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51.
Yingcong Dai 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2019,30(4-5):750-774
ABSTRACT At the turn of the nineteenth century, China’s Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was hit by a sectarian rebellion. Commonly considered a breakpoint marking the end of the dynasty’s golden age spanning most of the eighteenth century, the war to suppress the rebels, referred to as the White Lotus War (1796–1804) in this article (‘White Lotus’ was the umbrella name used by both the authorities and some sectarians for their teaching), exposed many structural drawbacks of the Qing political and military systems and depleted the dynasty’s financial resources, which had never been recovered. Reluctant in embracing guerrilla warfare in the beginning, the insurgents quickly turned themselves into master guerrillas. Shuttling in two massive mountain ranges in central China, they managed to prolong their rebellion and fought some successful battles against their suppressors. Superior in manpower, weaponry, and logistical support, the government forces had to adapt to guerrilla warfare, albeit passively and ineptly. This article gives a brief introduction to this little-known episode of guerrilla war at the turn of the nineteenth century in Qing China, expounds the strengths and weaknesses of both sides, and sheds light on the roots of the war’s long duration and the grim consequences to the Qing state. 相似文献
52.
Thomas I. Parks 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):185-202
While separatist-related conflict has re-emerged in southern Thailand, there is one predominantly Muslim border province that has remained outside of the conflict. Satun province has been conspicuously unaffected by the Malay-Muslim separatist movement, despite its shared history and ethnic origins with the conflict-affected provinces. In contrast to Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, the process of state penetration in Satun was gradual and comparatively less coercive, leading to relative stability and encouraging political and economic integration. This comparative study analyzes the history of cooperative state–minority relations and political stability in Satun province, and draws important lessons directly applicable to the unrest in neighbouring provinces. 相似文献
53.
Marc Widdowson 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3-4):478-506
The Christian resistance to the Arab invasion of Spain in 711 tends to be glossed over as a sideshow in what is usually presented as the inexorable progress of the conquest. This reflects the bias of our meagre sources, which mostly take the Arab perspective. Nevertheless, with close consideration and careful handling of these sources, we can draw from them an impression of a persistent insurgency that presented a real problem to the Islamic authorities and induced them to take both political and military countermeasures. This paper suggests how the resistance formed, its organization and tactics, and why the Arabs were unable to suppress it. 相似文献
54.
Robert J. Bunker 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):114-121
During the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), France chose to support Biafra, but only on a limited scale, providing mercenaries and obsolete weaponry to Ojukwu's regime. General Charles de Gaulle's assistance to Ojukwu was conditioned by the French military drawdown after 1961, the increased power of French secret services on the continent, and the interventions in Katanga (1960–1963), Gabon (1964) and Chad (1968–1972). France supported Biafra primarily to protect its former colonies from Nigeria, stop Soviet subversion and acquire an economic foothold in the oil-rich Niger Delta. De Gaulle chose a limited strategy for two reasons. If Biafra won the war, France would be Biafra's greatest ally. If Nigeria won the war, France could extricate itself from the situation relatively easily and re-establish relations with the Nigerian government, which is what ultimately occurred. 相似文献
55.
Spencer D. Bakich 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(4):688-711
Under what conditions can leaders achieve wartime political–military integration? In the Vietnam War, political–military integration exhibited dramatic variation: in the air war, the US was able to tightly integrate its political objectives and military conduct, but in the ground war, the American military prosecuted a strategy that was both divorced from broader political objectives and was immune from Washington's influence. I argue that the nature of information management between the military and civilian leadership explains the pattern of political–military integration in the Vietnam War more completely than do explanations that focus on the organizational cultures of professional militaries. 相似文献
56.
John A. Nagl 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):377-382
Etzioni both exaggerates and minimizes the influence of my book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife on different components of US military doctrine, mischaracterizes my treatment of the Malayan Emergency, and unfairly denigrates the successes of counterinsurgency in Iraq from 2007 to 2011 while misattributing the reasons for its failures in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 相似文献
57.
Saira Basit 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5-6):1040-1064
ABSTRACTSectarian militants have for years launched attacks from Pakistan across the border to Iran. Finding sanctuary in a neighbouring country can make the difference between success and failure for militants. Conventional wisdom holds that a lasting transnational militancy challenge would typically create serious interstate conflict. Militancy has triggered armed encounters between Iran and Pakistan. This article argues that despite some tension militancy has resulted in deeper cooperation in the ambivalent dyad. Both states’ overarching security concerns, having exhausted other options, the believed involvement of third-party states, and economic potential, have moderately alleviated negative pressure caused by militancy. 相似文献
58.
Jun Ando 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(7):794-808
AbstractThis study estimates a three-sector Feder–Ram model using US annual data for 1965–2014 to confirm the externality of defense expenditure in the United States. Although the model is often used in the literature to scrutinize whether this effect exists, a flaw intrinsic to this model is the appearance of multicollinearity. In this study, I introduced novel techniques, namely: the standardization and estimation of a simple slope, to estimate the model. The results are as follows. First, I prove that the multicollinearity problem can be resolved by standardization. Second, externality, which is judged to conventionally exist, is not found. Third, increases in defense expenditure bring about positive but limited economic growth when the ratio of private to defense expenditure in the previous year ranges from 5.09 to 6.82%. By re-estimating the model, this study contributes to developing the Feder–Ram model within the related literature. 相似文献
59.
Edward G. Keating Irv Blickstein Michael Boito Jess Chandler Deborah Peetz 《Defence and Peace Economics》2014,25(3):271-280
Building on prior work on optimal replacement of aging aircraft, this paper presents three methodologies to evaluate prospective aviation Service Life Extension Programs (SLEPs) and applies these methodologies to US Navy F/A-18E/F data. While considerable uncertainty remains as to the values of key parameters (e.g. the cost of F/A-18E/F SLEPs), the preponderance of the evidence available at this juncture favors undertaking SLEPs on F/A-18E/Fs rather than replacing them with new Joint Strike Fighters. 相似文献
60.
Amitai Etzioni 《Defense & Security Analysis》2014,30(4):304-310
A combination of threat analysis and “subterranean forces” (such as proclivities to fight conventional wars as compared to asymmetric ones) leads the USA to prefer focusing on the threats from China rather than those emanating from the Middle East. 相似文献