全文获取类型
| 收费全文 | 386篇 |
| 免费 | 4篇 |
| 国内免费 | 5篇 |
专业分类
| 395篇 |
出版年
| 2025年 | 1篇 |
| 2023年 | 4篇 |
| 2021年 | 16篇 |
| 2020年 | 18篇 |
| 2019年 | 34篇 |
| 2018年 | 15篇 |
| 2017年 | 25篇 |
| 2016年 | 30篇 |
| 2015年 | 10篇 |
| 2014年 | 32篇 |
| 2013年 | 58篇 |
| 2012年 | 16篇 |
| 2011年 | 10篇 |
| 2010年 | 10篇 |
| 2009年 | 13篇 |
| 2008年 | 13篇 |
| 2007年 | 18篇 |
| 2006年 | 15篇 |
| 2005年 | 20篇 |
| 2004年 | 16篇 |
| 2003年 | 5篇 |
| 2002年 | 1篇 |
| 2001年 | 3篇 |
| 2000年 | 1篇 |
| 1999年 | 3篇 |
| 1998年 | 3篇 |
| 1997年 | 1篇 |
| 1995年 | 1篇 |
| 1994年 | 1篇 |
| 1992年 | 1篇 |
| 1991年 | 1篇 |
排序方式： 共有395条查询结果，搜索用时 15 毫秒
101.
Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(7):871-885
AbstractThis paper examines the nexus between the Japanese strategy and economic–industrial mobilization during the period 1937–1945. From 1937 to December 1941, the country was engaged in a land war of attrition in China. This war requested an immense amount of resources and was associated with armaments procurement strategy with emphasis in the army. However, the Japanese strategic vision assumed that the state was strong enough to engage in one land war against China and in a naval war in the Pacific simultaneously. The basis of Japanese strategy was a utopia. Making things worse, the naval war in the Pacific was conducted against the most industrialized powers in the world [the US and the British Empire (Britain, Australia, India, etc.)]. Finally, the internal Japanese industrial mobilization was associated with immense errors in armaments production (absence of economies of scale and scope, limited raw materials, etc.). Under these circumstances, the defeat was an expected outcome. 相似文献
102.
运用潜艇和远程导弹联合作战形成的信息与火力联合打击优势来开发突袭航母战斗群的战法是联合作战研究中尚未解决的关键问题之一,根据信息作战、网络中心战和海上游击战原理,分别利用潜艇获取目标位置信息优势和远程导弹对目标打击火力优势,通过海上游击战战法,运用在以卫星为平台的网络中心环境中形成的信息与火力联合打击能力,实施对航母战斗群的突袭,对一个典型实例的初步试验及分析结果表明:与潜艇侦察目标能力有关的正确发现目标概率和评估远程导弹打击目标效果概率以及与远程导弹打击能力有关的命中目标概率对信息与火力联合打击能力的影响分别为20.79%、22.57%和20.20%%,是成功突袭航母战斗群的最重要的因素,而网络中心联合潜艇与远程导弹突袭航母则是充分发挥潜艇和远程导弹综合优势的科学战法。 相似文献
103.
104.
在明确了\"工程化\"内涵的基础上,研究了美军依托联合能力集成与开发系统(Joint Capabilities Integrationand Development System,JCIDS)建立的与装备需求生成紧密相关的军队联合能力需求生成机制。指出该机制具有典型的工程化特征和很高的工程化程度,集中体现在程序、任务、方法、成果、描述和管理6个方面。逐一阐述了各个方面中蕴含的工程化思想和方法,对建立符合我军特点的装备需求工程学科有一定参考价值。 相似文献
105.
