How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his ‘Maritime Strategy’ studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of ‘External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ of 1968 – finally followed by the ‘Brosio Study’ (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's ‘tactical northern flank’ was set to become an independent strategic theatre.     

Holding the Bridge in Troubled Times: The Cold War and the Navies of Europe

European navies made a fundamental contribution to the Cold War at sea, ensuring the effectiveness of deterrence even as Soviet naval forces grew to ominous proportions. European fleets were tasked with containing a Soviet attack until US forces could arrive on the scene. Many European navies pursued essential niche capabilities tailored for their own unique maritime environments. Others made important contributions to broader NATO efforts in the high-stakes arenas of sea control, power projection and even nuclear deterrence. Contentious issues did arise, for example concerning burden-sharing, but true to its name, the alliance succeeded collectively in wielding formidable sea power. This paper is based on the premise that the maritime players in the Cold War at sea were by no means restricted to the US and Soviet navies. The navies of Western Europe and Canada had major roles to play as well within the NATO area. They contributed a great deal to the political cohesion crucial to an essentially maritime alliance, and in many cases had a real operational contribution to make as well. What follows, then, is the Cold War at sea from a European point of view.     

The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement

As a consequence of the rapid growth of Soviet maritime power during the 1960s, hazardous incidents at sea and in the air became a regular part of the Cold War. Eventually, both Washington and Moscow came to recognize the importance of an agreement limiting this perilous set of interactions, resulting in the Incidents at Sea Agreement that was signed in May 1972. The set of rules and procedures agreed upon helped to calm tensions in subsequent crises and provides ample lessons for placing reasonable limits on other tense maritime rivalries.     

Bedeviled by a Paradox: Nitze,Bundy, and an Incipient Nuclear Norm

ABSTRACT

This article explores how two influential American policy makers—Paul Nitze and McGeorge Bundy—wrestled with the idea of a norm against the use of nuclear weapons. Existing scholarship has overlooked how both Bundy and Nitze came to understand the idea of nuclear non-use, especially related to the credibility of threats to use nuclear weapons. Using documentary evidence from their personal papers, this article illuminates the thinking of Bundy and Nitze, finding that both engaged with the idea of a norm of non-use of nuclear weapons in their strategic writing and thought.     

Allies with Benefits: US Effect on European Demand for Military Expenditures

This paper examines the security relationship between the US and Europe, focusing on potential spillin effects of US military expenditures on European demand for military expenditures during the early twenty-first century. The goal is to test whether or not European states view US expenditures as a complement or as a substitute to their own military expenditures. Past work in this area has found mixed results concerning the effect of US military expenditures, but focus strictly on the spillins within a formal alliance, specifically NATO, and use a time series dominated by Cold War dynamics. This study differentiates itself by accounting for both US total military expenditures and its regional expenditures through incorporation of US military base and personnel deployments across Europe. Additionally, this paper uses government revenue in its estimation to mitigate potential endogeneity. Findings using Arellano–Bond dynamic panel analysis suggest that there is a strong probability of substitution among European states.     

Making long-range planning work: the case of the US Army's 30-year strategic modernization plan

The extensive timespan of evolving assumptions about future adversaries, US military engagements, and technology inherent in the US Army's 30-year modernization strategy can overwhelm the management capacity of planners, and misdirect acquisition investments. Some military scholars have argued that long-range planning is futile due to the complexities of the global security environment. So how can the US Army manage the evolving assumptions inherent in its 30-year modernization strategy to ensure it remains a superior global force? This study will answer the above question by arguing that the US Army's 30-year modernization strategy, while emulative of a similar modernization approach in the threat-based planning environment of the Cold War, is viable if supported by a method and a tool that manage investments and planning assumptions.     

Planning for the next Takur Ghar

The USA is currently facing an increasingly diverse range of threats, including non-state actors, particularly violent extremist organizations attempting to do harm. The national leadership has made it clear that for the near future it will employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the tool of choice in short-duration, high-intensity operations that have more in common with the battle of Takur Ghar, than those with a larger footprint. It is critical then that the lessons of the past are learnt now and are applied before employing SOF in the future. This becomes especially important given the short lead-time in concert with the short-duration/high-intensity tempo of their operations. In the Battle of Takur Ghar, during Operation Anaconda, rigid adherence to the joint functions, especially clearer and more robust Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda would have yielded a better operational outcome and saved lives. With the benefit of hindsight, many things could have been done differently, but several key issues stand out. The C2 structure must include all components from the outset to synchronize effects and rapidly re-task ISR. There must be multiple communications redundancies and adequate bandwidth. Finally, all SOF, conventional and interagency capabilities must be synchronized under one task force commander with a sufficiently robust C2 infrastructure to direct the entire effort. As our nation calls on SOF at an ever-increasing rate, we must take those lessons learned and apply them to future operations.     

美国海军正在发展的水下探测系统

本文介绍了目前美国海军正在发展的几种水下探测系统。主要包括：先进可展开系统（ADS）,商用现成技术固定式分布系统（FDS-C）,商用声学流行技术快速嵌入计划（A-RCI）,潜艇拖曳阵系统（TB-29A）和无人水下航行器(UUV)。     

美国海军21世纪战略概念分析（连载一）

本文介绍名为“21世纪海上力量”的美国海军21世纪战略概念,阐述其各要素的内涵、现状和未来,并对“21世纪海上力量”做一些粗浅的分析。