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21.
The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what is unique to their development and the special adaptive potential they bring to the armed forces: generalized specialization, boundary spanning roles, and enlargement of military autonomy. Second, we analyze the actions of internal military entrepreneurs and their organizational mentors to show how they use this adaptive potential to “sell” the use of SOF to key policy-makers and decision-makers. 相似文献
22.
杨静 《武警工程学院学报》2010,(2):59-62,66
武警官兵在执勤过程中经常会遇到外国人,学习一些执勤英语十分必要。目前,武警指挥院校开设了《武警执勤实用英语》这门选修课,笔者在备课过程中发现,教材中有一些译文不是很准确,因此,撰写本文和编者商榷。本文从武警执勤用语的翻译现状入手,通过分析武警指挥院校正在使用的名为《武警执勤实用英语》教材中的译文,探讨了武警执勤用语的翻译。笔者提出在翻译过程中,译者应把握以下几点:术语翻译需谨慎、充分了解术语的内涵、避免直译出错、慎选词语、注意文化差异、使用对应文体、统一译文。最后,笔者提出了定期修改教材的建议。 相似文献
23.
Christopher Tuck 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2016,27(6):996-1018
This article evaluates the performance of the Special Air Service (SAS) during secret cross-border raids conducted as part of Britain’s undeclared war against Indonesia from 1963–1966. The analysis reviews the existing debate on the SAS’ performance during this campaign; it looks more closely at how military effectiveness might be defined; and it then examines, using the SAS’ own operations reports, the nature of their activities and their success or failure. This article concludes that critics of the SAS’ effectiveness during Confrontation are right; but for the wrong reasons. SAS operations did indeed have less effect than orthodox accounts would have it. But the reasons for this lay not in their misuse but in the exigencies of British strategy. This article demonstrates an enduring truth – no matter how ‘special’ a military force might be, tactical excellence cannot compensate reliably for problems in strategy. 相似文献
24.
Colin F. Jackson 《战略研究杂志》2016,39(5-6):820-846
ABSTRACTWhile many militaries have tried to capitalize on the potential of information operations in internal war, few have succeeded. I argue that military information campaigns fall short of expectations for two reasons. First, the theory of influence militaries generally embrace – communications as a non-lethal weapons system – is largely invalid. While treating information as a weapons system makes it easier to integrate it into the existing military planning system, this overstates the independent effects of communications on behavior and understates the importance of interactive effects of what commercial marketing theory refers to as the “marketing mix” – product, price, promotion, and placement. It would be more appropriate to treat military information operations as a form of marketing: a composite effort to induce a specific behavior in a target audience by applying a combination of material and ideational instruments. The marketing model suggests that the efficacy of information operations will depend not simply on the message and its delivery (promotion) but on the behavior the sender seeks to induce (the product), the costs of that behavior (the price), and the opportunities available for such behavior (the placement). 相似文献
25.
David Ucko 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(1):47-72
This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of ‘Distributed Operations’ (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference to the Malayan Emergency, in which the British and Commonwealth forces employed dispersed and decentralised small-unit formations to great effect. The article teases out the conditions that allowed DO to succeed in Malaya, and comments on the requirements and implications for the use of DO today in the prosecution of the ‘Long War’. 相似文献
26.
Sue Lautze 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(4):635-653
This article explores the livelihood pathways of serving Ugandan Army soldiers and traces their methods and motivations for enlistment. All were from areas of northern Uganda affected by nearly two decades of violent instability. With the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) increasing recruitment eligibility requirements and taking other measures to improve professionalism, some soldiers enlisted using false credentials and names, travelled to skirt unofficial ethnic quotas, and joined against their family's wishes. The Army's defence reform process was intended to preclude such problems. The article concludes with reflections on what strategic deception (by both recruits and the Army) may imply for warriors' honour. 相似文献
27.
Karen Kaya 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):527-541
This article is an extended book review of the Turkish book Commanders' Front (Komutanlar Cephesi, Istanbul: Detay Publishing, 2007), written by prominent Turkish journalist Fikret Bila, who compiled a series of interviews with retired Turkish military commanders and two former presidents. It provides a foreign perspective on counterinsurgency/terrorism strategies and lessons learned from Turkey's small war against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The interviews reveal the generals' views on Turkey's long-standing fight with the PKK, discussing topics ranging from the social aspect of the PKK problem to mistakes made in arming local militia. In addition, it presents the Turkish perspective on US policy in Iraq. 相似文献
28.
James S Corum 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(1):89-113
Rearming Germany was a long and complicated process. It was especially difficult to create a new German air force. The army generals who dominated the Bundeswehr cadre did not even want an air force but rather a small arm air corps. Moreover, Adenauer's defense staff failed to adequately budget or plan for a new air force. As rearmament began, US Air Force leaders, working closely with the small Luftwaffe staff in West Germany's shadow Defense Ministry, basically took charge of the process to ensure that the Germans built a new Luftwaffe on the American model – a large, multipurpose force organized as an independent service and fully integrated into NATO. The first Bundesluftwaffe commanders allied themselves to the Americans, often in opposition to their army comrades, to overcome the political problems caused by Adenauer's poor defense planning and create a modern air force on American lines. 相似文献
29.
‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges. 相似文献
30.