浅谈武警部队财务信息化建设

结合笔者工作实践,对武警部队实施财务信息化管理的现状和问题进行了简要归纳和总结,并着重对武警部队如何顺利推进财务管理信息化提出了建议和意见。     

美军在信息安全视野下利用社交媒体政策研究

近年来,美军逐步调整社交媒体政策,重视发挥其在公共事务、家庭服务以及塑造军队形象中的独特功能。从信息安全的角度出发,在分析美军社交媒体政策发展变化及其内在动因的基础上,总结出美军运用社交媒体所采取的信息安全措施。     

从《中导条约》的失效看未来国际军控走向

《美苏消除两国中程导弹和中短程导弹条约》的失效重创了本就脆弱的国际军控体系,对美俄战略稳定和全球军事安全带来消极影响,国际军控合作和全球军事安全迫切需要重构新的军控体系。本文立足当前国际军控现状,在分析美俄“退约”背后各方战略考量及国际军控面临的挑战,如“美国优先”理念下的霸权主义和单边主义、国际军控体系自身的脆弱性和局限性和新军事革命给全球安全增添新的变量的基础上,提出了“构建人类命运共同体”理念凝聚全球安全共识、以大国责任和义务为基础构建多层次军控体系和以多边军控体系循序推进国际军控进程等措施和建议,以期为推动国际军控合作,建立更为公平、合理、有效的国际军控体系做出贡献。     

基于双向启发式属性约简的战术决策建模研究

从预警机指挥引导的多机协同空战原则分析出发,针对超视距协同空战决策过程中的不确定性和不完备性问题,提出了一种不完备信息系统中的基于双向启发式属性约简的战术粗决策建模方法。首先考虑粗糙集决策过程中条件属性发生缺失或不确定的情况,根据扩展不完备信息概念建立了不完备决策信息系统的最优完备选择;其次基于分辨矩阵的属性约简算法,以属性频度的大小作为启发信息进行决策信息系统约简的双向选择,得出决策信息系统的最佳约简集合;然后依据使决策最有可能发生的原则,给出决策信息系统的最优选择,以该最优选择为代表提取出决策规则;最后根据软、硬杀伤结合使用的CGF实体超视距协同空战作战想定,建立了CGF实体综合战术决策模型,并通过作战决策实例对该方法的正确性和有效性进行了验证。结果表明：该方法能在作战态势信息不完备的情况下正确给出CGF实体综合战术行为。     

加快院校初级指挥人才培养模式转变的思考

加快武警院校初级指挥人才培养模式转变,既是贯彻落实胡主席主题主线重大战略思想的客观要求,也是适应建设现代化武警需要,不断提高院校人才培养质量的迫切要求。客观分析了以往武警院校初级指挥人才培养模式所取得的主要成绩、存在问题及原因;从适应武警部队现代化建设现实需要等方面,阐述了转变人才培养模式的必要性;从服务部队建设、培养合格人才的高度,提出了加快初级指挥人才培养模式转变的六项基本对策。     

新阶段推进武警学院科学发展的战略思考

武警学院要在新阶段、新起点上实现又好又快发展,必须用科学发展观统领发展战略,解决＂发展什么＂和＂怎么发展＂两个根本问题。为此,对学院发展面临的形势要有新认识,发展理念要有新升华,发展路径要有新突破。     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.     

Country survey: military expenditure and defence policy in Norway 1970–2013

This article examines military expenditure and defence policy in Norway from 1970 to 2013. Until 1990 Norwegian military expenditure remained between 2.5 and 3.0 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite constant GDP shares, the military expenditure could not sustain a large and properly armed mobilization army. The constant nominal defence budgets of the 1990s accentuated the Norwegian Armed Forces' underlying imbalance between tasks, structure and budget. Around year 2000, large organizational reforms were effectuated, in which costs, the number of man-years, and underlying imbalances between tasks, structure and budget were reduced. Military expenditure increased in nominal terms between 2003 and 2013, while real military expenditure remained practically constant.     

Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016

During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times.