Business and peace in the Niger Delta: what we know and what we need to know

The global restructuring of state–society relationships driven by neoliberal logic has not only allowed for the taming of the ‘state’, which has paradoxically accentuated its inadequacies, but has also facilitated, for better or for worse, the emergence of business – especially transnational corporations – as a major political force in global governance. Consequently, while the issues of peace and conflict have traditionally been the concern of governments, businesses are now increasingly being expected to make peace and conflict their concern. However, despite claims and counterclaims that businesses can be moneymakers and peacemakers, analyses of the relationship between business and peace remain largely embryonic. This paper seeks to contribute to this emerging business and peace debate by drawing on insights from the Niger Delta conflict to ascertain what we know and what we need to know if businesses are to become peacemakers in conflict zones in Africa.     

析魏晋南北朝孝文化的特征

魏晋南北朝时期的孝文化有两大突出之处：一个是特剐重视对以《孝经》为核心的孝道的研究和传播,主要表现在皇家重视学习、研究和传播孝道,学者对《孝经》等作了大量注解;另一个是在士族制度等因素的影响下,沿袭了汉代的“孝治天下”．但更具有虚伪性。     

AFRICOM: hard or soft power initiative?

The United States (US) Africa Command (AFRICOM) was launched in 2007, ostensibly to foster African security. Rather than focusing on traditional military operations, AFRICOM also embraces non-military activities such as humanitarian aid and African development. This begs the question as to what type of power (hard or soft) the US intends to wield through AFRICOM. Several US official statements have emphasised the soft power attributes of this military project. To this end, this article seeks to respond to two fundamental questions. First, is AFRICOM a soft power project? Second, how, if at all, has AFRICOM enhanced perceptions of the US in Africa? The article concludes that sceptical and negative perceptions of AFRICOM inhibit its soft-power objective of winning the hearts and minds of the African people.     

The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

ABSTRACT

Extended deterrence has been a main pillar of the security alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) since the end of the Korean War. The changing dynamics of US extended deterrence in Korea, however, affected Seoul’s strategic choices within its bilateral alliance relationship with Washington. Examining the evolution of US extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula until the Nixon administration, this article explains why South Korea began its nuclear weapons programme in a historical context of the US–ROK alliance relationship. This article argues that President Park Chung-hee’s increasing uncertainty about the US security commitment to South Korea in the 1960s led to his decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s despite the fact that US tactical nuclear weapons were still stationed in South Korea.     

The Dao of foreign policy: Understanding China’s dual strategy in the South China Sea

In the South China Sea, China neither implements power-maximizing policy nor engages a peaceful approach. Instead, China implements both coercion and cooperation in pursuing its strategic interest in the disputed area. How can we explain China’s paradoxical behavior? This article claims that the best way to explain China’s policy in the South China Sea is to understand the character of dualism in China’s strategic culture. Following constructivist theory that stresses culture, this article argues that Chinese duality approach in the South China Sea is rooted in the philosophy of Daoism. The symbol of Yin-Yang depicts Chinese assertive as well as cooperative behavior in dealing with the South China Sea dispute. Although from a normative perspective Daoism recognizes pacifism and non-violent behavior, the most important feature of Daoism is the assumption that reality consists of two opposing elements that are mutually embedded.     

Birth of a norm champion: how South Africa came to support the NPT’s indefinite extension

In 1995, South Africa was in a special position. It was: a new party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the first country to voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons, led by a charismatic leader, and seen as a champion of disarmament principles. Yet South Africa’s new leaders were also interested in affirming their position within the Non-Aligned Movement, which was adamantly opposed to the NPT’s indefinite extension. Why, then, did South Africa decide to support the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995? Existing scholarship has ascribed too much credit to pressure from the United States, overlooking domestic debates in South Africa and the bifurcation between professional diplomats and political elites. This article, building on new archival sources and in-depth oral-history interviews with major actors, demonstrates that South African diplomats opposed indefinite extension while South African policy elites allocated little attention to the topic until late in the game. The findings contribute to our understanding of South Africa’s norm entrepreneurship, as well as the politics of global nonproliferation.     

After the Split: Partition,Successor States,and the Dynamics of War in the Horn of Africa

Why do partitioned successor states engage one another in armed conflict? We explore the drivers of war between successor states by comparing two border crises that followed the partitions of Ethiopia (1993) and Sudan (2011). We argue that the politico-military struggles that give way to partition create important historical memories that shape what successor states think about the utility of military force. While the partition of Ethiopia yielded successor states led by regimes that were victors of the preceding war of partition, the war of partition in Sudan produced successor states that emerged out of military stalemate. This distinction explains why Ethiopia and Eritrea waged a costly border war that Sudan and South Sudan were able to avoid.     

Making a difference in peacekeeping operations: Voices of South African women peacekeepers

Recruiting more women into peacekeeping operations due to the perceived unique contributions they are said to make to missions has been widely advocated by the United Nations (UN) and other agencies as a means to overcome the unintended consequents of deployments – mainly the ongoing reports of sexual abuse of locals by male soldiers. However, taking into account the broader gender debates surrounding women’s contributions to peacekeeping, and by considering the experiences of women in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), this study reveals the challenges women face in realising these widely advocated contributions. These challenges include the current recruiting processes, the self-perception of female soldiers, the deeply patriarchal ideologies within South African society, and the hyper-masculine culture which overwhelms the military. The study concludes that, for women to be properly utilised, a reassessment of recruitment processes in the SANDF is necessary, gender training should be prioritised, and an androgynous soldier identity should be advocated.     

Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.     

The Management of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal

Pakistan, the fastest growing nuclear weapon state in the world, has established over the last decade a nuclear management system it holds to be “foolproof.” Despite the explosion of radical groups challenging the writ of the state, it dismisses concerns by critics that its nuclear weapons are not safe and secure as “preposterous” and an attempt to “malign” the state. This article examines Pakistan's nuclear management system in four functional areas: command-and-control, physical security, nuclear surety, and doctrine. It describes what is publicly known in each area, identifies areas of omission and inadequacy in each one, and examines several premises of the nuclear program the author considers to be unfounded. Comparing these deficiencies in Pakistan's nuclear management system to the current problems plaguing the US nuclear management system, the author concludes that complacency and unfounded confidence in the efficacy of such programs, if not addressed and corrected, could lead to a future nuclear catastrophe in South Asia.