Noncombatant Immunity and the Ethics of Blockade

This article counters Michael Walzer's argument against tight blockades. It shows that the interdiction of food shipments need not violate the principle of noncombatant immunity. Whether it is morally permissible to impose a strict blockade depends on the circumstances of the target state. The more self-sufficient a country is, the more acceptable it should be for a belligerent to cut the enemy's external lines of supply. The Allied blockade of Germany during the First World War illustrates the argument. Fault in this case should be assigned to the German government for the loss of civilian lives.     

War,vagueness and hybrid war

It has frequently been observed in the literature on hybrid wars that there is a grey zone between peace and war, and that hybrid wars are conflicts which are not clear cases of war. In this paper, I attempt to illuminate this grey zone and the concept and nature of war from the philosophical discussions of vagueness and institutional facts. Vague terms are characterized by the fact that there is no non-arbitrary boundary between entities which lie in their extension, and entities which do not lie in their extension. I apply a theory of vagueness to notions such as “war” and “peace” and go on to suggest that the exact boundary for what counts as a war or not is arbitrary. However, the context in which the conflict occurs determines a range of possible locations for this boundary. The most important contextual parameter is in this respect how the parties to the conflict themselves conceptualize the conflict. I suggest that this can in various ways help us understand grey-zone conflicts.     

《孙子兵法》“令之以文，齐之以武”治军思想对院校学员队管理的启示

孙子兵法治军思想的核心是“令之以文,齐之以武”,用现代的观点来解读就是“以情带兵、依法治军”的思想,其对我们的工作实践有重要的启示意义。结合院校实际,抓好学员队的管理工作就是要“以情带兵、依法治队”,队干部只要把握好使用二者的尺度,就能带出一支纪律严明、充满活力的部队,营造出一个育人成才的和谐氛围。     

浅谈《孙子兵法》在部队安全防事故中的应用

《孙子兵法》中所蕴含的军队管理理念对部队的安全防事故工作有着高度的借鉴意义。从各级指挥员是部队安全防事故工作的主导,有效预防各类事故案件指挥员应具备综合的管理素质,明确部队安全防事故工作是全体官兵的共同责任三个方面,对《孙子兵法》在部队安全防事故中应用的合理性进行了分析。     

Tilting at windmills: The flawed U.S. policy toward the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war

ABSTRACT

This article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger’s own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon’s policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors.     

‘A Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut’? Naval Gunfire Support During the Malayan Emergency

The utility of naval gunfire support (NGS) during the Malayan Emergency has been the subject of significant scrutiny. While the limitations of NGS were demonstrated in Malaya, it also has proven to be extremely useful under certain circumstances. The circumstances in which NGS has proven effective during earlier and later insurgencies have generally reflected those of the Malayan Emergency. Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been less conducive to the application of maritime power, but they did not denote the end of the naval role or the potential usefulness of NGS in counterinsurgency operations. NGS is an unheralded capability, but, aside from the historical significance, it remains relevant in the contemporary era under the right conditions.     

The timing of contests

We develop a simple model to analyze the timing of contests. When the odds of winning a contest are exogenously given – we show that if either the players discount the future or if the total cost of contest is smaller in the future – there exist subgame perfect equilibria where both players settle, anticipating a contest in the future. With endogenous efforts, the aggregate efforts expanded in a contest are smaller if the contest occurs in the future when the relative effort productivities remain constant or diverge over time, thus creating scope for delay in contests. When the effort productivities converge over time, the total efforts may be greater under a future contest. As a consequence, players either settle over the two periods, or else they initiate a contest immediately.     

An Investigation of the Weights of Pattern 1907 Bayonets made in the UK around the First World War Period

The standard issue bayonet of the British Army immediately preceding and during the First World War was the Pattern 1907. This was manufactured at different times and in varying numbers during that period by one official body, the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield, and by five private contractors. These bayonets were made according to published official specifications issued by the War Department and based on a ‘pattern example’ provided by the Royal Small Arms Factory. The specifications indicate, inter alia, the quality of metal used in making the bayonets, methods of inspection and proofing, and the required maximum and minimum weight range of the completed bayonet. However, examination of a series of these bayonets in a private collection suggested that their weights varied considerably from the mid-point values of the allowed weight ranges in the original and amended specifications (16.5 oz. and 17 oz., respectively). To establish if this was a common feature among this class of bayonet as opposed to a chance factor, the weights of other surviving Pattern 1907 bayonets were determined and compared to establish the degree of variance from the official specifications as originally set out by the Royal Small Arms Factory. Seventy-six percent of the 142 bayonets surveyed were found to be above the mid-point of the allowed weight range given in the amended manufacturing specifications, with many being at the upper end of the allowed range. This is a statistically unusual result. It is speculated that the target weight may have been deliberately set higher by the individual manufacturers to eliminate the possibility of rejection of any underweight bayonets by the Royal Small Arms Factory inspectors and so a refusal of acceptance and payment for the work.     

HOW WAS THE COLD WAR WON?

Reagan's Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster, by Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson. Crown Publishers, 2009. 464 pages, $32.50.

The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War, by James Mann. Viking, 2009. 410 pages, $27.95.     

The impact of strategy and measurement on models of French military expenditure

The intention of this paper is to analyse why people go to war, despite the, at first sight, divergence between benefits and costs. This paper provides a comparison of the willingness to go to war in different OECD countries using World Values Survey data. The empirical findings in the United States, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden and West Germany, using the willingness to fight as a dependent variable, indicate that such factors as pride, trust, and political ideology significantly influence individuals' willingness to go to war.