Initiating insurgencies abroad: French plans to ‘chouannise’ Britain and Ireland, 1793–1798

Secret French plans to launch guerrilla-style raids on the British Isles devised in the spring of 1796 were referred to as ‘chouanneries’. The name and concept behind these small-war operations were modelled on the irregular tactics used by the Chouan rebels in the Vendée, which the French state army had brutally quashed, but some wished to transfer into their institutional practice. Part of France's ongoing military strategy in the war against Britain, which included fomenting insurrection in Ireland, these irregular operations were to be manned partially by pardoned deserters and released convicts and prisoners of war. Of these, only Tate's brief invasion of Wales in 1797 was realised, but the surviving plans provide insightful historical lessons into an Anglophobic mindset shared by a small network of practitioners and policy deciders on the effectiveness of such shock and awe tactics. Largely motivated by the desire to take revenge for Britain's support of counter-revolutionaries in the Vendée, these plans could more aptly be referred to as counter-‘chouanneries’.     

The prospects of combined action: Lessons from Vietnam

Military commanders, policymakers, and analysts have recently embraced the concept of combined action as a powerful tool to improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces in the fight against the Taliban. In doing so, they explicitly draw inspiration from the Combined Action Program employed by US Marines during the Vietnam War. This program is widely considered to have greatly improved the effectiveness of South Vietnamese government forces and contributed to increased population security in its area of operations and is considered a model worthy of emulation. This study finds that the success of the Vietnam-era Combined Action Program was more qualified than contemporary proponents argue. It argues that successes were tempered, and conditioned, by the choice of junior commanders, the level of operational control enjoyed by the US Marines, and the way the local forces were recruited and deployed. These conditions offer valuable lessons for those seeking to employ combined action not only in present-day Afghanistan, but also in future counterinsurgency campaigns.     

Book reviews

This paper defines the global economic costs of conflict and suggests two key criteria, namely comprehensiveness and consistency, which are necessary for a valid calculation of such costs. A critical review of the literature reveals that most studies focus on national income losses, using counterfactual regression models, finding a negative impact on growth both for conflict countries themselves and for their neighbors. However, the debate is quite fragmented and the literature fails to combine these insights in a comprehensive and consistent manner. Furthermore, there is little work thus far on integrating aggregate and micro‐level estimates of the costs of conflict.     

The real exchange rate Enigma: A safe haven solution from the cold war era

In this paper I shift the focus of real exchange rate analysis from conventional macroeconomic variables, which have failed to explain changes in floating real dollar exchange rates, to military security variables, which show an uncanny ability to explain the pattern of floating real exchange rate changes among NATO‐area floating currencies from early 1973 through the failed Soviet coup of August, 1991.     

THE FATE OF DISPUTED TERRITORIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This paper presents a simple model to characterize the outcome of a land dispute between two rival parties using a Stackelberg game. Unlike Gershenson and Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]), we assume that the opposing parties have access to different technologies for challenging and defending in conflict. We derive the conditions under which territorial conflict between the two parties is less likely to persist indefinitely. Allowing for an exogenous destruction term as in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000 Garfinkel, M. and Skaperdas, S. 2000. Conflict without misperceptions or incomplete information: how the future matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 793–807. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we show that, when the nature of conflict becomes more destructive, the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, in which the territory’s initial possessor deters the challenging party, increases if the initial possessor holds more intrinsic value for the disputed land. Following Siqueira (2003 Siqueira, K. 2003. Conflict and third‐party intervention. Defence and Peace Economics, 14(6): 389–400. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), our model has policy implications for peace through third‐party intervention.     

Causal Linkages Between Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth

We use the Hsiao–Granger method to test for terrorism–growth causality for seven Western European countries. In bivariate settings, the impact of economic performance on domestic terrorism is very strong. In trivariate settings, the impact of performance on terrorism diminishes. In general, we find that economic performance leads terrorist violence in robust ways only for three out of seven countries. Terrorism is almost never found to causally influence growth in bivariate and trivariate specifications. Our findings indicate that the role of economic performance in determining terrorist violence appears to have been important for some countries, whereas all attacked economies have been successful in adjusting to the threat of terrorism.     

A Note on the Economics of Stolen Valor

Abstract

The economics of stolen valor concerns the act of trading on false claims of being awarded valorous military service medals. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the 2005 Stolen Valor Act, largely on First Amendment grounds. Misrepresentation that devalues the reputation of medals for valor may not violate the revised statute despite decreasing the wage premium and discouraging investment in military effort.     

SECURITY AND FORCED MIGRATION CONCERNS IN SOUTH AFRICA

“As we close this century, there is for the first time realistic hope of a more just future. A Century stained with the sufferings of ceaseless war and atrocity is as much marked by our incomplete efforts to secure the foundations of an international society, one in which all peoples are equal and equally protected from abuse. The last decade has seen the application of dormant humanitarian principles and laws in various fora. The ICC offers us the opportunity to build on these disjointed enforcement efforts. A properly functioning permanent court will be humanity's best chance yet to move out of its self-destructive cycle. Justice is a vindication, a historical right and a deterrent.”