在依法从严治校中加强院校正规化建设

依法从严治校,是体现现代教育思想和遵循军事教育规律的办学之道,是一种先进高效的管理模式。武警院校在调整改革中,必须始终坚持从严治警、依法从严治校,不断提高院校正规化建设水平。     

Modern Sikh Warriors: Militants,Soldiers, Citizens

Central to the mainstream Sikh identity is the concept of ethically-justified force, used as a last resort. There is no place for absolute pacifism in this conception of ethical living. Fighters and martyrs occupy an important place in the Khalsa narrative, and Sikhs are constantly reminded of the sacrifices and heroism of their co-religionists of the past. This article explores how the Sikh warrior identity is manifested in the contemporary world. It examines the Sikhs who, in the 1980s and 1990s, were involved on both sides of the Punjab crisis: those militants who fought for a Sikh homeland (“Khalistan”) and those Sikhs in the Indian army who suppressed the insurgency. The article also looks beyond the militants and soldiers to Sikhs employed in modern security-related professions, the broader issue of Sikh symbols relating to the use of force, and violence within the Sikh diaspora. An examination of the Sikhs in various parts of the world reveals additional uses and consequences of ideology, whether in enlistment in the armed forces of the states in which they live, or in the support of the militancy in India, particularly in the 1980s. The conclusion is that the modern Sikh warrior is a nuanced actor behaving in various ways, some overt and some subtle: the warrior is willing to physically fight those perceived to be tyrannous, but most initiatives have shifted to pursuing justice through non-violent means, such as legal struggles for civil rights. Although armed Sikh militancy against the Indian government is in the past, there are strong residual resentments still requiring redress. All of this is of great relevance to understanding the ethics of armed force within modern Sikhism.     

The perils of special approaches to counterterrorism: the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005

The death of Jean Charles de Menezes on the London Underground in 2005 remains a horrifying example of what happens when counterterrorism goes wrong. One of the extraordinary features of the shooting was the remarkable number of special elements, police units, military Special Forces, and unusual procedures and tactics involved in the incident. This article attempts to assess the causal significance of the special dimension in the horrific chain of circumstances. It does so by interrogating numerous explanations for the tragedy and highlighting the role of the special factor. The Stockwell shooting remains very important today because it casts a sharp and somewhat harsh spotlight on the particular pitfalls of special responses, measures and units to the multitudinous threats posed by international terrorism in the twenty-first century.     

A gentle occupation: unravelling the Dutch approach in Iraq, 2003–2005

This article examines the so-called ‘Dutch approach’ to conducting stabilisation operations. The term is mostly used in relation to the mission carried out by the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province from 2006 to 2010, but actually originates in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Here, a 1350-strong battle group operated from July 2003 until March 2005 as part of the US-led coalition, after which the Dutch forces left Iraq relatively unscathed and self-confident of their ability in dealing with this type of conflict. On the basis of archival research and interviews, the authors unravel the ‘Dutch approach’ in southern Iraq by tracing its roots and by examining the Dutch operation in the context of the American and British experiences. They argue that despite predominantly effective tactical reflexes and an overall adequately broad interpretation by battle group commanders of a too narrowly defined political mandate, stability in Al Muthanna was conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique and effective approach. The term ‘Dutch approach’ turned out to be a convenient fabrication which, after the relatively successful mission in Al Muthanna, became increasingly politicised in the run-up to a dangerous new operation in southern Afghanistan.     

武警院校教育规模化、内涵式发展及其实现途径

将武警院校教育的发展方式作为研究的切入点,在分析过往武警院校教育发展方式所造成的诸如院校数量多、规模小、条块分割、结构不合理、办学效益不高等问题及其原因的基础上,提出了武警院校教育应走规模化、内涵式发展道路的思路,以及武警院校教育实现规模化、内涵式发展方式的具体途径和方法,并对此从理论与实践两个方面进行了论证。     

科技创新引领下的武警部队现代化装备建设发展思路与策略

推进武警部队现代化装备建设跨越发展,需要认清现状、更新观念、明确目标,确立没有科技创新就没有真正意义上的现代化装备建设的观念。武警装备科技创新,应在注重装备理论研究、加强非致命武器研发、拓展特种器材研制上实现新的突破和跨越;要在创新科技人才建设机制、完善装备科研管理机制、建立装备研发保障机制上增强科技创新能力,发挥科技创新引领的作用。     

论武警法律体系构建与完善

武警法律体系是以武警法为核心,由现行的各种军事法律规范和武警规章为基础,以武警基本法、武警组织法、武警行为法、武警保障与监督检查法等武警法分支为主体而组成的内容协调一致的有机整体。本文是从武警法律体系的角度讨论贯彻实施《人民武装警察法》。从理论的层面讨论有关武警法律体系的内容。     

The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-Insurgency

This article argues that there is little evidence supporting the existence of the often praised, and allegedly subtle and successful ‘Dutch approach’ to stabilisation and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. It denounces the uncritical use of the term and refutes suggestions of historical and cultural roots to such an approach, for instance in Dutch colonial warfare in the Indonesian archipelago. It concludes by explaining the true conditions that gave rise to this notion, which seems to feed into a gratifying national self-image of the Dutch as non-martial, conflict averse and tolerant, rather than offering an original and successful formula for countering insurgencies.     

Local defence forces and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: learning from the CIA's Village Defense Program in South Vietnam

Some scholars would have us believe that the distinctions between military and policing roles, methods and objectives have become increasingly blurred by the security demands of a post-Cold War and post-11 September global and domestic order. This article explores the current state of the police–military divide through a conceptual and case study analysis. It concludes that, in this case, there is some conflation occurring at a macro-level as international and domestic affairs have become increasingly indistinct, but the article also demonstrates that the actual ethos and practice of these agencies still differs strongly. Most importantly, the article argues that this distinction is in fact a very useful one in planning for future peace support operations     

The limits of covert action: SAS operations during ‘Confrontation’, 1964–66

This article evaluates the performance of the Special Air Service (SAS) during secret cross-border raids conducted as part of Britain’s undeclared war against Indonesia from 1963–1966. The analysis reviews the existing debate on the SAS’ performance during this campaign; it looks more closely at how military effectiveness might be defined; and it then examines, using the SAS’ own operations reports, the nature of their activities and their success or failure. This article concludes that critics of the SAS’ effectiveness during Confrontation are right; but for the wrong reasons. SAS operations did indeed have less effect than orthodox accounts would have it. But the reasons for this lay not in their misuse but in the exigencies of British strategy. This article demonstrates an enduring truth – no matter how ‘special’ a military force might be, tactical excellence cannot compensate reliably for problems in strategy.