The Taliban's ‘military courts’

The Taliban's ‘code of conduct’, which lists rules of discipline for the fighters, has been widely discussed, but do the Taliban try to implement it? This article discusses the structures that the Taliban have put in place for this purpose and their evolution over the years. It assesses that while the Taliban's ‘military justice’ system is still work in progress, the fact that it has attracted a significant investment in human resources bears witness to a serious intent of the leadership. However, the Taliban's concern with the behaviour of their fighting force is driven by their own political calculus, not by any sympathy for the international law of conflict.     

《现代汉语词典》（第5版）方位名词计量研究

本文采用计量方法考察《现代汉语词典》（第5版）所收录的130个方位词,分析它们在语音形式、词义架构、结构形式三个方面的特点,以帮助词典使用者更深入地了解现代汉语方位词的特点。     

India’s Taliban Dilemma: To Contain or to Engage?

India’s Afghanistan policy in the 1990s is termed a zero-sum game of influence with Pakistan. New Delhi’s aversion to the pro-Pakistan Taliban regime is considered a marker of this rivalry. This paper revisits India’s approach towards Afghanistan and examines if New Delhi was necessarily averse to engaging with pro-Pakistan political factions during 1990s. Based on fresh primary interviews with former Indian policymakers, media archives, and official reports, the paper shows that India engaged with and accommodated pro-Pakistan factions after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 until 1996. The Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul in September 1996 challenged India’s engage-with-all approach. Nonetheless, the decision to sever ties with the Taliban and to bolster anti-Taliban factions was highly debated in New Delhi. Many in India saw the Taliban as a militant Islamist force sponsored by Pakistan. For others, however, it was an ethno-nationalist movement representing Pashtun interests, and not necessarily under Islamabad’s control.     

Brinkmanship,not COIN,in Pakistan’s post-9/11 Internal War

Politics is critical to making sense of Pakistani successes and failures in dealing with non-state armed groups. This includes domestic political currents; regional political currents; and the global impetus of the post-9/11 era. How these currents overlap renders to any reading of insurgency in Pakistan real complexity. This article engages with this complexity rather than shirking from it. Its hypothesis is that while the insurgency bordering Afghanistan has been an epicentre of Pakistani military efforts to fight the Taliban, this theatre is in of itself insufficiently inclusive to grasp the nature of Pakistan’s security challenges and its consequent responses.     

Beyond the Double Game: Lessons from Pakistan’s Approach to Islamist Militancy

States commonly take one of three approaches to militant groups on their soil: collaboration; benign neglect; or belligerence. All three approaches are present in Pakistan, where some groups also move back and forth among these categories. I employ the term “coopetition” to capture this fluidity. The dynamic nature of militancy in Pakistan makes the country an excellent laboratory for exploring a state’s assessment of the utility an Islamist militant group offers, and the threat it poses relative to other threats informs the state’s treatment of that group. In this article, I put forward a typology that situates Islamist militants in Pakistan in one of the above four categories. I also illustrate how a group’s identity, objectives, and alliances inform assessments of its utility and threat relative to other threats. In addition to enhancing our understanding of militant–state dynamics, this taxonomy builds on and helps to unify earlier typologies of Pakistani militancy.     

Panjwai: a tale of two COINs in Afghanistan

The US Army has two approaches to counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. One is hard, or combat-focused, and the other is soft, or development-focused. This study examines two US Army task forces deployed to Panjwai District, Afghanistan from 2012 to 2013. CTF 4-9 and 1-38 offer a meaningful comparison because they pursued these contrasting approaches among the same population and against the same enemy at the same time and place. The study compares each unit’s approach and finds that neither approach was successful absent the other. The article concludes by recommending further research into combining the approaches at the operational level.     

Analyzing Taliban taranas (chants): an effective Afghan propaganda artifact

This article describes and analyzes a little understood Afghan Taliban propaganda tool: chants or taranas . These melodic refrains effectively use historical narratives, symbology, and iconic portraits. The chants are engendered in emotions of sorrow, pride, desperation, hope, and complaints to mobilize and convince the Afghan population of the Taliban's worldview. The chants represent culturally relevant and simple messages that are communicated in a narrative and poetic form that is familiar to and resonates with the local people. They are virtually impossible for the United States and NATO to counter because of Western sensitivities concerning religious themes that dominate the Taliban narrative space, not to mention the lack of Western linguistic capabilities, including the understanding and mastering the poetic nature of local dialects.     

Specialization in defence forces

The choice between balanced and specialized defence forces depends on the technology of defence output (e.g. whether a force scope multiplier is present), the existence of scope and scale economies, the platform customization costs and, of course, the level of defence budgets. Minimum force element levels (thresholds), and scale economies facilitate specialization as opposed to scope economies (e.g. platform‐sharing), scale diseconomies and the force scope multiplier (e.g. defence weakest‐link technology). When a balanced force is not optimal, the option value of a non‐optimally maintained force element must also include the opportunity cost arising from suboptimal force elements. Shrinking defence budgets may produce two surprising phenomena. If some force elements are shut down as a result of thresholds, the surviving ones may increase in platform numbers as well as enjoying closer‐to‐most‐desirable platforms. Furthermore, if heritage force elements are shut down within the budget contraction environment, overall defence capability might rise.     

The legality of unmanned aerial vehicles outside the combat zone: a case study of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

The drone is the latest tool to promote interests of a nation-state. It is clear that USA as well as other major powers anticipate that robotics will play a key role in future warfare. Today, more than 70 countries have already acquired drone technology and many others are desperate to join the ranks. This urge for drone technology will ultimately lead to a “boundless and borderless war without end.” In the case of Pakistan, the US drone campaign has raised some important issues regarding how their use could, or should, be regulated in the future. This article analyses the legal issues raised by the US's use of drone technology in non-combat zones, such as Pakistan. It is argued that a reckless disrespect of Pakistan's sovereignty has had adverse implications and consequences for the legitimacy of the Pakistani government. Drone strikes have prompted instinctive opposition among the Pakistani population, hurt their feelings and estranged them from the government. This in turn has added to Pakistan's instability and stimulated a ground-swell of animosity toward the USA.     

Mark XIIA IFF系统中频数字接收机设计与仿真

Mark XIIA IFF是一种由美军与北约盟军共同研制的为了提高战场态势感知能力的新型敌我识别系统。以其为研究对象,提出了Mark XIIA Mode 5系统中频数字应答接收机的框架结构,并利用Simulink软件设计了一种最佳的状态接收机仿真模型,对结果进行了分析,验证了方案的可行性,为具体方案的实现奠定了基础。