An overview of conflict in Africa in 2014

Violent conflict escalated in Africa in 2014, with five sub-Saharan states – the Central African Republic (CAR), Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan – accounting for an estimated 75% of all conflict-related deaths on the continent. This paper provides an overview of the five major sub-Saharan African conflicts in 2014 and considers the underlying causes and dynamics in the Seleka/anti-Balaka conflict in the CAR, the Islamist threats of Boko Haram and al-Shabaab in Nigeria and Somalia, the civil war in South Sudan, and the long-running conflict between Sudan's government and southern and Darfuri rebels. The paper unpacks the general trends evident in these conflicts and the implications for the settlement thereof, including the targeting of civilians, ethnic and religious mobilisation and the state as epicentre of violence. The paper concludes with a brief look ahead to 2015.     

The ties that bind

Analysis of the failures of African security forces generally focuses on structural issues such as corruption of senior leadership, insufficient equipment and training, and coup d’état fears driving mistrust of armies that are too strong or effective. However, less examined is the role that sub-state identity plays; using Libya, South Sudan, and Mali as case studies, this paper examines how ethnicity inhibits the development of national armies, divides them, and exposes a critical flaw that adversaries are able to exploit. Given the increasingly ethnic nature of conflict throughout the world, and the rising threat that ethnic conflicts in Africa pose to regional and Western partners, it may be prudent for researchers, policymakers and other stakeholders to examine the critical role that sub-state identity plays in undermining African security forces.     

CONTRIBUTORS

Conventional wisdom states that the stability-instability paradox does not explain the effect of nuclear proliferation on the conflict propensity of South Asia, and that nuclear weapons have had a different and more dangerous impact in South Asia than Cold War Europe. I argue that the paradox explains nuclear South Asia; that the similarities between nuclear South Asia and Cold War Europe are strong; and that conventional instability does not cause revisionist challenges in the long run. I develop and probe a psychological causal mechanism that explains the impact of nuclear weapons on Cold War Europe and South Asia. Following the ten-month mobilized crisis in 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have adopted a more moderate foreign policy toward India after experiencing fear of imminent nuclear war, as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev did forty years earlier. I argue that the stability-instability paradox explains Cold War Europe and nuclear South Asia and will, conditional on Iranian and North Korean revisionism, predict the impact of nuclear weapon development on these states' conflict propensities.     

How does state security limit the right to protest? State response to popular participation in South Africa

In South Africa, the right to protest has come under threat from the state. Increasing cases of forceful policing and, at times, unlawful procedural prohibitions of protest attest to this. Interviews with members of different community-based organisations across South Africa show that protest is sometimes delegitimised under the guise of security as protestors are constructed as threats to the state. The larger implication of this treatment is that these protestors are treated as non-citizens who are excluded from participating in governance. This study aims to describe this situation through securitisation theory, arguing that South Africa has become a securitised state. It therefore looks at the implications of this securitised response for popular participation in South Africa.     

Are police deaths a consequence of flaws in the South African Police Service administration? A SWOT analysis

This article argues that since the advent of democracy, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has been plagued by poor administration. Having inherited a repressive police force, the post-apartheid national police commissioners (NPCs) have found it difficult to transform the organisation. Among the unintended consequences has been a rise in police deaths. Although police deaths can be attributed to numerous factors, this article focuses on fault lines in the SAPS administration through a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis drawing largely on existing scholarly debates. Essential theoretical perspectives have been employed to gain insight into the root causes of the problem. The article concludes that poor administration and a lack of trust, partnership and collaboration between police officers and community members have perpetuated the killing of police officers. These killings are further compounded by the flawed and ill-conceived selection and appointment of NPCs. As a consequence, the article recommends that the appointment of NPCs should be promptly reviewed. It further recommends that each potential candidate should have risen through the ranks and must fully comprehend the challenges facing the organisation.     

UNCLOS and maritime security: the “securitisation” of the South China Sea disputes

This Critical Comment seeks to situate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) within the context of South China Sea (SCS) dispute. Bearing in mind that maritime actions of the main disputants – China, Vietnam, and the Philippines – increasingly “securitise” these long-standing disputes and vice versa, the study examines the concept of a maritime “regime complex.” Whereas efforts have being made to examine UNCLOS and indeed the dispute within the framework of a maritime “regime complex,” the key finding shows that the increased “securitisation” of the disputes makes it difficult to envisage effective engagement of UNCLOS as a resolution mechanism. It will also reveal that China's firmly established expansionist agenda in the SCS region is indicative of Beijing's susceptibility to compromise a diplomatic solution to these long-standing disputes. These discoveries are structured around the knowledge that the spatial relation of the SCS critically espouses not only its geo-strategic significance in terms of natural resources endowment, but also the enduring maritime disputes within the region.     

Explaining the (il)legality of Uganda's intervention in the current South Sudan conflict

During the night of 15 December 2013, fighting broke out between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba, the capital of the Republic of South Sudan. The fighting pitted forces loyal to President Salva Kiir against those loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar. Five days later, Uganda sent troops into South Sudan, advancing a number of reasons for intervention, including that it had been invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan to ensure order; it needed to evacuate Ugandan citizens caught up in the fighting; it had been asked by the United Nations Secretary-General to intervene; and that the regional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development had sanctioned the intervention. As the conflict escalated, Ugandan troops started fighting on the side of forces loyal to Kiir. The underlying reasons for the intervention were clearly economic, but those advanced were legal. This article discusses both sets of reasons and concludes that the economic reasons are more persuasive. Nevertheless, while some of the legal arguments (such as being invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan) can be asserted, others are clearly dubious. In addition, the participation of Ugandan troops in the fighting on the side of the Kiir government renders the intervention illegal.     

Special Section: Nuclear Stability In South Asia

The question of nuclear stability in South Asia is a subject of both academic and policy significance. It is the only region in the world that has three, contiguous nuclear-armed states: India, the People's Republic of China, and Pakistan. It is also freighted with unresolved border disputes. To compound matters, all three states are now modernizing their nuclear forces and have expressed scant interest in any form of regional arms control. These issues and developments constitute the basis of this special section, which explores the problems and prospects of nuclear crisis stability in the region.