全文获取类型
收费全文 | 1960篇 |
免费 | 413篇 |
国内免费 | 257篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 2篇 |
2022年 | 21篇 |
2021年 | 30篇 |
2020年 | 28篇 |
2019年 | 26篇 |
2018年 | 23篇 |
2017年 | 104篇 |
2016年 | 112篇 |
2015年 | 86篇 |
2014年 | 132篇 |
2013年 | 180篇 |
2012年 | 209篇 |
2011年 | 223篇 |
2010年 | 79篇 |
2009年 | 119篇 |
2008年 | 102篇 |
2007年 | 153篇 |
2006年 | 185篇 |
2005年 | 160篇 |
2004年 | 146篇 |
2003年 | 112篇 |
2002年 | 87篇 |
2001年 | 88篇 |
2000年 | 68篇 |
1999年 | 46篇 |
1998年 | 17篇 |
1997年 | 17篇 |
1996年 | 14篇 |
1995年 | 9篇 |
1994年 | 10篇 |
1993年 | 8篇 |
1992年 | 11篇 |
1991年 | 8篇 |
1990年 | 8篇 |
1989年 | 5篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有2630条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
81.
为了实现利用船舶静态电场对船舶进行跟踪的目的,针对传统卡尔曼滤波算法中存在的问题,设计一种新的非线性滤波器。建立船舶的状态空间模型,分析传统卡尔曼滤波算法在船舶跟踪中存在的问题;依据渐进贝叶斯思想,利用连续白噪声与离散白噪声序列噪声协方差之间的关系,设计一种新的渐进更新扩展卡尔曼滤波器。仿真结果表明,该滤波器能有效地抑制由于初始误差较大而造成的滤波性能下降和滤波发散,能够有效地跟踪船舶,具有较高的实用价值。 相似文献
82.
Per Marius Frost-Nielsen 《Journal of Military Ethics》2018,17(1):21-35
In this article, I outline a holistic approach to the military concept of “Rules of Engagement” (ROE), which complements the legal aspects of ROE with considerations of operational and political requirements for the use of military force. Drawing upon two illustrative cases from the US military experience with the use of ROE, I demonstrate that ROE for any particular military operation should be formulated to balance optimally, if not harmonize fully, the legal, operational and political concerns related to the use of force. In this task, political decision-makers and military practitioners alike are confronted with unavoidable and real-life dilemmas. How these dilemmas are handled has significant implications for how legal requirements concerning accountability and concerns for civilian lives in military combat can be preserved through ROE. 相似文献
83.
84.
George Joffé 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2016,27(1):1-21
Although the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is seen as a novel manifestation of Islamic extremism, it is in fact the latest, albeit perhaps the most effective, of a long line of revivalist movements in the Islamic and the Arab worlds. Its motivations – hisba and jihad – differ little from its predecessors and its ambitions – to create a state organised in accordance with the precepts of the Islamic caliphate – reflect a long-standing Islamic ambition. It differs, of course, in terms of the sophistication of its political and military strategies, which mirror the contemporary complexities of the world in which it operates, but its objectives recall long-standing Islamic ideals, even if articulated in radically brutal and extremist ways. More importantly, perhaps, ISIS or Da’ish, to give it its Arabic sobriquet, reflects the enormous degree of resentment inside the Middle East at the ways in which Western powers have intervened in regional affairs over recent years, particularly their support for regimes and economic systems there that have betrayed, in the popular imaginary, the essential principles of social justice that lie at the root of Islamic vision of ideal social order. Indeed, in many respects, its analysis of the world in which it operates and of the objectives it seeks differ little in essence from those any other resistance and rejectionist movement, whether religious or sectarian. More specifically, it has been the sectarian conflict that resulted from the reversal of political order in Iraq as a result of the 2003 American-led invasion that has driven the success of the movement in capturing widespread Sunni support. Whether it can manage the complexities of the administration of a state remains open to question. 相似文献
85.
Andreas Lutsch 《战略研究杂志》2016,39(4):535-558
ABSTRACTRecent nuclear-weapons-related consultation in NATO within the framework of the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review sheds light on historical experiences with nuclear consultation in NATO. In the early years of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which became the main forum for multilateral nuclear consultation in the alliance, developing a nuclear weapons first use doctrine was of particular importance. This process led to the adoption of the Provisional Political Guidelines (PPGs) on the threat to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. With a focus on West Germany as the primary addressee of the NPG, it will be postulated that nuclear consultation functioned and may still be seen as an essential tool to manage the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence in the framework of NATO. 相似文献
86.
87.
88.
89.
Assessing missile defence through the prism of offence–defence theory requires primarily an examination of legal and structural constraints on future development. New weapons technology is frequently cited as having the most critical impact on the offence–defence balance. Yet, the method for assessing the introduction of a new weapons technology tends to neglect projected maturity and instead focus excessively on the initial rudimentary capabilities. It is argued here that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) missile defence is set to incrementally become more advanced in terms of quality, quantity and mobility, which is supported by a strategy that is increasingly favouring offence. As the system gradually enhances the offensive advantage vis-à-vis Russia, NATO categorically rejects any legal or structural constraints on future deployments. 相似文献
90.