Lost through non-translation: bringing Clausewitz's writings on ‘new wars’ back in

While Carl von Clausewitz has generally been respected as one of the most profound philosophers of war, his expertise has been regarded as somewhat limited if not even irrelevant to the so-called ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War world. Many scholars in international relations have claimed that ‘new wars’ are essentially ‘post-Clausewitzian’ and ‘post-trinitarian’ in nature, meaning that they are no longer fathomable through a Clausewitzian framework. However Clausewitz's earlier writings were nearly exclusively dedicated to guerrilla warfare, or what he called ‘small wars’. These writings have been largely overlooked by many analysts of contemporary conflicts. By drawing on his rare and untranslated writings, the article uncovers a critical part of Clausewitz's expertise in asymmetric warfare and shows that, far from being irrelevant in an age where interstate warfare is increasingly being replaced by conflicts between states and semi-/non-state actors, Clausewitz's philosophical writings actually shed new light into the particular interactive dynamics generated during wars waged under conditions of asymmetry.     

What Happened to Israeli Military Thought?

Abstract

This article addresses the following question: how can one explain the neglect of the intellectual aspects of the profession on the part of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)? The explanations offered for that neglect are a mixture of cultural and societal factors. The cultural explanation focuses on Israeli strategic culture; the traditional Israeli perception of the combination of rich experience and experience-based intuition as a winning ticket; the tendency to extol improvisation; a cult of material strength; and a strong belief in technology. The social explanation stresses the declining attractiveness of a military career for qualitative young Israelis. The article contends that change can take place only if the IDF undergoes a process of institutional intellectualism – if not willingly then one imposed by the political echelon.     

Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants

This article uses a novel database of 1,625 posthumously published biographies of members of two Islamist militant organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)), all of whom were killed in the course of carrying out militant attacks. In general, each biography provides data on the militant’s birthplace, education, recruitment, and training. The number of observations in this database is a full order of magnitude larger than those of previous databases assembled from militant biographies. While the sample of militants in this database is the product of multiple selection effects, analysis of the database undermines many common myths about Pakistani militants and casts doubt on current policy approaches to mitigating Islamist militancy in Pakistan.     

Deterring ‘Able Archer’: Comments Arising from Adamsky’s ‘Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice’

This is a short commentary on Dmitry Adamsky’s recent article ‘The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice’. First, it teases out nuances in the relationship between deterrence and strategy and considers deterrence to be both a strategy and an effect. Second, it explores the culminating point of deterrence in theory and considers it untenable, as it does not conform to the logic of, or to any logic analogous to, Clausewitz’s culminating point of victory. Deterrence logically cannot culminate. Moreover, any culminating point of deterrence would ignore why the potential deteree should perceive the actions of his deterrer in such a way as to render strengthened strategies of deterrence counterproductive. It is the deteree who is the only strategic actor to determine whether the deterrer is actually practising a successful strategy of deterrence or not.     

Delusion of Defeat: The United States and Iraq, 1990–1998

This article challenges the widely held belief that that the United States ‘won the war but lost the peace’ following the war with Iraq in 1991. Fears of a resurgent Iraq grew throughout the decade, despite abundant evidence that Iraq was becoming desperately weak and was no longer a threat to regional security. In fact, the United States won the war as well as the peace by any meaningful definition of the term. The article also discusses the reasons why US policymakers and observers convinced themselves that they had lost. The final section considers implications for strategy and policy in wars of limited objectives.     

试论武警“合训”院校现代化教学模式的构建

武警部队院校体制调整后,作为担负学历教育的“合训”院校,只有大力加强教学理论研究,及时实现教员角色转变,积极营造健康向上的教学环境,才能顺利实现“培养具有较高文化素养、具备扎实军事基础的新型军事人才”的教学目标。     

中小学校长治校漫话——由“钱学森之问”引发的思考

“钱学森之问”是广大校长必须直面的一个严峻课题。校长作为一所学校教学业务的指导者和教育行政的管理者,应以教学、管理、学生、教师及社会为基本职业维度,在工作中以“五心”标准要求自己。导致校长履职失范的因素包括校长自我认知错位、上级行政主管单位制度缺位及学校教职工角色异位等方面。人格自觉与制度跟进是加强校长队伍建设、规范校长治校理教的根本和正途。     

中国共产党的领导地位是历史和人民的必然选择

中国共产党成立90年来,带领中国人民赢得了民族独立和人民解放,初步实现了国家的繁荣昌盛和人民的共同富裕。回顾历史,审视现实,放眼全球,展望未来,只有坚持党的领导,中华民族才能不断走向新的胜利。     

一种针对OpenSSL中RSA的计时攻击改进算法

针对原有BB-Attack（Boneh and Brumley’s Attack）计时攻击算法在样本量小的情况下存在0~1间隔不明显、攻击精确度低等问题,依据Montgomery乘法中额外约简数目与输入消息的关系,结合统计分析中的t检验,给出了一种改进的计时攻击算法。计时攻击实验结果表明：改进算法能够产生更加明显的0~1间隔,并且减少了攻击样本量,提高了攻击效率。     

仪器柔度标定误差对杨氏模量压入识别的影响

针对材料杨氏模量仪器化压入识别的2种代表性方法——Oliver-Pharr方法和Ma方法,通过有限元数值模拟分析了仪器柔度标定误差对杨氏模量识别精度的影响。结果表明：仪器柔度及压入载荷越大,由标定误差导致的杨氏模量识别误差越大;当材料较软且压入深度较大时,仪器柔度的标定误差甚至可能导致材料杨氏模量的识别结果为负值;通过比较证明,Ma方法比Oliver-Pharr方法具有较低的仪器柔度敏感性和较高的测试精度。