The British occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922

During World War I the military campaign in Mesopotamia placed enormous demands on local man- and animal power to provide the logistical resources vital to its conduct. This required the British civil and military authorities to construct a wartime state apparatus that filled the administrative vacuum left by the retreating Ottomans and made possible its downward penetration and mobilisation of local resources for the war effort. This article examines the interaction of politics and logistics in Mesopotamia and views the enhanced wartime levels of resource extraction in light of the British attempts to codify their presence in the country after 1918 and the nationalist backlash that resulted.     

Rubber match: a third Lebanon war

Israel and Hezbollah have applied the lessons learned from the 2006 Lebanon War and have been preparing for a future conflict with both sides aiming for a more decisive victory. With improved capabilities from 2006, future hostilities will be far more destructive. This article analyzes their performance in 2006 and the lessons they have drawn to predict what a future conflict is likely to look like. The article analyzes both parties in three categories: ground forces; rockets, missiles, and anti-armor weapons; and lastly, Israel's air and sea dominance and Hezbollah's efforts to counter that dominance. Finally, this article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is unlikely to become a larger regional conflict involving Syria and Iran.     

Major Stepan Stebelski of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: examples of insurgency leadership and tactics

This is a biographical analysis of Stepan Stebelski (‘Khrin’) and his time in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. His military command is an example of classic insurgency tactics and strategies. He was trained in underground tactics before the Second World War, used his image very effectively during his time in the UPA, and used his knowledge of the terrain to become an exceptional enemy against Soviet and Polish authorities.     

Budget allocation under uncertainty and the costs of war and insecurity

This study presents a framework and models for the analysis of government budget allocation into defense and civilian expenditures in situations of uncertainty about the incidence of war. The models display the intricate relationships between security levels, subjective probabilities of the occurrence of war, and potential war damages. We show that poor countries tend to perceive greater probabilities of war than their richer rivals, and that the psychological burden of insecurity is larger when the country’s wealth is larger and when its preference for security is higher. We apply our models to the Israeli–Syrian arms race and show that the higher rate of growth of Israel’s gross domestic product relative to that of Syria is expected to lead to an increase in Syria’s perception of the likelihood of war and to a decrease in Israel’s perception of such a likelihood. We also show that if Syria’s regime becomes ideologically more extreme, the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s security at the level that it enjoyed prior to the change will be very high, whereas the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s welfare will be moderate.     

超声速导弹的光滑二阶滑模控制器设计

建立了带有气动系数不确定量和外界干扰的超声速导弹的运动模型。采用输出重定义技术克服了导弹过载输出的非最小相位特性,利用容易测量的过载和角速度相组合重新定义了新输出量。为了削弱滑模控制的颤振影响,同时又保持滑模控制的强鲁棒性,采用光滑二阶滑模控制方法设计了导弹过载控制系统中的控制器。设计了二阶滑模观测器对汇总不确定量进行有效估计。为了检验所设计的观测器和控制器的控制效果,仿真分析中对比了光滑二阶滑模控制器和传统滑模控制器的仿真结果。仿真结果表明：光滑二阶滑模控制器能够有效地削弱颤振影响,使导弹过载输出快速准确地跟踪上过载指令信号。     

‘Full spectrum dominance’: Donald Rumsfeld,the Department of Defense,and US irregular warfare strategy, 2001–2008

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake.     

Guerrillas and bandits in the Serranía de Ronda, 1810–1812

The Spanish Guerrilla (1808–1812) which has given its name to ideologically motivated insurgencies is usually portrayed as a patriotic uprising against the French occupation forces of Napoleon. It was that, in part, but also many other things besides. This case study illustrates its overlap and convergence with banditry but also with social unrest turned into uprisings directed by poor Spaniards against their creditors, as in the storming of Ronda by insurgents in 1810. From the propaganda of the day to the subsequent Spanish patriotic historiography, there has been a tendency to exaggerate the amplitude of events and also the damage that was done to the French forces and the casualty figures inflicted on them.     

浅谈《孙子兵法》中的战场造势理论

《孙子兵法》问世两千多年以来,其学术价值受到历代军事家、史学家、哲学家们的广泛重视和一致赞誉。对于战场造势的研究,尤以孙子兵法为最先和最具代表性。其中,先胜后战、因情造势和择人任势等内容,是《孙子兵法》中战场造势理论的核心和精华。     

潜艇近水面定深航行时的变结构控制方法研究

用自由递阶的变结构控制（ＶＳＣ）方法研究了在二阶波浪力干扰下,潜艇近水面航行时的定深控制问题,并分析了各控制参数对控制性能的影响。通过与ＰＩＤ控制方法的比较,表明本文设计的变结构控制系统具有较高的控制精度和较强的适应性。     

A chessboard model of the U‐boat war in the Atlantic with applications to signals intelligence

This paper uses a simple Monte Carlo model to analyze the influence of signals intelligence on the Second World War's Battle of the Atlantic. The principle measure of effectiveness is the number of U‐boat days of attack to which convoys were subjected. A secondary measure is the number of convoyed ships sunk. The model is validated against historical data and then used to explore the effectiveness of the two sides' signals intelligence. Allied use of signals intelligence is shown to have been capable of completely offsetting German use of signals intelligence, and then some. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005