After the Split: Partition,Successor States,and the Dynamics of War in the Horn of Africa

Why do partitioned successor states engage one another in armed conflict? We explore the drivers of war between successor states by comparing two border crises that followed the partitions of Ethiopia (1993) and Sudan (2011). We argue that the politico-military struggles that give way to partition create important historical memories that shape what successor states think about the utility of military force. While the partition of Ethiopia yielded successor states led by regimes that were victors of the preceding war of partition, the war of partition in Sudan produced successor states that emerged out of military stalemate. This distinction explains why Ethiopia and Eritrea waged a costly border war that Sudan and South Sudan were able to avoid.     

Making a difference in peacekeeping operations: Voices of South African women peacekeepers

Recruiting more women into peacekeeping operations due to the perceived unique contributions they are said to make to missions has been widely advocated by the United Nations (UN) and other agencies as a means to overcome the unintended consequents of deployments – mainly the ongoing reports of sexual abuse of locals by male soldiers. However, taking into account the broader gender debates surrounding women’s contributions to peacekeeping, and by considering the experiences of women in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), this study reveals the challenges women face in realising these widely advocated contributions. These challenges include the current recruiting processes, the self-perception of female soldiers, the deeply patriarchal ideologies within South African society, and the hyper-masculine culture which overwhelms the military. The study concludes that, for women to be properly utilised, a reassessment of recruitment processes in the SANDF is necessary, gender training should be prioritised, and an androgynous soldier identity should be advocated.     

India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn

For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, ‘Cold Start’, intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine's architects.     

How do sources of traditional legitimacy constrain popular uprisings? The case of the Kingdom of Swaziland

ABSTRACT

Research concerning authoritarian stability and peace usually investigates co-optation and repression. Recently, several studies argue that traditional legitimacy is also important for stability in monarchies. However, existing research rarely considers how legitimacy constrains rebellions and help the royal family to stay in power. Hence, this article explores the causal links between sources of traditional legitimacy and absence of uprisings. The study investigates the relationship with a case study of the Kingdom of Swaziland. In line with my expectations, I find a causal relationship between sources of traditional legitimacy and absence of popular uprisings. First, the royal family actively uses traditional legitimacy to justify their rule. Second, the Afrobarometer indicates that the Swazi people trust the King more than citizens in other African countries trust their head of state. Third, opposition actors have limited opportunities to mobilize the broader population against the monarchy. Fourth, traditional legitimacy dampens ongoing protests and thereby hinders their escalation into popular uprisings or political violence. Repression is clearly an important explanation for limited rebellion in Swaziland, but this article shows that also traditional legitimacy sources play a role.     

COUNTRY SURVEY XX: DEFENCE SPENDING AND PEACEKEEPING IN URUGUAY

Uruguay is a country with a very unusual profile, since it has just 3.4 million inhabitants but is among the top ten troop contributors to the UN PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) and is the first contributor per capita. In 2002 and 2003 it was the seventh troop contributor to the UN, and by the end of 2005 it was eighth in the UN ranking. Uruguay has never had any imminent external threat to its security after its independence in 1828, and it has had no internal threat since the end of the urban guerrillas’ actions in the 1970s. The country has no defence industry, and has always had an all‐volunteer military service, which presently involves almost 1% of the total population, and about 2% of the labour force. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that, in the past decades, Uruguayan defence spending has been influenced mainly by internal factors, most of them of an economic nature. The high participation in PKO has not increased military expenditure and it has produced a positive impact on the country’s economy.     

QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON THE FLOW OF NARCOTICS: SUPPLY AND DEMAND RESTRAINTS IN A NORTH–SOUTH MACRO‐MODEL

This paper constructs a macroeconomic model of North–South interaction where the flow of narcotics from the South to the North is restricted. The economic effects are akin to quantitative restrictions in trade policy. Two alternative policy scenarios will be considered. One involves reducing the supply of drugs at the source, accompanied by aid. Supply‐side restrictions have negative aggregate supply‐side effects in the producing region, because of the monopoly rents generated from that type of control. This makes them a second‐best policy, particularly if the accompanying aid is not used for poverty alleviation and fails to expand domestic aggregate demand. Alternatively, demand side restrictions will be found to be superior.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea

This study analyses an arms race between South and North Korea over the period 1963–2000. Despite the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the arms race between South and North Korea has rarely been studied. In this study, the South–North arms race is empirically estimated using Richardson’s action–reaction model. The pattern of South–North arms race between the Cold War (1963–1989) and the post‐Cold War eras (1990–2000) as well as the existence of an arms race is examined comparing both countries’ defence spending, number of military personnel and tactical aircraft.     

MILITARY SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SOUTH ASIA: A REPLY

We review some critical comments upon our earlier paper in this journal and respond to these. We also critically evaluate a proposed alternative methodology giving reasons why our own provides a more robust approach for examining the nexus between military spending and economic growth in South Asia.     

AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANISATION' PEACE OPERATIONS

This paper reviews recent developments among African regional organisations in undertaking peacekeeping operations, as well as in preparing for future missions. It focuses on those that have been the most active: the Organisation of African Unity/African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community. The paper goes on to briefly describe and analyse the activities of the French, UK, and US capacity-building programmes designed to develop African peacekeeping capacities. The author then identifies some specific concerns and recommends actions to help meet today's challenges. The paper concludes with a short analysis of African organisations' capacities and proclivities to provide a peacekeeping force for Sudan.     

Don't stop with Joint Forces Command … cut AFRICOM too

Abstract

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has been a military success but a strategic messaging failure. The United States’ relationships across Africa cannot be boiled down to military affairs. This paper argues that Africa has many more opportunities than challenges and thus requires a more balanced foreign policy solution from Washington DC than a new military command. For the military engagement that does need to take place, a more low-profile approach would benefit the United States in Africa.