地铁火灾应急预案的制定

介绍地铁火灾发生时的几个主要的特点以及其巨大的危害性,引出了地铁火灾应急预案制定模式的重要性。通过对已有的资料进行研究、分析,同时结合实际,对地铁火灾应急预案制定时所包含的主要内容进行了科学的完善,得出了一个完整的预案制定模式。     

输电塔-线体系在断线作用下的动力响应

架空送电线路设计技术规程给出了断线情况下导地线静态平衡后的张力系数,该系数没有考虑塔-线体系的动态冲击效应。以晋东南-南阳-荆门1000kV输电线路沿山头汉江大跨越工程为参考,利用两基三线模型分析了断线工况下大跨越输电塔的动力响应。数值模拟分析表明,断线荷载对输电塔的冲击作用显著,应力放大系数γ达到1．42—1．94。该结论可以为输电线路相关规范的制定提供参考,也为类似塔-线结构体系的动力计算提供借鉴。     

基于估计协方差MME检测的频谱感知算法

针对小采样数据长度下,采样协方差矩阵对统计协方差矩阵估计不准,影响传统最大最小特征值(MME)检测算法检测性能的问题,提出一种基于逼近收缩(OAS)矩阵估计的改进MME检测算法。首先利用OAS估计量对采样数据做协方差矩阵估计,再对估计协方差矩阵特征值分解,将最大最小特征值之比作为检测统计量,克服了传统MME算法检测门限随采样点大幅波动的缺陷,提高了检测门限的鲁棒性。仿真结果表明,所提算法的检测门限具有鲁棒性,检测性能提高了1 d B~2 d B。     

运载器牵制释放结构动力响应数值模拟方法研究

将运载器牵制释放垂直发射的过程依次分为静态、牵制、释放三个阶段.利用MSC.Patran/Nastran的场功能和分组分析功能,将前一个阶段的计算结果场向后一个阶段的初始条件场传递,提出了一种分析运载器牵制释放全过程结构动力响应的分阶段计算新方法.解决了牵制释放过程中由于出现运载器-发射台分离面给结构动力响应计算带来的困难.采用该方法计算了几个运载器牵制释放的算例,分析了牵制阶段牵制力的变化、释放阶段运载器结构动力响应的特点、不同释放时间对结构动力响应的影响.算例表明:该方法实施简便、精度较高,还可拓展用于不同时刻释放、释放不同步、施加缓释力等条件下运载器结构动力响应的分析,为牵制释放系统的研制提供参考.     

一类具Holling-Ⅲ类功能性反应的食物有限捕食-被捕食模型的极限环

研究一类具Holling-Ⅲ类功能性反应的食物有限捕食-被捕食模型的动力学性态。应用微分方程定性理论,证明当正平衡点不稳定时该模型存在唯一稳定的极限环。     

频域加权LQR控制器改进设计

基于线性二次型调节器(Linear Quadratic Regulator,LQR)控制方法,设计一种频域加权LQR控制器;通过对其常用滤波器进行改进,提出一种新型滤波器设计思路.当振源频率低于执行器下限响应频率,导致执行器输出减小时,通过改变滤波器参数、增大低频部分权重及控制力,可提高低于执行器响应下限频段的控制性能...     

India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.