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本文研究空战机动方式的数学模型,给出了几个平面基本机动方式的数学模型及其详细指导。包括纯追踪、顺航向接敌、纯碰撞、正前置角接敌、负前置角接敌等。这些数字模型应用在一个平面双机格斗仿真专家系统中得到了良好的效果。 相似文献
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针对混合飞艇体积巨大同时气动外形复杂使得现有条件的风洞试验很难精确测量其气动性能的问题,开展了适用于混合飞艇气动性能分析的计算流体力学(CFD)的数值分析方法研究。考虑混合飞艇低速大雷诺数的特点,将变分多尺度方法 (VMS)与动态Smagorinsky大涡模拟(LES)模型相结合,提出了组合的VMSLES湍流模型。将基于RANS方法和LES方法的其他三种湍流模型相对比,利用雷诺数相近、实验数据丰富的6:1长椭球飞艇对不同的湍流模型进行了对比验证。结果显示LES方法预测结果与实验结果吻合较好,优于RANS方法,并能显示更多流动细节,而组合的VMS-LES模型能够更精确地捕获实验研究中观察到的二次涡。利用组合的VMS-LES模型对有翼HAV与多囊瓣HAV进行了气动性能分析,并研究了不同部件对飞艇气动特性的影响。结果表明,由于尾翼表面产生的一次涡与二次涡相互作用,尾翼在增加气动升力的同时也增加了阻力。 相似文献
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AirSea Battle (ASB) has generated significant publicity, controversy, and debate among scholars, analysts, commentators, and observers of US defense strategy. However, a research gap exists concerning formal analysis of the impact of the operational concept on the relationship between the US Air Force (USAF) and the US Navy (USN). The impact of the ASB operational concept on the USAF–USN relationship is examined across the issue areas of strategy, budgets, weapons procurement, and training. These four issue areas represent important areas of historical conflict and competition between the Air Force and Navy. The conclusion is that ASB is ushering in a new era of Air Force–Navy partnership that advances the inter-service dynamic from “jointness” toward integration. The emergent USAF–USN partnership therefore represents a significant development in US defense politics and defense strategy. 相似文献
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Yoav Gortzak 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2014,25(1):137-160
Military commanders, policymakers, and analysts have recently embraced the concept of combined action as a powerful tool to improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces in the fight against the Taliban. In doing so, they explicitly draw inspiration from the Combined Action Program employed by US Marines during the Vietnam War. This program is widely considered to have greatly improved the effectiveness of South Vietnamese government forces and contributed to increased population security in its area of operations and is considered a model worthy of emulation. This study finds that the success of the Vietnam-era Combined Action Program was more qualified than contemporary proponents argue. It argues that successes were tempered, and conditioned, by the choice of junior commanders, the level of operational control enjoyed by the US Marines, and the way the local forces were recruited and deployed. These conditions offer valuable lessons for those seeking to employ combined action not only in present-day Afghanistan, but also in future counterinsurgency campaigns. 相似文献
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Under the administration of President George W. Bush, Pentagon rhetoric has increasingly articulated a more robust vision of space as a future battlefield. This analysis details some of the ongoing spending for research and development programs identified in current U.S. Air Force, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and Defense Advanced Research and Planning Agency (DARPA) planning and budget documents related to “space control” and “space force projection.” This analysis finds that current support for “space superiority” and “space control” systems remains largely rhetorical—with little actual budgetary support. Unclassified technology development programs included in the six-year Future Years Defense Plan are a decade or more away from deployment. Programs related to offensive counterspace, space-based missile defense interceptors, and space-based strike total slightly less than $300 million in FY 2006 funding. We conclude significantly higher expenditures in research and development would be required to develop and deploy killer micro satellites, space-based missile defense interceptors, and military space planes. 相似文献
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Roger Arditti 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5):764-789
It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency. 相似文献
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机载有源雷达干扰系统是现代飞机一种辅助电子对抗系统,根据其功能可分为支援干扰系统和自卫干扰系统,其中支援干扰系统装在专用电子战飞机上,自卫干扰系统装在作战飞机吊舱上.主要论述国外机载电子干扰吊舱的构成、装载平台、技术现状及发展. 相似文献