Making long-range planning work: the case of the US Army's 30-year strategic modernization plan

The extensive timespan of evolving assumptions about future adversaries, US military engagements, and technology inherent in the US Army's 30-year modernization strategy can overwhelm the management capacity of planners, and misdirect acquisition investments. Some military scholars have argued that long-range planning is futile due to the complexities of the global security environment. So how can the US Army manage the evolving assumptions inherent in its 30-year modernization strategy to ensure it remains a superior global force? This study will answer the above question by arguing that the US Army's 30-year modernization strategy, while emulative of a similar modernization approach in the threat-based planning environment of the Cold War, is viable if supported by a method and a tool that manage investments and planning assumptions.     

Planning for the next Takur Ghar

The USA is currently facing an increasingly diverse range of threats, including non-state actors, particularly violent extremist organizations attempting to do harm. The national leadership has made it clear that for the near future it will employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the tool of choice in short-duration, high-intensity operations that have more in common with the battle of Takur Ghar, than those with a larger footprint. It is critical then that the lessons of the past are learnt now and are applied before employing SOF in the future. This becomes especially important given the short lead-time in concert with the short-duration/high-intensity tempo of their operations. In the Battle of Takur Ghar, during Operation Anaconda, rigid adherence to the joint functions, especially clearer and more robust Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda would have yielded a better operational outcome and saved lives. With the benefit of hindsight, many things could have been done differently, but several key issues stand out. The C2 structure must include all components from the outset to synchronize effects and rapidly re-task ISR. There must be multiple communications redundancies and adequate bandwidth. Finally, all SOF, conventional and interagency capabilities must be synchronized under one task force commander with a sufficiently robust C2 infrastructure to direct the entire effort. As our nation calls on SOF at an ever-increasing rate, we must take those lessons learned and apply them to future operations.     

Why Boko Haram should be on the European Union list of designated terror groups

In the course of the last few years, the Islamic sect Boko Haram has become of great interest to academics, researchers and analysts. At the same time, experts, especially at the European Union (EU) level, have been reluctant to include Boko Haram in the EU list of terrorist organisations, despite the fact that this group has clearly demonstrated its transformation into a terrorist organisation. Security challenges and threats are, by definition, subject to change, and it is the task of security institutions to create policies to address these challenges and threats. Terrorism cannot be addressed in isolation, and policymakers are confronted at all levels with the difficult task of making sense of this evolution. By assessing the current security situation in Nigeria, this commentary tries to ascertain the potential repercussions to regional stability from the Boko Haram phenomenon. Insurgencies have often been initiated from and supported by neighbouring countries and have expanded conflicts across borders. Countering Boko Haram will require various institutions to conduct similar and concurrent counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist operations. At the global level, such co-ordination has often proven difficult. The EU has to keep the pace in this case.     

基于PEPA的防空通信系统抗毁特性分析

通信系统的抗毁性能是分析作战系统能力的一项重要指标。本文分析了防空通信系统的组织结构和对抗特点,利用性能评价过程代数（PEPA）描述了防空通信系统的状态演化,提出了基于PEPA的防空通信系统抗毁特性分析方法。通过具体案例,对通信系统的组织结构、抗击软硬杀伤的能力进行建模和仿真验证。实验结果表明,PEPA方法适用于防空通信系统的建模与分析,能够实现对防空通信系统的结构进行对抗过程的建模;通信系统的不同要素对抗毁性能的影响不同,可以采取有效策略以提高防空通信系统的抗毁能力。     

美国海军正在发展的水下探测系统

本文介绍了目前美国海军正在发展的几种水下探测系统。主要包括：先进可展开系统（ADS）,商用现成技术固定式分布系统（FDS-C）,商用声学流行技术快速嵌入计划（A-RCI）,潜艇拖曳阵系统（TB-29A）和无人水下航行器(UUV)。     

“Flectas non frangas”: revisiting early twenty-first century UK–US defense relations (2000–2005) after five years

Adopting the analytical framework of the established interpretive “schools” of Anglo-American relations, this article offers several reflections on UK–US defense relations as they occurred over the significant years of 2000–2005. During those years, trajectories were established on which UK–US defense relations continue to travel today and outcomes emerged which are still being navigated. This article concludes that the Latin phrase, “Flectas Non Frangas” (essentially translated as: “Bend not Break”), is the most appropriate to adopt to characterize the developments undergone in recent UK–US defense relations. Many historical and strategic lessons with contemporary relevance are drawn.     

状态数计算的卫星控制系统健康状态评估

健康评估是卫星在轨安全健康工作的关键技术之一.针对卫星控制系统的健康状态评估问题,首先分析了卫星控制系统的内部结构特征,将控制系统按其结构分层并提出了基于层次推理地健康状态评估方法,然后通过分析系统特有的工作关系确定了各级系统状态数的计算方法,最后以某型气象卫星的一种控制模式为例计算了从部件到整系统的各级别状态数.计算以及仿真的结果显示该方法能够利用状态数合理地表示控制系统的健康状态.     

India’s Taliban Dilemma: To Contain or to Engage?

India’s Afghanistan policy in the 1990s is termed a zero-sum game of influence with Pakistan. New Delhi’s aversion to the pro-Pakistan Taliban regime is considered a marker of this rivalry. This paper revisits India’s approach towards Afghanistan and examines if New Delhi was necessarily averse to engaging with pro-Pakistan political factions during 1990s. Based on fresh primary interviews with former Indian policymakers, media archives, and official reports, the paper shows that India engaged with and accommodated pro-Pakistan factions after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 until 1996. The Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul in September 1996 challenged India’s engage-with-all approach. Nonetheless, the decision to sever ties with the Taliban and to bolster anti-Taliban factions was highly debated in New Delhi. Many in India saw the Taliban as a militant Islamist force sponsored by Pakistan. For others, however, it was an ethno-nationalist movement representing Pashtun interests, and not necessarily under Islamabad’s control.     

北斗卫星导航系统商业化发展策略

为应对海军在全球公域投送力量时面临的严重"反介入/区域拒止"(anti-access/areal denial,A2/AD)挑战,美国海军利用电磁作战方面的技术优势,率先提出并重点发展了"电磁机动战"。虽然该理论还处于进一步完善当中,但随着研究和实施的深入,将有助于提高美国海军在电磁领域的作战优势。     

论美军“作战云”理论的制胜机理

美军"作战云"理论的制胜机理是以云计算技术作为物质基础和技术依托,以"云部署、云聚合、云攻击(防御)、云消散"体现作战过程,以"集中指挥、分布式控制和分散执行"为基本指控方式,以"跨域协同"作为作战协同的基本方式。由于该理论实现了战场信息的有效融合和共享,作战力量的动态聚能和释能,作战任务的临时赋予和即时完成以及不同领域作战能力的互补增效,因此将促使美军的武器装备、力量结构、作战方式及战场形态等发生新的重大变化。