关于图的n-Irredundance数和n-Domination数

设G是简单连通图,r_n~c(G)和ir_n(G)分别表示图G的连通n-Domination数和n-Irredundance数、本文证明了如下结论:r_n~c(G)≤(3n+1)ir_n(G)-2n。     

MEASUREMENT OF PLASMA POTENTIAL USING EMISSIVE PROBE IN A MAGNETIC MIRROR

ＭＥＡＳＵＲＥＭＥＮＴＯＦＰＬＡＳＭＡＰＯＴＥＮＴＩＡＬＵＳＩＮＧＥＭＩＳＳＩＶＥＰＲＯＢＥＩＮＡＭＡＧＮＥＴＩＣＭＩＲＲＯＲＺｈａｎｇＪｉａｎｄｅ（ＤｅｐａｒｔｍｅｎｔｏｆＡｐｐｌｉｅｄＰｈｙｓｉｃｓ,ＮＵＤＴ,Ｃｈａｎｇｓｈａ,４１００７３）Ｆａ...     

相依目标群状态转移概率矩阵的特性及其应用

本文对相依目标群的状态转移概率矩阵的性质进行了深入的分析,得到了若干重要结论,并在此基础上讨论了相依目标群系统的火力分配模型     

抗超高速撞击多层结构复合材料研究

本文介绍了抗超高速撞击多层结构复合材料的设计、制备和实验,并对结果进行了讨论,实验证明,以SiC陶瓷基复合材料为防护层、以空心微珠或多孔变密度复合材料为缓冲层、以编织物复合材料为结构层的多层结构复合材料,具有面密度低、抗撞击速度范围宽、抗撞击性能好的特点。     

How to rethink war: Conceptual Innovation and AirLand Battle Doctrine1

This article examines the role of ideas in US Army innovation after the Vietnam War. It challenges the view that failure, changes in the strategic environment or technology are the sole drivers of military innovation and analyses the role of ideas and identity in the army's development of AirLand battle doctrine. It highlights how the reform in ideas led to a ‘re-conception’ of the strategic environment, the nature and dynamics of warfare and a change in self-understanding. The organisational reforms embodied these ideas and led to a new way of war practised in the first Gulf War.     

Hard Line: The Republican Party and US Foreign Policy since World War II Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment

This article examines the Dhofar campaign in Oman (1965–75), and the role Britain played in assisting the Omani royal government against left-wing insurgents. Using existing secondary sources and declassified British government papers, it reassesses the contribution of British military advisers and special forces to the counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, the balance between military action and civil affairs, the external dimension of the conflict, and intelligence and covert operations. It concludes by assessing whether the Dhofar War offers any guidance to Western armed forces involved in contemporary COIN campaigns such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq.     

The myth of Afghan electoral democracy: the irregularities of the 2014 presidential election

ABSTRACT

This article systematically assesses the 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election, the first transfer of power from President Hamid Karzai to an elected successor, using provincial voting data as well as explicit data from polling centers. The analysis finds unusual voting results in the April election, where no candidate received 50%+1 votes required by the Afghan constitution, versus the voting results realized for the June ‘runoff election.’ As in other Afghan voting analyses, this article finds voting based on ethno-linguistic preferences, and interestingly found Dr. Ashraf Ghani receiving almost all the swing votes in the runoff election even though the other leading candidate from the April election all endorsed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. More importantly, however, the research presented here clearly finds extremely strange voting patterns. For example, the polling data center analysis finds 606 polling places where Ghani received all 600 votes and Abdullah received none and another 900 polling centers that gave virtually all its votes to Ghani. These results in combination with other analyses raise the very real possibility that the election results were illegitimate. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research to future Afghan elections and their processes as well as to the long-standing conflict in the country.     

IRA operational intelligence: the heartbeat of the war

This article will seek to provide a detailed examination of the IRA's operational intelligence methodologies. Providing not only a lengthy discussion on the organization's intelligence collection protocols, it will also examine the interplay between intelligence and IRA decision-making. It will be contended that intelligence's influence resided in its ability to introduce a strong element of predictability into the IRA's decision-making process. This depended on an ability to construct a detailed intelligence picture of the target and its geographical milieu so as to minimize the likelihood of volunteers encountering unforeseen circumstances that could adversely affect planned or anticipated outcomes.     

Building A New Luftwaffe: The United States Air Force and Bundeswehr Planning for Rearmament, 1950–60

Rearming Germany was a long and complicated process. It was especially difficult to create a new German air force. The army generals who dominated the Bundeswehr cadre did not even want an air force but rather a small arm air corps. Moreover, Adenauer's defense staff failed to adequately budget or plan for a new air force. As rearmament began, US Air Force leaders, working closely with the small Luftwaffe staff in West Germany's shadow Defense Ministry, basically took charge of the process to ensure that the Germans built a new Luftwaffe on the American model – a large, multipurpose force organized as an independent service and fully integrated into NATO. The first Bundesluftwaffe commanders allied themselves to the Americans, often in opposition to their army comrades, to overcome the political problems caused by Adenauer's poor defense planning and create a modern air force on American lines.