空降兵师(团)登岛作战兵力分配模型

通过结合空降兵师(团)级登岛作战的战术特点,确立了遮断点的单点和联合价值的指标体系,建立了以联盟博弈为基础的兵力分配初步模型,然后以Shapley值作为此联盟博弈的解,结合投放过程中的兵力损耗,得到一个合理的兵力分配方案,从而建立了师(团)级空降登岛作战的兵力分配模型和算法.     

基于成品油有限竞争市场的军油筹措战略研究

对国家成品油市场进行分析,认为目前国内成品油市场是典型的双寡头垄断有限竞争市场。通过对成品油市场主体厂商行为博弈的讨论,得出产量博弈的状况近期不会出现,价格博弈将使企业走入囚徒困境的结论。根据分析针对性地提出军油筹措战略,为相关决策提供参考。     

Inventory transshipment game with limited supply: Trap or treat

Inventory transshipment is generally shown to be beneficial to retailers by matching their excess demand with surplus inventory. We investigate an inventory transshipment game with two newsvendor-type retailers under limited total supply and check whether the retailers are better off than the case without transshipment. We derive the ordering strategies for the retailers and show that unlike the unlimited supply case, a pure Nash equilibrium only exists under certain conditions. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that inventory transshipment may not always benefit both retailers. Although one of the retailers is guaranteed to be better off, the other could be worse off. The decision criteria are then provided for the retailers to determine if they will benefit from the exercise of inventory transshipment. Numerical study indicates that the carefully chosen transshipment prices play an important role in keeping inventory transshipment beneficial to both retailers. Subsequently, a coordinating mechanism is designed for the retailers to negotiate transshipment prices that maximize the total profit of the two retailers while keeping each of them in a beneficial position.     

Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game‐theoretic model

Consider a distributed system where many gatekeepers share a single server. Customers arrive at each gatekeeper according to independent Poisson processes with different rates. Upon arrival of a new customer, the gatekeeper has to decide whether to admit the customer by sending it to the server, or to block it. Blocking costs nothing. The gatekeeper receives a reward after a customer completes the service, and incurs a cost if an admitted customer finds a busy server and therefore has to leave the system. Assuming an exponential service distribution, we formulate the problem as an n‐person non‐zero‐sum game in which each gatekeeper is interested in maximizing its own long‐run average reward. The key result is that each gatekeeper's optimal policy is that of a threshold type regardless what other gatekeepers do. We then derive Nash equilibria and discuss interesting insights. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 702–718, 2003.     

二维非线性正交异性材料的瞬态热传导反问题研究

针对正交异性材料的二维非线性热传导反问题,本文采用顺序函数法对表面热流辨识进行了研究。在求解反问题时用到有限体积法、牛顿-拉夫逊法并引入未来时间步长的概念。在每个时间步内,将待辨识热流视为非线性方程组的未知量,通过一个迭代过程进行求解。从文中的例子可以看出,真实热流和辨识热流结果相近,从而证明了本方法在辨识二维非线性热传导反问题时是准确、稳定、有效的。     

军事云环境下基于动态博弈的资源调度方法

针对军事云环境下联合指挥资源调度优化问题,综合考虑了多部队任务需求,多目标优化,多部队资源竞争等约束条件,运用动态博弈理论及方法,建立并提出了一种基于完全信息扩展博弈的资源调度模型及方法,提高了资源调度效率,兼顾了多部队利益,增加了联合作战效益。最后通过实验验证了其有效性及准确性。     

基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略

以无人车集群系统协同监视再入体着靶过程为任务背景,开展智能集群自组织策略相关技术研究。设计无人车集群执行再入体着靶协同监视的集群行为模式;针对协同监视过程中的集群聚集行为,提出基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略。各智能体以实现群体聚集为"合作目标",以降低自身能量消耗为"竞争目标",开展博弈;基于微粒群算法规划局部路径,最终使群体系统涌现出聚集行为。仿真实验验证了设计的自主聚集策略的有效性。     

The timing of contests

We develop a simple model to analyze the timing of contests. When the odds of winning a contest are exogenously given – we show that if either the players discount the future or if the total cost of contest is smaller in the future – there exist subgame perfect equilibria where both players settle, anticipating a contest in the future. With endogenous efforts, the aggregate efforts expanded in a contest are smaller if the contest occurs in the future when the relative effort productivities remain constant or diverge over time, thus creating scope for delay in contests. When the effort productivities converge over time, the total efforts may be greater under a future contest. As a consequence, players either settle over the two periods, or else they initiate a contest immediately.     

中国空间安全形势

随着中国在太空领域的不断崛起,太空地位不断提升的同时,也面临着各种各样的挑战,这些挑战既有源自传统政治领域的大国阻挠,也有来自外太空的人类共同威胁。为了应对这些威胁和挑战,保护中国的太空利益和国家利益,我们需要从多方面着手,多管齐下,以维护日益重要的中国国家太空利益。     

Cost allocation of capacity investment games

Consider a manufacturer serving a set of retail stores each of which faces deterministic demands in a finite planning horizon. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the production capacity of the manufacturer is built, followed by production, outsourcing to third party manufacturers if necessary and distribution to the retail stores. Because the retail stores are usually managed by different managers who act as independent profit centers, it is desirable that the total cost is divided among the retail stores so that their incentives can be appropriately captured and thus efficient operations can be achieved. Under various conditions, we prove that there is a fair allocation of costs among the retail stores in the sense that no subset of retail stores subsidizes others, or equivalently, the resulting capacity investment game has a nonempty core, that is, the capacity investment game is a balanced game. In addition, our proof provides a mechanism to compute a fair cost allocation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 512–523, 2013