对抗战时期中国机器工业“繁荣”的思辨

抗战时期,中国的机器业获得了一个＂繁荣＂的发展。这是近代中国追求机器业发展几十年的结果,更是战争特殊环境直接推动的结果。然而,这种主要因战争而＂繁荣＂的假象是暂时的,在整个中国工业中的比重也很弱,它并没有将中国工业化推向深入。同时,就战争带给机器业的影响来看,它是一把双刃剑,无论就战争发动者与应对者,它带给人类的是祸大于福,任何寄希望于战争带动社会经济、大发战争财的做法迟早会作茧自缚。我们应反对战争、创造和平、珍惜和平,只有在和平环境中才能谋求真正的发展。     

《孙子兵法》谋略思想对武警部队执勤、处突的启示

中国人民武装警察部队（以下简称武警部队）作为我国的一支重要武装力量,担负国家赋予的安全保卫和维护社会稳定任务。在当前日益复杂的斗争形势中,完成执勤、处突任务不仅要具备过硬的军事技能,而且也要善于运用谋略。《孙子兵法》中所蕴涵的“道义”、“庙算”、“知彼知己,百战不殆”等谋略思想,对武警部队执勤、处突具有很强的借鉴意义。     

未来战争模式及对策浅议

未来战争呈现大纵深、立体化作战空间,快速到达、全天候的作战行动,高度发达的信息获取、控制、使用技术使战场趋于透明化,自动化、网络化、智能化的指挥系统,屈人而不夺人的军事胜利的基本特征;针对新一代战争提出了对策建议。     

Lessons learned: The Dutch ‘Stay-Behind’ organization 1945–1992

Right after World War II, two separate initiatives were taken in the Netherlands to establish a stay-behind organization – or, rather, two stay-behind organizations. Both initiatives were purely Dutch, and both groups, remnants from wartime Dutch intelligence and sabotage organizations, wanted to liaise exclusively with the British. Only later did the Americans become members of what then came to be known as the Tripartite Committee. After a period of about 15 years, during which the Chief of the General Staff loosely coordinated both organizations, known as O (for Operations) and I (for Intelligence), a crisis broke out. The question was whether the two organizations should be amalgamated or not. After much discussion it was decided to keep them separate, but more closely coordinated. The first coordinator of this new type, a non-military man, was appointed in 1967. From that moment on the Dutch stay-behind organization, under supervision of highly respected civilian authorities, was able to perfect its organizational structure. The introduction, during the 1980s, of new specially designed radio equipment made special wireless operators superfluous. This development made for a leaner and more efficient organization.

After the Berlin Wall had come down, and in the wake of the ‘Gladio’ affair in Italy, the Dutch stay-behind organization was dissolved.     

Pricing war within a real option framework∗

The aim of this paper is to provide insights on war spending using simple tools of financial calculus rather than developing a general theory. Combining Grossman and Han's theory of war finance with the empirical literature that displays a straightforward relationship between the real value of money and wartime military events, we advocate the use of the real option approach of war spending. Some calculations and an empirical example illustrate this approach.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea

This study analyses an arms race between South and North Korea over the period 1963–2000. Despite the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the arms race between South and North Korea has rarely been studied. In this study, the South–North arms race is empirically estimated using Richardson’s action–reaction model. The pattern of South–North arms race between the Cold War (1963–1989) and the post‐Cold War eras (1990–2000) as well as the existence of an arms race is examined comparing both countries’ defence spending, number of military personnel and tactical aircraft.     

The economic policy of acquiring foreign currency in wartime: The example of Croatia

This paper attempts to describe the methods employed by the Croatian government in order to acquire the foreign currency which was essential for strategic imports during the period 1991–1995. The starting point for this was the fact that foreign currency was in the hands of Croatian households, export companies, and Croatian companies abroad. The Croatian central bank gained access to households’ foreign currency principally by gaining their confidence. It gained access to companies’ currency by means of “export rights”, and perhaps also as a result of the integration of political and economic positions which was a relic of the former Yugoslavia.     

The road not taken: Conflict termination and guerrillaism in the American Civil War

Irrespective our views on the rationality of our opponent's continuing to conduct operations against us, unless utterly extirpated, he retains a vote on when and how conflict will end. This is because war is about power — compelling another actor to do something he would not otherwise do, or to cease doing something he would otherwise prefer to do. In planning for conflict termination we should account for the peculiarities of opponents who may decide not to quit when we have beat them fair and square. We do not desire that they cease conventional fighting, but that they cease fighting altogether.     

Polaris,East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968

This article investigates the little-known plans formulated by Harold Wilson's Labour government to deploy Polaris submarines in the Indo-Pacific region. The scheme was first proposed in 1965 as a response to several problems faced by British policy-makers, including China's acquisition of a nuclear capability, Britain's wish to maintain a meaningful position ‘East of Suez’ at reduced cost, and German pressure for equal treatment within NATO on nuclear matters. Despite extensive high-level discussion, the plans were finally abandoned in mid-1968, as Labour moved more decisively to forsake the world role.     

How to Last Alone at the Top: US Strategic Planning for the Unipolar Era

This article investigates how key actors within the US defence policy community realigned their interests to forge a new consensus on the redirection of US defence strategy following the ‘peace shock’ they faced with the collapse of bipolarity. This consensus centred on the idea that achieving US security in the ‘age of uncertainty’ demanded overwhelming US military power, which was widely interpreted as necessitating military capabilities to fight multiple major theatre wars simultaneously against regional ‘Third World’ adversaries. This helped to preserve many of the principal pillars of US Cold War defence policy through deflecting calls for more radical organisational changes and deeper cuts to defence budgets.