy and mass to the BBP.