Collecting Oriental and Asiatic Arms and Armour: The Activities of British and East India Company Officers,c.1800-1850

During the first half of the 19th century substantial quantities of Oriental and Asiatic arms and armour first began to appear in Britain. On the one hand they certainly reflected the expansion of empire but their wider significance has yet to be discussed. This article seeks to address that omission by exploring the growth of interest in these objects within military circles, what they represented to the individuals who acquired them, and how they fitted into the wider collecting strategies of military officers as a group.     

基于打击链的智能武器风险分析与控制方法研究

打击链是分析武器和系统等作战要素有效性的一种方法.针对当前智能武器概念缺乏一致定义的问题,本文提出了基于打击链作战方式的智能武器判定方法.针对智能武器认定困难引发的军控措施争论,分析了智能武器两方面的失控风险:人失去对自主武器的控制权与自主武器本身存在不可控因素和缺陷;以及智能武器的问责困境:如何在指挥者、编程者与智能...     

Brothers in arms,yet again? Twenty-first century Sino-Russian strategic collaboration in the realm of defence and security

2014–2015 were years of turmoil for strategic relations, with Sino-Russian relations emerging as a particularly interesting set of ties to observe. This article asks whether recurrent Sino-Russian exhortations of friendship are mirrored by their strategic alignment in the defence and security realm, half a century after the end of the Sino-Soviet pact during the communist era. We examine the arms trade between the two countries and with regional partners, but also the recent pattern of bilateral and multilateral military exercises, as a combined test of the security and defence relationship. We are able to show that the image of friendship that both Moscow and Beijing like to promote, while apparent at the UN Security Council and within the BRICS group, remains constrained by rivalry in high-tech segments of the arms industry and by lingering concerns about the prospects of peer interference in their shared regional vicinity.     

一类非线性军备竞赛博弈的动力学研究

针对多国军备竞赛问题,基于混沌动力学理论,并考虑到非线性因素对军备竞赛的影响,改进了理查森军备竞赛模型,建立了三国非线性军备竞赛的动力学模型,通过Matlab数值仿真表明,各博弈方的预期函数影响军备竞赛的稳定性,通过调整国家的不同预期函数变量,能够使军备竞赛从混沌逐步趋于稳定,这一结果将为国际军控研究提供一定的参考。     

The Odyssey of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

This study examines the failures of the William J. Clinton and Barack Obama administrations to secure ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It applies an integrated analytical framework for assessing treaty ratification that builds upon previous research in order to understand why the Clinton administration failed to achieve CTBT ratification in 1999 and why the Obama administration has so far failed to advance the treaty in the Senate. The study concludes that CTBT ratification, despite Obama administration pledges of support, remains highly unlikely. Finally, the study analyzes the common domestic political factors present in both cases and suggests areas for further research.     

The benefits and costs of the UK arms trade

A benefit‐cost framework and the associated evidence is used to evaluate UK arms exports. Two issues are examined in detail. First, trade externalities; and second, a case study of the problems and costs of maintaining the UK submarine industrial base without exports.     

UNITED STATES—SOUTH AFRICA RELATION

Abstract

The article evaluates the security challenges that are likely to occur along international borders in East Africa with the advent of the East African Community Common Market in July 2010. In an attempt to illustrate the porosity of borders and the likelihood that criminals could take advantage of the situation, the author describes the ease with which transnational crime could thrive (in the absence of efficient border security measures) under the guise of informal cross-border trade that derives its basis largely from the customs and historical linkages in the region. Border towns in the region are considered zones of risk but also opportunities for quick money-making ventures and deals that tend to attract a variety of criminals. While the danger is not alarmingly high, there is a likelihood that with the opening up of the East African Community to the free movement of goods and people, criminals will exploit this freedom to commit crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling and moving terrorists and contraband goods unless mechanisms are put in place to curtail these activities. Should this not happen, the mission of the East African Community could be jeopardised.     

舰用激光模拟器

本文建立了小口径炮激光模拟器的激光大气传输和接收器布阵的数学模型,介绍了模拟器的系统组成,工作原理,主要特点和总体设想,并分析了外界环境干扰对整机系统的影响以及消除干扰的方法和途径。最后探讨了激光武器模拟器的发展趋势。     

Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?

Turkey has been investing in its national defence industrial base since the 1980s. As with other developing countries, Turkey’s motivations for investing in national defence industries can be boiled down to the pursuit of defence autarky, economic benefits and international prestige. However, after 40 years of investment, Turkey is unable to reach the primary goals of defence industrialisation. We argue that three factors are important to understanding Turkey’s persistence in these primary goals. First, Turkey believes that there is an overall improvement in its defence industrial capabilities and the goal of autarky is still reachable. Second, increased defence exports support the belief that Turkish defence industries have become sustainable and the trend will continue in the future. The third reason, perhaps most important of all, has to do with the domestic political gains of defence industrialisation: the AKP uses defence industry and indigenous weapon systems for prestige and, therefore, garners broader support.     

Resource allocation in an asymmetric technology race with temporary advantages

We consider two opponents that compete in developing asymmetric technologies where each party's technology is aimed at damaging (or neutralizing) the other's technology. The situation we consider is different than the classical problem of commercial R&D races in two ways: First, while in commercial R&D races the competitors compete over the control of market share, in our case the competition is about the effectiveness of technologies with respect to certain capabilities. Second, in contrast with the “winner‐takes‐all” assumption that characterizes much of the literature on this field in the commercial world, we assume that the party that wins the race gains a temporary advantage that expires when the other party develops a superior technology. We formulate a variety of models that apply to a one‐sided situation, where one of the two parties has to determine how much to invest in developing a technology to counter another technology employed by the other party. The decision problems are expressed as (convex) nonlinear optimization problems. We present an application that provides some operational insights regarding optimal resource allocation. We also consider a two‐sided situation and develop a Nash equilibrium solution that sets investment values, so that both parties have no incentive to change their investments. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 59: 128–145, 2012