Interchange fee rate,merchant discount rate,and retail price in a credit card network: A game‐theoretic analysis

We consider two game‐theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer's interchange fee rate, an acquirer's merchant discount rate, and a merchant's retail price in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two‐stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail price, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent US bill “H.R. 2695,” we develop a three‐player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decision. We derive both the Shapley value‐ and the nucleolus‐characterized, and globally‐optimal unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we find that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also show that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill “H.R. 2695” is thus more effective, if the degree of division of labor in the credit card network is higher as the merchant, acquirer, and issuer are more specialized in the retailing, acquiring, and issuing operations, respectively. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

一种基于博弈论的无线网状网络路由与信道分配联合优化算法

无线网络中的路由与信道分配可极大地影响网络的性能.为了解决无线网状网络中的路由与信道分配问题,提出并研究了一种称为CRAG(基于博弈论的无线网状网络路由与信道分配联合优化)的方法.CRAG采用协同博弈的方式将网络中的每个节点模型化为一个弈者,每个弈者的策略为与其相关的路由与信道分配方案,收益函数为给定流量需求矩阵下的成功传输流量.弈者通过协同博弈来优化收益函数以最大化网络的吞吐量.基于NS3的仿真结果表明,CRAG在收敛性、时延、丢包率和吞吐量方面优于其他当前的算法,从而证明了协同博弈的方法可以用于无线网状网络的路由与信道分配联合优化,并有效地改进网络性能.     

基于Multi-Agent的航空集群系统重构机理研究

集群作战是未来空中作战的主要样式,其重构机理的研究对于提升航空集群执行任务的整体性能以及在遭受攻击时的生存能力具有重要作用。从作战任务层面出发,对集群系统重构的定义以及类型、触发机制和基本原则进行了分析阐述;借鉴博弈论理论,将航空集群系统分布式重构问题映射为多Agent之间的合作-竞争问题,建立了基于Multi-Agent的系统重构模型,给出了重构的流程与算法,为航空集群系统自适应重构能力的设计实现提供了理论技术支持。     

不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈分析

在详细分析威慑与威逼区别的基础上,构建了不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈模型。按照最大期望效用准则,分析了不完全信息下军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的条件,研究表明:运用鲁宾斯坦经典讨价还价唯一完美均衡解,得出以下结论:争夺目标自身的效用越大,战争带来的声誉得益效用越大,军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的可能性越大;一旦进入讨价还价阶段,威逼者会接受挑战者提出的方案,冲突将不再发生。     

多舰对抗研究

研究了海上军事实战模式抽象出的一追二和一二对抗的两大问题。解决一追二问题的方法共讨论了三种：初始角的平分线航向法、瞬时角的平分线航向法、中点轨迹法。给出了确定性的数学模型、以及选代计算方法。一二对抗问题的结论可以由—一对抗问题的结论经过迭加而得到。而—一对抗问题的解决是以定性微分对策的双边极值原理为基础展开的。     

Revisiting J.C. Wylie's Dichotomy of Strategy: The Effects of Sequential and Cumulative Patterns of Operations

J.C. Wylie presented his dichotomy of sequential and cumulative operational patterns in a context of effect through control, not victory or peace, as the objective of war. The author refines concepts of control presented by Rosinski, Eccles, Schelling and Corbett and presents its three facets (taking, denying, exercising) to develop a model of control as manipulation of the opponent's operational choices. This concept of control, when applied to sequential and cumulative strategy, reveals the effect each has operationally and, from there, strategically, in the primary arenas and forms of engagement (land, sea, air and cyberspace; conventional, guerrilla, terrorism, special operations).     

一种鲁棒的场地球类视频中的球门探测方法

在场地球类视频中,球门常常会伴随着精彩片段而出现。因此,球门探测是体育视频的基础,同时也是视频高层语义概念探测的研究热点。目前,利用机器学习方法进行视频中的对象探测是非常有前途的研究领域。基于此,提出一种基于模糊决策树的球门探测算法,用来探测场地球类视频中球门帧的出现,为了提高分类准确性,在模糊决策树训练的过程中加入了平衡处理。实验结果表明,与基于阈值和决策树的算法相比,该算法可以得到更好的分类结果(F-measure>95%),并且我们可以从所建立的树中推导出模糊规则来解释分类模型。     

多捐赠者肾脏调换问题

用于器官移植的肾脏处于严重的短缺状态。为缓解这一问题,越来越多的国家开始实施各种形式的肾脏调换计划。肾脏调换问题一般被建模为一个合作博弈(KE)。其中的局中人为病人及与其配型失败的捐赠者所构成的二元组。现实中不乏拥有多个配型失败捐赠者的病人。定义了多捐赠者肾脏调换博弈(MDKE),分析了其可行解及稳定解的结构,证明了捐赠多颗肾脏无益于参与稳定调换,将TTC算法、KE稳定解的NP难解性以及最大覆盖稳定解的不可近似性拓展到MDKE。实验表明引入MDKE效果显著。     

基于凸优化理论的三维微分对策制导规律求解

针对三维微分对策制导律(DGL)求解问题,引入凸优化理论,将DGL求解归结到Hamilton系统的求解,设计了DGL求解算法,通过对代价函数梯度特征的凸分析,推导出对策系统鞍点存在的充要条件和求解方法,解决了以往通过对微分对策模型简化求解导致的模型不能客观反映作战过程的问题.     

Discrete search allocation game with false contacts

This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007