电子战训练仿真系统开发方法研究

为了提高电子战训练仿真系统开发的效率和质量,参照建模与仿真领域和软件工程领域中的模型开发与运行过程模型,提出了一个基本开发过程,将基于高层体系结构HLA电子战训练仿真系统的开发划分为相互关联的9个阶段,规定了每个阶段的开发活动。展示了联邦成员软件自动生成工具KD-FedWizard在基于HLA电子战训练仿真系统分析、设计和实现中的应用。     

基于异构多联邦的舰潜联合仿真系统研究

在已有的水面舰艇和潜艇装备应用研究系统的基础上,通过整合仿真资源、统一仿真标准构建舰潜联合仿真实验系统。探讨了联合仿真实验系统的主要功能及框架结构;阐述了开发联合仿真实验系统所面临的关键问题及其解决办法。最后实现了水面舰艇和潜艇装备应用联合仿真实验系统,并采用一个典型的编队防潜作战想定验证了系统的优越性,为未来海军多兵种联合作战仿真实验奠定了坚实的基础。     

面向任务的战术行动自主协同关系模型

在信息化战争的大背景下,战术行动中团队协同作战一直是研究的重点问题,而如何建立自主协同关系是团队协同研究的一个难点问题。在分析已有团队协同理论和框架的基础上,提出一种面向任务的战术行动自主协同关系模型建立方法。该模型首先根据当前战场态势和上级任务发布自主协同任务集合,各作战单元根据战场态势和自主决策自愿参与自主协同任务,其次利用作战单元与自主协同任务间的相互关系实现对关键角色的判断。如果关键协同成员参与自主协同任务则自主协同关系建立成功,反之,建立失败。     

Making long-range planning work: the case of the US Army's 30-year strategic modernization plan

The extensive timespan of evolving assumptions about future adversaries, US military engagements, and technology inherent in the US Army's 30-year modernization strategy can overwhelm the management capacity of planners, and misdirect acquisition investments. Some military scholars have argued that long-range planning is futile due to the complexities of the global security environment. So how can the US Army manage the evolving assumptions inherent in its 30-year modernization strategy to ensure it remains a superior global force? This study will answer the above question by arguing that the US Army's 30-year modernization strategy, while emulative of a similar modernization approach in the threat-based planning environment of the Cold War, is viable if supported by a method and a tool that manage investments and planning assumptions.     

Planning for the next Takur Ghar

The USA is currently facing an increasingly diverse range of threats, including non-state actors, particularly violent extremist organizations attempting to do harm. The national leadership has made it clear that for the near future it will employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the tool of choice in short-duration, high-intensity operations that have more in common with the battle of Takur Ghar, than those with a larger footprint. It is critical then that the lessons of the past are learnt now and are applied before employing SOF in the future. This becomes especially important given the short lead-time in concert with the short-duration/high-intensity tempo of their operations. In the Battle of Takur Ghar, during Operation Anaconda, rigid adherence to the joint functions, especially clearer and more robust Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda would have yielded a better operational outcome and saved lives. With the benefit of hindsight, many things could have been done differently, but several key issues stand out. The C2 structure must include all components from the outset to synchronize effects and rapidly re-task ISR. There must be multiple communications redundancies and adequate bandwidth. Finally, all SOF, conventional and interagency capabilities must be synchronized under one task force commander with a sufficiently robust C2 infrastructure to direct the entire effort. As our nation calls on SOF at an ever-increasing rate, we must take those lessons learned and apply them to future operations.     

“算法战争”的概念、特点与影响

分析了"算法战争"的概念,考察了美军围绕筹划"算法战争"所展开的相关举措,讨论了"算法战争"的潜在影响,并指出了其局限性所在。建议跟踪研判"算法战争"的未来演变趋势,依托军民融合加强算法储备,重视反制措施的研究和伦理探讨。     

作战实验在"网络中心战"研究中的运用

本文对美军运用作战实验研究"网络中心战"的方法进行了归纳和分析.     

Counterinsurgency or irregular warfare? Historiography and the study of ‘small wars’

This article argues that the history of irregular warfare provides a valuable analytical and critical perspective for the study of counterinsurgency campaigns and counterinsurgency doctrine. A focus on the history of irregular warfare highlights the close relationship between warfare in Europe and in the colonies. Moreover, it enables us to identify more exactly the intersection of multiple factors that lead to an escalation of violence in small wars. Finally, it also sheds light on the lack of strategic reflection on the use of irregular auxiliaries that is characteristic for many counterinsurgency campaigns.     

The German wars of liberation 1807–1815: The restrained insurgency

In the Age of Napoleon, ‘small wars’ and ‘revolutionary war’ were closely connected. There were, however, different strands of this phenomenon: speaking professionally, conservative officers condemned small wars as an irregular regression to previous less disciplined forms of warfare. The Prussian state continually tried to discipline and regulate spontaneous risings. Yet the irregular character of small wars offered the opportunities for a less complex way of fighting, thus enabling the arming of the ‘people’ to fight. Individual undertakings, such as Ferdinand von Schill's doomed campaign in 1809, were designed to spark off a general popular uprising. But they were cheered by many and supported by few. Meanwhile, Neidhardt von Gneisenau conceived guerrilla-style Landsturm home-defence forces, which were designed for an irregular people's war. These concepts were put into practice in the ‘war of freedom’ – or ‘war of liberation’ – in 1813. Eventually both the mobilisation and the tactics remained regular, however, despite the emphatic appeal to a national ‘people's war’.     

现代反恐怖作战反游击战理论初探

世纪之交 ,美俄等军队进行的几场反恐怖战争 ,其对手在处于劣势时 ,通常以游击战术与之对抗。因此 ,美俄军队在反恐怖作战中 ,也运用反游击战手段反制恐怖武装 ,其高技术条件下的反游击战战略战术对取得战争胜利起到了至关重要的作用。