Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs

The roots of the information technology Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can be traced to the mid-1970s, when the West capitalized on scientific-technological developments to neutralize the threat posed by Soviet second echelons. However, the cultivation of the technological seeds of the American RMA preceded the maturation of the conceptual ones. Although it was the US that was laying the technological groundwork for the RMA, Soviet, rather than the American military theorists, were the first to argue that the new range of technological innovations constituted a fundamental discontinuity in the nature of war, which they dubbed the ‘Military-Technical Revolution’ (MTR). About a decade later, this fundamental Soviet approach to the transformations in military affairs was analyzed, adapted and adopted by the US, and designated the RMA. This article deals with the intellectual history of the Soviet MTR and the American RMA.     

‘Pounding Their Feet’: Israeli Military Culture as Reflected in Early IDF Combat History

Abstract

How did the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) organisational and military culture shape their understanding of security threats, perceptions of warfare, and instinctive responses to security challenges? Israel's early military history is marked by the stubborn persistence of accepted patterns of thought and action. In the first twenty years of its existence, the IDF habitually came to sacrifice both political and military long-term and medium-term considerations in favour of the superficial, short-term satisfaction of its drive for action. The Israeli Army as an institution separated military actions from their political implications, and all too often, granted itself freedom of action at all levels of command. That myopic pattern led to recurring raids and minor operations during the 1950s, and contributed notably to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967.     

Productive War: A Re-Conceptualisation of War

Conventional wisdom on the phenomenon of war is criticised for providing little relevant guidance to deal with the security challenges of our era. One reason is that this attitude uncritically assumes power as synonymous with force. In response, ‘productive war’ is here proposed as a re-conceptualisation of war based on Michel Foucault's alternative understanding of power. Productive war appreciates the role of violence but subordinates it to non-kinetic dynamics influencing the dimension of meaning in international security. This theoretical perspective provides a conceptual framework to deal with the dynamics of political mobilisation essential to create public support for nation-building abroad and for visions of world order.     

Book Reviews

Iain McCallum, Blood Brothers Hiram and Hudson Maxim: Pioneers of Modern Warfare. London: Chatham, 1999. Pp. 224, 33 illus., 2 maps, biblio., index. £20. ISBN 1–86176–096–5.

Eric Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, 1912–1918. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999. Pp.xviii + 268, 20 illus., 3 maps, biblio., index. £42.50/$59.50 (cloth), £18.50/$27.50 (paper). ISBN 0–7146–4828–0 and ‐4382–3.

Azar Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War: Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, and other Modernists. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Ppviii + 334, biblio., index. £45. ISBN 0–19–820715–8.

David B. Woolner (ed.), The Second Quebec Conference Revisited: Waging War, Formulating Peace: Canada, Great Britain, and the United States in 1944–1945. Basingstoke; London: Macmillan Press, 1998. Pp.xiii + 210, index. £32.50. ISBN 0–333–75970–2.

Jeffrey Grey. Up Top: The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955–1972. St Leonards NSW: Allen &; Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1998. Pp.xx + 380, 110 illus., 12 tables, 23 maps &; diagrams, appendices, notes, biblio., index. NP. ISBN 1–86448–290–7.

Susan L Carruthers, The Media at War. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000. Pp.321, biblio., index. £14.99 (paper). ISBN 0–333–69143–1, also available in hardback.

Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr, Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War. Washington DC: Naval Historical Center, 1998. Pp.xxi + 517, 120 illus., 14 maps, biblio., index. NP. ISBN 0–1604–9476–1.

Marvin Pokrant, Desert Shield at Sea: What the Navy Really Did and Desert Storm at Sea: What the Navy Really Did. Both Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999. Pp.xxiii + 265,9 illus., biblio., index. £44.95. ISBN 0–313–31023–8. Pp.xxiv + 329,12 illus., biblio., index. NP. ISBN 0–313–31024–6.

David Kaularich and Ronald C. Kramer, Crimes of the American Nuclear State: At Home and Abroad. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999. Pp.xviii + 195, biblio., index. £42.75. ISBN 1–55553–371‐X.

Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post‐Cold War Era. Lanham, MD: Rowman &; Littlefield, 1998. Pp.viii+279, notes, index. $29.95. ISBN 0–8476–8574–8.

Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases. Oxford: Oxford‐University Press, 1998. Pp.400, index. £48. ISBN 0–19–829–349–6.

Stephen J. Cimbala, Coercive Military Strategy. College Station, TX: Texas A&;M University Press, 1998. Pp.229, biblio, index; $39.95. ISBN 0–89096–836–5     

Britain’s ‘Independent’ V-Bomber Force and US Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1962

This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.     

An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession

This article explores a perennial theme in the literature of strategic studies: the relationship between military theory and the military profession. It begins with a conceptual analysis of this relationship. It then investigates what military theorists themselves have had to say about the utility of their craft. It concludes by assessing the actual influence of military theory on selected individuals and institutions. The individuals are George S. Patton, Jr., and Ulysses S. Grant. The institutions are the United States Army and the United States Air Force in the late twentieth century. The fundamental finding is suggested in the title: military theory can indeed be quite useful in the maturation of military commanders and in the development of martial institutions, but it is not always necessary and by no means perfect. It should thus be studied assiduously but used with caution.     

Civil–Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After

The pattern of civil–military interaction in India is informed by the notion that civilians should refrain from involvement in operational matters. The emergence of this trend can be traced back to the defeat against China in 1962. In its aftermath, the belief that the debacle occurred because of civilian interference took hold. Thereafter, politicians restricted themselves to giving overall directives, leaving operational matters to the military. The Indian ‘victory’ in the subsequent war with Pakistan was seen as vindicating this arrangement. This essay argues that the conventional reading of the China crisis is at best misleading and at worst erroneous. Further, it contends that the subsequent war with Pakistan actually underscores the problems of civilian non-involvement in operational issues. The historical narrative underpinning the norm of civilian abstention is at the very least dubious.     

Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In)

The information systems controlling our critical infrastructure are vulnerable to cyber attack. Cyber war is therefore inevitable unless we improve our cyber defenses. The only way to do this is by building security into systems at the design stage.     

When Will Non-Democratic Actors Win a Moral Victory Following Highly Costly Military Defeats?

Following costly military defeats political elites usually attempt to persuade their publics that the battlefield outcome was not a shameful defeat but a ‘moral victory’. Yet, only sometimes their public accepts these claims. The paper tries to explain this variation in the domestic publics' perceptions in the cases of non-democratic entities. It is argued that the key variable that determines actors' success in claiming a moral victory is the existence of certain battlefield elements, or at least symbolic military acts/achievements of the defeated actor which can persuade his public that these battlefield elements existed. Propaganda efforts to misrepresent the battlefield facts can play only a secondary role and only under certain conditions.     

The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice

This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis – the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon – a ‘culminating point of deterrence’.