群体可拓层次分析法在C~4ISR系统效能指标赋权中的应用

指标赋权是C4ISR系统效能评估的重要环节,提出了一种新的指标赋权方法——群体可拓层次分析法(GEAHP),较好地解决了指标赋权过程中多专家意见集结的问题,以及判断矩阵的合理构建和一致性检验问题。描述了GEAHP的基本过程,并通过实例对其正确性进行了验证。     

COURTING THE GLOBAL SOUTH WITH “DUAL-BENEFIT” NONPROLIFERATION ENGAGEMENT

President Barack Obama and an array of other Western leaders continue to assert that the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-state actors is one of most pressing challenges to global security today. Yet, Western efforts to engage governments—particularly governments across the global South—in a practical nonproliferation dialogue have largely yielded disappointing results. This viewpoint examines the need for a new strategy to engage the developing world in nonproliferation programs. It argues that strategies focused strictly on WMD nonproliferation are unsustainable, and ultimately are destined for failure. An alternative “dual-benefit” nonproliferation engagement strategy utilizes the enlightened self-interest of partner governments needed to achieve broad-based buy-in among all partners. In a concluding section, we recommend that the “Group of 8” Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction standardize this model of nonproliferation engagement as it sets out to identify and fund WMD nonproliferation capacity-building initiatives beyond the states of the former Soviet Union.     

NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND MIDDLE EAST STABILITY

The United States faces a series of strategic and policy conundrums as it attempts to promote strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. This article examines the relationship between a reduced US nuclear arsenal and strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. It argues that a series of interrelated political and military factors play a much more significant role in regional security and stability than the US strategic arsenal, which has never, with a few extraordinary exceptions, played a direct role in maintaining regional security. The United States has constructed a system of regional stability based on conventional deterrence and defense that has seen it forward base forces at various installations in the region in combination with efforts to arm, train, and equip host-nation militaries. Nuclear weapons have never played a prominent role in this regional system. Evidence presented in this article suggests that there is no compelling reason for the United States to abandon and/or modify the defensive system of conventional deterrence and defense by adding nuclear-backed guarantees to the mix.     

AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANISATION' PEACE OPERATIONS

This paper reviews recent developments among African regional organisations in undertaking peacekeeping operations, as well as in preparing for future missions. It focuses on those that have been the most active: the Organisation of African Unity/African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community. The paper goes on to briefly describe and analyse the activities of the French, UK, and US capacity-building programmes designed to develop African peacekeeping capacities. The author then identifies some specific concerns and recommends actions to help meet today's challenges. The paper concludes with a short analysis of African organisations' capacities and proclivities to provide a peacekeeping force for Sudan.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea

This study analyses an arms race between South and North Korea over the period 1963–2000. Despite the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the arms race between South and North Korea has rarely been studied. In this study, the South–North arms race is empirically estimated using Richardson’s action–reaction model. The pattern of South–North arms race between the Cold War (1963–1989) and the post‐Cold War eras (1990–2000) as well as the existence of an arms race is examined comparing both countries’ defence spending, number of military personnel and tactical aircraft.     

Managing Global Counterinsurgency: The Special Group (CI) 1962–1966

The contemporary American counterinsurgency discourse has emphasised a particular historical narrative of Vietnam to justify large-scale military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent from this narrative is any reference to the broader Cold War context in which Vietnam existed alongside numerous other small-scale counterinsurgencies and was therefore the exception, not the rule. This article seeks to redress this shortcoming by examining the way counterinsurgency was conceived and managed at the level of ‘grand strategy.’ Specifically, it focuses on the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) to demonstrate that senior policymakers under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson understood ‘counterinsurgency’ as involving ‘indirect’ assistance to foreign governments, rather than taking ‘direct’ military action with American ground forces.     

India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn

For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, ‘Cold Start’, intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine's architects.     

地缘政治视角下的中巴军事技术合作

中国和巴基斯坦是社会制度和意识形态完全不同的两个国家,但是自1951年正式建立外交关系的50多年来,两国之间发展起来的睦邻友好＂全天候和全方位＂的国家关系堪称世界上双边关系的典范。中巴友好关系的存在有力的支撑了南亚地缘政治格局的安全与稳定,其中,中巴军事技术合作又是这一友好关系中极为重要的一个侧面。通过分析中巴军事技术合作的背景、历史和现状,可以有效的了解南亚地缘政治格局的复杂性以及我国在其中的核心战略利益所在。文章分为三个部分：第一部分分析中巴友好的地缘政治因素和历史原因;第二部分分析中巴军事技术合作的历史、现状以及其在中巴关系起到的重要作用;第三部分在前几部分的基础上,对中巴军事技术合作中存在的一些不足之处提出看法并对未来进行展望。