排序方式: 共有264条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
81.
82.
为了克服传统风险评估中定性分析方法客观性较差等缺点,定义了与仿真信号特征参数一致性相关联的后果系数,对仿真信号风险事件所导致的后果进行了定量分析,并在此基础上提出了基于一致性分析的仿真信号应用风险评估模型,最后给出了该模型应用于舰艇辐射噪声仿真的评估实例。评估实例表明,该模型不仅有助于充分挖掘信号仿真中阶段性数据的有用信息,同时也能为仿真信号的风险评估提供实用工具。 相似文献
83.
墨菲定理指出系统危险源必然引发事故,海恩法则强调事故发生是量的积累,因此欲提高飞机这种高风险系统的服役安全就必须展开风险管理。风险管理是安全管理的重要组成部分,系统安全性理论是安全管理的基础,在对系统安全性进行定义、明确目标和组成的基础上,建立了一种适用于飞机服役过程的风险管理模型,并分析了其风险控制步骤,对于飞机服役过程的风险管理有一定的指导意义。 相似文献
84.
85.
基于指挥信息系统的风险管理,贯穿于作战指挥活动的全过程。从指挥信息系统的结构和组织体制的实际出发,围绕指挥信息系统的风险因素,进行风险辨识,给出了基于信息熵理论的信息系统风险评估方法,以指挥活动中的组织计划过程的风险评估为例建模,为在不确定条件下,科学评估指挥信息系统风险提供了定性分析与定量分析方法。 相似文献
86.
This article studies the optimal capacity investment problem for a risk‐averse decision maker. The capacity can be either purchased or salvaged, whereas both involve a fixed cost and a proportional cost/revenue. We incorporate risk preference and use a consumption model to capture the decision maker's risk sensitivity in a multiperiod capacity investment model. We show that, in each period, capacity and consumption decisions can be separately determined. In addition, we characterize the structure of the optimal capacity strategy. When the parameters are stationary, we present certain conditions under which the optimal capacity strategy could be easily characterized by a static two‐sided (s, S) policy, whereby, the capacity is determined only at the beginning of period one, and held constant during the entire planning horizon. It is purchased up to B when the initial capacity is below b, salvaged down to Σ when it is above σ, and remains constant otherwise. Numerical tests are presented to investigate the impact of demand volatility on the optimal capacity strategy. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 218–235, 2016 相似文献
87.
88.
本文建立了实际复摆振荡系统的非线性模型,并用一阶谐波平衡法导出各种特征状态函数,从而分析计算定常周期及其运动稳定性、稳定分支振荡的跳跃特性和最大振幅特性。本文利用可控力矩激振装置成功地实现了复摆的强迫振荡实验。实例表明不仅能准确地辩识实际复摆非线性模型的参数,而且实测到复摆的稳定分支振荡和跳跃现象,从而实验验证了实际复摆非线性振荡的理论分析。 相似文献
89.
We consider a distribution system consisting of a central warehouse and a group of retailers facing independent stochastic demand. The retailers replenish from the warehouse, and the warehouse from an outside supplier with ample supply. Time is continuous. Most previous studies on inventory control policies for this system have considered stock‐based batch‐ordering policies. We develop a time‐based joint‐replenishment policy in this study. Let the warehouse set up a basic replenishment interval. The retailers are replenished through the warehouse in intervals that are integer multiples of the basic replenishment interval. No inventory is carried at the warehouse. We provide an exact evaluation of the long‐term average system costs under the assumption that stock can be balanced among the retailers. The structural properties of the inventory system are characterized. We show that, although it is well known that stock‐based inventory control policies dominate time‐based inventory control policies at a single facility, this dominance does not hold for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand. This is because the latter can provide a more efficient mechanism to streamline inventory flow and pool retailer demand, even though the former may be able to use more updated stock information to optimize system performance. The findings of the study provide insights about the key factors that drive the performance of a multiechelon inventory control system. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 637–651, 2013 相似文献
90.
This article studies a firm that procures a product from a supplier. The quality of each product unit is measured by a continuous variable that follows a normal distribution and is correlated within a batch. The firm conducts an inspection and pays the supplier only if the product batch passes the inspection. The inspection not only serves the purpose of preventing a bad batch from reaching customers but also offers the supplier an incentive to improve product quality. The firm determines the acceptance sampling plan, and the supplier determines the quality effort level in either a simultaneous game or a Stackelberg leadership game, in which both parties share inspection cost and recall loss caused by low product quality. In the simultaneous game, we identify the Nash equilibrium form, provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and find parameter settings under which the decentralized and centralized supply chains achieve the same outcome. By numerical experiments, we show that the firm's acceptance sampling plan and the supplier's quality effort level are sensitive to both the recall loss sharing ratio and the game format (i.e., the precommitment assumption of the inspection policy). © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013 相似文献