执行视图(EV)在美军装备体系决策中的应用

在体系SoS(System-of-Systems)工程领域中,如何构建科学合理的装备体系结构,即装备体系决策一直是众多问题中的热点之一。执行视图EV(Executive Views)是美军在解决体系决策问题方面的最新研究成果。与以往的工程手段相比,执行视图具有便于理解、易于使用、适于高层决策的特点,它为解决庞大复杂的体系决策问题提供了强有力的支持。美国陆军已经率先将执行视图应用于其指挥控制(C2)体系的决策之中,并取得了良好的效果。描述了执行视图产生的背景,通过示例展现了执行视图的开发结果和信息表示方法,并对传统视图和执行视图进行了比较。     

The Odyssey of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

This study examines the failures of the William J. Clinton and Barack Obama administrations to secure ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It applies an integrated analytical framework for assessing treaty ratification that builds upon previous research in order to understand why the Clinton administration failed to achieve CTBT ratification in 1999 and why the Obama administration has so far failed to advance the treaty in the Senate. The study concludes that CTBT ratification, despite Obama administration pledges of support, remains highly unlikely. Finally, the study analyzes the common domestic political factors present in both cases and suggests areas for further research.     

U型钢板桩施工的滑坡动态勘察技术及数值模拟

为节省边(滑)坡灾害的应急加固时间,提高边(滑)坡处置的效率和质量,针对边(滑)坡在勘察阶段提出了基于U型钢板桩施工的动态勘察技术,即在静压植桩机压入U型钢板桩的同时,利用与其配套的压入管理系统设备与软件对压桩数据进行监测和分析,从而反馈出地层强度等信息。数值模拟中,为了能利用工程中所得压桩阻力图谱来反推地层信息,归纳总结了不同土体在桩压入时的应力云图和压桩阻力规律。结果表明:压桩阻力规律与地层信息之间存在对应关系,据此可判断地层强度特征等信息,数值模拟也为后续的现场试验研究提供了依据。     

舰艇机动穿越深海会聚区对潜艇探测研究

深海会聚区效应是深海水声传播显著的特征,并为远距离潜艇探测提供了有效途径。首先分析了深海会聚区形成的原因和条件,然后根据海区会聚区的预报距离和宽度,构建了舰艇采用两次机动穿越会聚区测算被探测潜艇的位置和运动要素模型,最后通过算例分析舰艇两次穿越会聚区的方法和求解潜艇运动要素和位置的过程,分析结果验证了舰艇穿越会聚区对潜艇定位方法的可行性。     

导弹两种蛇形机动对反导舰炮突防效果比较

为探讨反舰导弹的近距离机动突防能力,用仿真方法计算了反舰导弹末端作水平蛇形机动和垂直蛇形机动时对近程反导舰炮武器系统的突防概率,以图示方式给出了两种机动周期、两种舰炮射速、多种机动幅值条件下的计算结果.结果表明,短周期大幅度的频繁机动可显著提高反舰导弹的突防能力,且两种蛇形机动的突防效果大致相同;而提高舰炮射速则是削弱...     

India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn

For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, ‘Cold Start’, intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine's architects.     

The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy

Washington's so-called Maritime Strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to full fruition during the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow”s strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war. Relying on a variety of interviews and newly declassified documents, the authors assert that the Maritime Strategy represents one of the rare instances in history when intelligence helped lead a nation to completely revise its concept of military operations.     

Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru: An Example of US Army Psychological Operations

This article analyzes the assumptions of US and Peruvian military personnel regarding insurgent susceptibilities to psychological operations in 1988. The discussion is based on both archival material and the experiences of the author, who was a member of the joint US-Peruvian team. The paper provides insight into the workings of US Army psychological operations as they were conducted in the 1980s and outlines both the strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken.     

Operation ‘enduring freedom’: a victory for a conventional force fighting an unconventional war

The track record of the US military in unconventional wars has not been good and there were fears that Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ might suffer the same fate as previous campaigns. This contribution explores why the Taliban were defeated so easily by the US in 2001. It challenges the view that America's victory was due solely to changes in its modus operandi or that the outcome heralds a change in the fortunes of the US when fighting unconventional war. It also questions the idea that America's victory was a consequence of Taliban incompetence. Instead, it explains the defeat of the Taliban in terms of the prevailing political conditions within Afghanistan, which made them vulnerable to attack. The essay concludes that current political circumstances could, in the long run, permit the resurrection of the Taliban and undermine the US-led coalition's victory.     

Misapplying lessons learned? Analysing the utility of British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76

This article examines the British Army's deployment in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland. It argues that the core guiding principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) – employing the minimum use of force, firm and timely action, and unity of control in civil–military relations – were misapplied by the Army in its haste to combat Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism between 1971 and 1976. Moreover, it suggests that the Army's COIN strategy was unsuccessful in the 1970s because commanders adhered too closely to the customs, doctrine, and drill applied under very different circumstances in Aden between 1963 and 1967, generally regarded as a failure in Britain's post-war internal security operations. The article concludes with a discussion of the British government's decision to scale back the Army's role in favour of giving the Royal Ulster Constabulary primacy in counter-terrorist operations, a decision which led ultimately to success in combating IRA violence.