《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2012,23(4-5):627-647
In recent years two theories have emerged in academia with regards to ‘small wars’: A ‘German way of war’ and a ‘British way of war’. The first one believes in a specific German military culture until 1945 accepting mass violence against civilians to quell any form of civil unrest. The second theory stresses a moderate British approach during the twentieth century; in defeating insurgencies the British Army had applied ‘minimum force’. This article challenges both views by looking into two largely forgotten counter-insurgency campaigns by the end of the First World War: The Germans in the Ukraine in 1918 and the British in Mesopotamia in 1920. It will be argued that one cannot speak in general terms about a ruthless German and a moderate British approach during this period – in fact it was quite the contrary in some ways. 相似文献
106.
《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2012,23(4-5):781-798
The article aims to offer a survey of the historiographical analysis of British counter-insurgency practices and campaigns since the publication of Armed Forces and Modern Counter-insurgency, edited by the author and the late John Pimlott in 1985. It is argued that the volume in question was influential at a time when there was little academic interest in counter-insurgency in Britain. Moreover, the subject generally had been little studied in Britain in the past beyond work by a handful of military writers and theorists. Arguably, the analytical framework followed in Armed Forces and Modern Counter-insurgency holds its value even after over a quarter of a century. Since the 1980s, however, it has become apparent that the subject is of increasing academic interest, not least in terms of the ongoing debate on the nature and application of the concept of ‘minimum force’ in British campaigns. 相似文献
107.
Ian F. W. Beckett 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2019,30(4-5):994-1019
ABSTRACT What Rudyard Kipling called the ‘campaign of lost footsteps’ was the longest campaign fought by the Victorian army. The conquest of Upper Burma, an area of 140,000 sq. miles with a population of four million, took only three weeks in November 1885 and was accomplished with minimum cost. However, the removal and deportation of the Burmese King and dismantling of all traditional authority dismantled led to growing resistance to British rule leading to an increasingly difficult guerrilla war. Though the Burmese guerrillas were characterised by the British as mere bandits or dacoits, many were former soldiers along with Buddhist monks. The extremely difficult nature of campaigning in the terrain and climate of Burma was not sufficiently appreciated by the War Office, who viewed the conflict as a ‘subaltern’s war’ and ‘police’ work. Intended regime change was also not accompanied by any consideration of the likely implications. Prolonged insurgency necessitated deploying a force far larger than originally intended; though order was finally secured by 1895, the campaign proved destructive of Burmese society while British recruitment of hill tribes into the police and armed forces sowed the seeds for future divisions. 相似文献
108.
Sandor Fabian 《Defense & Security Analysis》2019,35(3):308-325
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its initial actions in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the term hybrid warfare has received much public attention. Many have argued that the Russian actions we saw in Ukraine were part of a completely new strategy while others have suggested that there was nothing new in Russia’s actions. This article takes a critical look at these claims. Through the assessment of the history of the term hybrid warfare and a rigorous analysis of the so-called Gerasimov doctrine, this study finds that the Russian hybrid warfare strategy is rather a western myth than a formal comprehensive Russian strategic concept. Additionally, through the assessment of the Russian use of information operations and the way she has utilised the cyberspace in several recent conflicts, the study finds that against all claims Russia did not make these areas its main battlefield, but rather has been using them in support of its traditional concepts. 相似文献
109.
Michael S. Curl 《Arms and Armour》2019,16(1):27-55
Despite the lance’s status and the amount of attention the couched lance has received in historiography, study of its martial art has been neglected. The various lance types and techniques used by western European cavalry have only recently begun to receive scholarly attention. Additionally, Medieval European lance use has too often been studied in isolation, without an adequate understanding of the idiosyncratic and asymmetrical dynamics of mounted combat. Although the charge with the couched lance was a valid tactic, it was only one of many. Light and heavy lances were used in one hand or two to trip, block, unhorse, and wrestle. These techniques were governed by the harsh laws of distance, speed, impact, iron, and asymmetry. By utilizing the surviving Fechtbücher and several Peninsular and Near Eastern sources, a brief foray into the diverse techniques of lance use and their purposes has been attempted here. 相似文献
110.